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Preface
ONE of the most important problems confronting developing
countries is how to promote national integration—how to bind
together the various regions and diverse peoples of a country
into a well-functioning and interdependent whole. Cohesive
forces are essential not only to ensure the continued existence
of the nation-state as one political entity and give political sta-
bility, but also to enable economic development to take place.
For without some measure of integration, both human and
material resources that are needed to raise living standards
must be diverted instead toward coping with the centrifugal
forces of regional disaffection or rebellion.
National integration is particularly important in Indonesia
because of its great size and the enormous diversity of its
peoples. Indonesia stretches almost 5,000 kilometers from west
to east and consists of about 6,000 inhabited islands. Its popu-
lation of over 175 million (the fifth largest in the world) is very
unevenly distributed, with almost two-thirds of the people living
on the less than 7 percent of the land area that makes up the
island of Java. In addition, the levels of economic development
and participation in the life of the nation vary considerably in
the different regions.
This study analyzes the four basic dimensions of national in-
tegration in Indonesia, the historical, sociocultural, interaction
(transportation and communications), and economic, as they
manifest themselves in the country’s twenty-seven provinces.
Each dimension incorporates a large variety of specific charac-
teristics, the most important of which are analyzed separately
in terms of their value in promoting the integration of the
provinces into the nation-state. The spatial patterns of the
various characteristics in each dimension are then examined
through statistical analysis and the extent to which these rein-
force one another is considered. This part of the study is based
xi
on the 1980 census and other recent materials that provide data
at the provincial level. Finally, government policies that relate
to national integration are examined and evaluated and the
problems that continue to confront the country as it attempts to
increase both national cohesion and economic development are
discussed.
This book was inspired by my undergraduate work at Oxford
and graduate work at Rutgers, and by the opportunity to spend
five years in the early 1970s living and working in the “pe-
ripheral” Indonesian province of North Sulawesi. During those
five years I traveled in almost half of Indonesia’s provinces and
experienced first hand many of the challenges facing the nation-
state. The contrast between Java and the Outer Islands was very
striking in terms of infrastructure, accessibility, and the avail-
ability of commodities. Yet the plight of ordinary peasants every-
where seemed remarkably similar as they struggled to survive,
to provide for their families, and to improve their standard of
living. A return visit in 1985 revealed the considerable progress
that had been made in many aspects of development and na-
tional integration, thanks to the increased oil revenues gen-
erated during the 1973–1983 petroleum decade. However, life
for the ordinary Indonesian remains hard: the currency has
been devalued several times, and wages for most workers
remain below $1 per day. Resistance to integration, though
muted, continues in Irian Java and East Timor. But overall, the
country has made remarkable strides in attaining greater co-
hesion and is probably more fully integrated now than at any
time in its history. Significant improvements have been made in
all the major dimensions of integration. These are discussed in
detail in the book.
The spatial patterns of the characteristics of each dimension
of national integration, calculated on a per-capita or per-unit-
area basis for each province, are illustrated in a number of
maps. On each map the provinces have been divided into five
categories by ranking their data on the characteristic under
consideration and using the natural breaks in the data to de-
lineate the categories. Technically, Jakarta, Aceh, and Yo-
gyakarta are not provinces, although they are considered as
such in this book. Jakarta is officially known as Daerah Khusus
Istimewa (D.K.I. Jakarta: the Very Special Region of Jakarta),
and Aceh and Yogyakarta are Daerah Istimewa (D.I. Aceh and
D.I. Yogyakarta: Special Regions of Aceh and Yogyakarta).
However, for convenience these special designations have been
omitted in the text and tables.
Preface
xii
Places are described using their official names at the period
of history being discussed. The island known in Dutch colonial
times as Celebes is referred to in the post-independence period
by its authentic and official name, Sulawesi. The term Borneo is
used to refer to the whole island, with the Indonesian part being
referred to by its older, now official name, Kalimantan. The part
of western New Guinea that is an official province of the Re-
public of Indonesia, known in the past as West Irian or Irian
Barat, had its name changed officially in 1972 to Irian Jaya.
The Spice Islands are known both by their Indonesian name,
Maluku, and by their English equivalent, the Moluccas. Finally,
the islands commonly known in English as the Lesser Sunda Is-
lands are referred to by their Indonesian name, Nusatenggara.
The names of provinces have been capitalized, for example West
Java and North Sumatra, to distinguish them from the geo-
graphical areas of western Java and northern Sumatra, which
are not coterminous.
For the sake of consistency, all Indonesian terms (including
place names) are written in their modern forms, with spelling
changed to correspond to the new spelling (ejaan baru) an-
nounced by President Suharto in 1972. Thus:
dj becomes j (as in Djakarta, now officially Jakarta);
j becomes y (wajang is now officially wayang);
tj becomes c (Pantja Sila is now officially Panca Sila, with the
c pronounced as in the English ch);
c becomes k (Macassar is now officially Makassar);
sj becomes sy (Sjariat is now officially Syariat, with the sy
pronounced as in the English sh).
Similarly, the old Dutch spelling, oe, as in Soekarno, was
changed officially in 1947 to the modern form, u (pronounced
oo), as in Sukarno (although traditional spelling is still widely
used in proper names).
Preface
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Introduction
WHAT is it that holds a nation-state together? Why do some
countries suffer from internal conflicts that lead to regional
rebellions, civil war, or even the permanent breakup of the
state? Conversely, why do other countries remain united, able to
contain and benefit from diversity, with strong integrative links?
What are the critical elements that bind the disparate parts of a
country together and nurture a common sense of unity? 1
As with so many issues, it is easier to ask questions than to
supply answers. Yet an analysis of states that have split up, such
as Pakistan, the British West Indies, the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, and French West and Equatorial Africa, and an
examination of countries that have undergone civil war, such as
Nigeria, Chad, Lebanon, and the Republic of the Sudan, suggest
that certain elements are crucial to maintaining the unity of a
nation-state. Essential elements exist in the historical and po-
litical, sociocultural, interaction (transportation and communi-
cations), and economic dimensions, all of which will be explored
in detail in this book.
Almost all countries are deeply concerned about national in-
tegration—the need to bind together the various regions and
diverse peoples of a country into a functioning and interde-
pendent whole. But integration is especially important in the
Third World, where national boundaries were superimposed by
the colonial powers without considering the wishes of the inhab-
itants, and where there has been insufficient time and oppor-
tunity for countries to break down the geographical and cultural
barriers dividing different ethnic groups within the country.
The problems are especially great in large developing coun-
tries, where greater diversity and greater distances accentuate
the problem of achieving national unity. Such is the situation
1
in Indonesia, a physically fragmented country extending more
than 5,000 kilometers from west to east and containing extraor-
dinary geographical and cultural diversity.
Cohesive forces are vital both to ensure the continued exis-
tence of the nation-state as one political entity and give political
stability, and to enable economic development to take place.
For without some measure of integration, both human and ma-
terial resources that are needed to raise living standards must
be diverted instead toward coping with the centrifugal forces
of regional disaffection or rebellion. The success of a country’s
economic development also depends to a considerable extent
on the strength of its integrative, cohesive bonds, so that the
almost inevitably uneven spatial impact of development does
not unduly exacerbate regional differences and tensions and
lead to disintegration. An understanding of the spatial patterns
of national integration is therefore essential in economic devel-
opment planning.
National integration is a multidimensional, complex, and dy-
namic concept, involving a great variety of interlocking ele-
ments that operate separately to some extent but yet are also
interacting, cumulative, and generally mutually reinforcing.
Indeed, integration is a holistic concept in which the totality of
the separate aspects is greater than the sum of the different
parts.
National integration incorporates a number of different di-
mensions. Four stand out as particularly important. First,
common, integrative, historical experiences obviously act as a
cohesive force. These range from shared suffering to common
achievements and include a great variety of historical and po-
litical experiences, both major and minor, that have become
part of the common heritage of a country.
Second, shared sociocultural attributes can help give a
nation-state its identity, distinguish it from surrounding states,
and enable its citizens to feel a sense of unity. Shared charac-
teristics that enhance a feeling of nationhood include a common
language, common cultural features associated with religious
practice as well as other cultural elements, and opportunities
to belong to nationwide organizations and share in common na-
tionwide activities.
Third, interaction among the diverse peoples within a
nation-state promotes integration, especially among those who
share various sociocultural attributes. Thus, all kinds of
Introduction
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movement and communication among provinces are important,
including land, sea, and air transportation links, radio, tele-
vision, and telephone communications, migration, and trade.
Fourth, regional economic interdependence and some
measure of regional balance in economic development are fun-
damental to national integration. A perception that standards of
living are improving and that there is some measure of equity in
the location of new industrial growth and development schemes
may be of more importance to national integration than eco-
nomic growth per se. Indeed, geographically unbalanced eco-
nomic development, by which one area of the country or one
group of people is seen to benefit disproportionately, can be de-
cisively disintegrative.
National integration depends upon a fundamental balance
among these four major historical-political, sociocultural, inter-
action, and economic components—a dynamic equilibrium. If
one component is neglected or becomes out of balance, disinte-
grative forces may emerge that can threaten a state’s stability
or even its continued existence.
National integration is also highly complex. Part of the com-
plexity arises from the way that the factors of integration op-
erate at different levels; indeed, increased integration at one
level may result in less cohesion at another. For example, an
integrated network of extended family members with the typ-
ically deep kinship ties, expectations, and obligations found in
Far Eastern cultures contrasts with hostility among major pow-
erful families. Similarly, rural life may be integrative at the local
level, with mutual help groups functioning to strengthen bonds
among neighbors; but these groupings may at the same time ac-
centuate the fact that certain people are excluded. Rural areas
may seem less integrated into the whole than urban areas, es-
pecially when contact among rural communities is minimal; yet
where people are brought into closer proximity and greater
contact with one another in urban surroundings, disintegrative
factors such as ethnic and social differences may be accen-
tuated. Heightened ethnic awareness frequently occurs as dif-
ferent ethnic groups live close together in urban areas, 2 while
contrasts between rich and poor, also brought into sharp relief
in an urban context, can easily trigger dissatisfaction, another
disintegrative force. The political implications of this dissatis-
faction help to explain the greater attention characteristically
given in development plans to urban centers. A disproportionate
amount of investment designed to relieve disruptive, disinte-
grative political pressures, especially in the capital cities of de-
National Integration in Indonesia
3
veloping countries, however, serves to attract greater migration
and, through the process of cumulative causation, to increase
the degree of primacy and the vulnerability of the city and its
government to political pressure. In addition, the gap between
city and countryside is also widened. One of the concerns,
therefore, of developing countries is to increase the degree
of integration between city and countryside, between regional
capitals and their hinterlands, and to improve the integrative
function of a network of urban places. Economic development is
strongly related to the degree of integration at this level. 3
Other sociocultural elements can be integrative at one level
but disintegrative at another. For example, Hinduism acts as
a cohesive force among the Balinese but distinguishes them
clearly from most other Indonesians, who are Muslim. Another
complication is that “paradoxically aspects of integration and
disintegration can both occur at the same time, and may even
be causally related.” 4 The situation of the Chinese in Indonesia
illustrates this point well. Their trading network and close cul-
tural ties throughout the Indonesian archipelago make them
an integrative force in one respect. But their conspicuous cul-
tural differences and economic wealth and power distinguish
them from the rest of Indonesian society. Yet even this disinte-
grative element has an ironic integrative twist, for, by being ob-
viously different, they become a common target for the hostility,
resentment, and frustration of other Indonesian citizens—thus
binding these non-Chinese Indonesians more closely together
than they would otherwise be.
Similarly, other seemingly integrative forces may have para-
doxical effects. For example, increased commonality in one so-
ciocultural element, such as the ability to speak a common
language, may throw into relief other differences such as re-
ligion, way of life, or social status. Even such key commonalities
as religion, language, and culture may vary in importance in
different national contexts. Thus, linguistic differences create a
barrier to national unity in Belgium but not in Switzerland, in
India but not in Tanzania. Religious differences cause few ten-
sions in the United States, but are a potent disintegrative force
in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. Furthermore, sociocultural
features may not necessarily be critical in and of themselves,
but may assume disproportionate importance when they rein-
force other differences such as the actual or perceived distrib-
ution of power or economic disparities.
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Any analysis of national integration, therefore, must be at-
tempted with extreme care. In any given situation, individual
cohesive characteristics have to be considered separately in
terms of their importance, their integrative roles, and their in-
teraction with other elements.
Integration is also a dynamic concept. The subdivisions of
a national entity may change in their level of integration into
the national whole over time. Once integrated does not mean
always integrated, as the Scottish and Welsh nationalist move-
ments within the United Kingdom have clearly demonstrated.
The degree of integration reflects clearly the political lead-
ership and its priorities. For example, the special treatment af-
forded by the Dutch to the Indonesian regency (kabupaten) of
Minahasa in North Sulawesi was not continued by the Javanese-
dominated regime after independence; this led to anti-Javanese
revolts there. Concern for national integration has resulted po-
litically in suppression and increased domination by the central
government and, under Sukarno, in the use of contrived ex-
ternal enemies to stimulate nationalistic emotions and deflect
attention from internal regional tensions. The costs, however,
of these policies have been considerable, in terms both of lost
opportunities for economic development and of the actual costs
in people and materiel. Integration needs careful nurturing to
ensure that constructive, centripetal, integrative forces consis-
tently prevail over destructive, centrifugal, divisive ones.
Yet does integration mean the extension of control by the
central government into all regions and levels of society, the “in-
creasing dominance of the core over the periphery in a spatial
system,” as Friedmann has expressed it? 5 Or is it shared power,
fair representation, and participation by people from every part
of the country in every aspect of the national life and gov-
ernment?
Certainly at the structural level in Indonesia, the central
government has control over the entire area of the state
through the channels and hierarchies of a unified framework.
There are five levels of government, which extend to every
tiny island, paralleled by a five-tier military command structure.
Structurally, the central government has control over the po-
litical life and the educational, health, communications, and
other facilities. Functionally, however, integration depends on
more than just control by the central government and vertical
response to it. It involves the mutual interdependence of re-
gions and regional participation in national affairs. This dis-
tinction is comparable to the difference between national inte-
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gration and nationalism. Nationalism is concerned with evoking
patriotic, nationalistic emotions, feelings that are important in
overcoming local regionalisms and particularisms, and empha-
sizes vertical links to the center. National integration, by con-
trast, is a much broader and more inclusive concept, concerned
with lateral as well as vertical linkages. It focuses on the func-
tioning interaction and mutual interdependence of the diverse
parts of the state, ties that continue largely independently of
the strength of nationalistic emotion. Obviously this is a much
stronger type of relationship than the one nationalism creates
on its own. It is interesting to note that the collapse of the West
Indies Federation has been attributed precisely to the lack of
these lateral linkages among the islands. 6
Many studies on national integration in the past have dealt
with the topic sectorally, from the perspective of the political
scientist, sociologist, anthropologist, or economist. 7 In this
book, the focus is upon the spatial aspects of national inte-
gration. This includes an evaluation of historical experiences:
the extent to which these have been integrative and shared by
all parts of the country, an analysis of the spatial distribution of
sociocultural commonalities and the degree to which these are
interdigitated or concentrated in particular regions, a consider-
ation of the degree to which interaction takes place among the
diverse areas and peoples of the state, and a study of the extent
to which all parts of the country share in economic growth and
development. These different dimensions of integration are then
synthesized in an analysis of common spatial patterns of na-
tional integration.
Obviously the level of national integration does not de-
termine the political stability of a country. Yet it does have a
profound effect upon the way a country withstands the political
stresses and strains imposed upon it from both outside and
inside the country. It comprises the stage upon which the po-
litical actors play out their roles. As Deutsch has put it:
A basic survey of geographical patterns, settlement, transport,
areas of different language dialects, cultures, etc., would not
give us an answer about the future success or failure of political
unity. The final decision would come from the realm of politics—a
leader, a movement, or a political party—but the surveys would
help us to start out with a more detailed and realistic picture of
the very uneven world in which politics must function. 8
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National integration is a matter of particular concern in In-
donesia because of the great diversity of both its geographical
environments and its peoples. Indonesia consists of over 13,000
islands (about 6,000 of which are inhabited) with a 1988 popu-
lation of over 175 million, the fifth largest in the world, which in-
corporates enormous ethnic and cultural diversity. In addition,
people range in their levels of development and sophistication
from the Stone Age inhabitants in the inland mountainous areas
of Irian Java to the most modern and cosmopolitan urban
dwellers of the major cities.
One of the most significant geographical facts about In-
donesia is its uneven population distribution. As can be seen
from both Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1, the contrast is between
Java and Madura, where in 1980 over 91 million people, or
almost two-thirds of the Indonesian population, lived on less
than 7 percent of the land area, and where average population
densities in 1980 were 690 persons per square kilometer (with
neighboring Bali having a slightly lower but also relatively high
population density of 444 persons per square kilometer); and
the Outer Islands, where average population density nowhere
exceeded 139 persons per square kilometer. By way of striking
example, in 1980 the entire population of Kalimantan (6.7
million) was only slightly larger than that of the capital city of
Jakarta (6.5 million).
This demographic contrast underlies many of the problems
and tensions of the Indonesian nation-state. It has also given
rise to the general acceptance of a core-periphery model that
considers Java and Bali as a congested nuclear core and the
Outer Islands as an underdeveloped, sparsely populated pe-
riphery. Although this core-Outer Islands dichotomy may appear
simplistic in a country with the size and diversity of Indonesia,
it is well established in the literature. 9
The physical features of the Indonesian archipelago have
had a strong impact upon the population distribution and the
levels of development within the country. There is a clear dis-
tinction between the larger islands of Sumatra, Borneo, Java,
and New Guinea, which rest at least in part on two fairly ex-
tensive continental shelves (the Sunda and Sahul shelves) and
have extensive coastal lowlands fringing shallow seas; and the
islands to the east of Bali and Borneo and west of New Guinea,
which rise abruptly from great ocean depths and have virtually
no coastal plain at all (see Figure 1.2). 10 The great coral reefs
off the west coast of Sumatra and especially along the edge of
the Sunda shelf in the Makassar Straits and Flores Sea have
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Figure 1.1. Population density in Indonesia, 1980. Based on data from
the 1980 population census in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia
1983‚ Buku Saku‚ Table II.1.3
played an important part in deflecting shipping routes wherever
possible to the generally coral-free sea covering the Sunda shelf
between Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Java, and Borneo. In the
eastern part of the archipelago, coral reefs and frequently swift
ocean currents combine to make navigation more hazardous.
This geological background has had many effects on the
geographical environment of the archipelago. It is responsible
for the accessibility of much of the land area and has enabled
the sea to become a common link among coastal dwellers who
depend upon it for their source of livelihood, both for food and
for commerce. It has led to the development of vast swamps
along the edges of the islands on the continental shelf, partic-
ularly in eastern Sumatra, western and southern Borneo, and
southwestern New Guinea. It has affected the topography and
the types of soil found in the different islands and consequently
their different potential for agriculture. And it has determined
the location of mineral resources found beneath the soil: pe-
troleum and natural gas, coal, tin, nickel, copper, and other
ores.
These physical differences underlie the uneven development
of the islands. Java compares favorably with many of the other
islands in the archipelago in a number of ways. Its relatively
central location within Indonesia, its smaller size and elongated
shape, and its general freedom from coastal swamps afford
greater access than that which exists in Sumatra (with its pre-
cipitous western highlands and eastern swamplands and silted
Introduction
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Table 1.1. Area, population, population density, and percentage
urban by province‚ 1980
Province Area in
km2
Percentage
of land
area
Population
in 1000s
Percentage
of
population
Density
per
km2
Percentage
urban
1. Aceh 55,392 2.9 2,611 1.8 47 8.9
2. North Sumatra 70,787 3.7 8,361 5.7 118 25.5
3. West Sumatra 49,778 2.6 3,407 2.3 68 12.7
4. Riau 94,562 4.9 2,169 1.5 23 27.2
5. Jambi 44,924 2.3 1,446 1.0 32 12.7
6. South Sumatra 103,688 5.4 4,630 3.1 45 27.4
7. Bengkulu 21,168 1.1 768 0.5 36 9.4
8. Lampung 33,307 1.7 4,625 3.1 139 12.5
Sumatra
473,606 24.7 28,016 19.0 59 19.6
9. Jakarta 590 0.03 6,503 4.4 11,023 93.7
10. West Java 46‚300 2.4 27‚454 18.6 593 21.0
11. Central Java 34‚206 1.8 25,373 17.2 742 18.8
12. Yogyakarta 3,169 0.2 2,750 1.9 868 22.1
13. East Java 47‚922 2.5 29,189 19.8 609 19.6
Java
132,187 6.9 91,270 61.9 690 25.1
14. Bali 5,561 0.3 2,470 1.7 444 14.7
15. West Nusatenggara 20,177 1.1 2,725 1.9 135 14.1
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16. East Nusatenggara 47,876 2.5 2,737 1.9 57 7.5
17. East Timor 14,874 0.8 555 0.4 37 n.a.
Nusatenggara
88,488 4.6 8,487 5.8 96 12.0
18. West Kalimantan 146,760 7.7 2,486 1.7 17 16.8
19. Central Kalimantan 152,600 8.0 954 0.7 6 10.3
20. South Kalimantan 37,660 2.0 2,065 1.4 55 21.4
21. East Kalimantan 202,440 10.6 1,218 0.8 6 40.0
Kalimantan
539,460 28.1 6,723 4.6 12 21.5
22. North Sulawesi 19,023 1.0 2,115 1.4 111 16.8
23. Central Sulawesi 69,726 3.6 1,290 0.9 18 9.0
24. South Sulawesi 72,781 3.8 6,062 4.1 83 18.1
25. Southeast Sulawesi 27,686 1.4 942 0.6 34 9.4
Sulawesi
189,216 9.9 10,410 7.1 55 15.9
26. Maluku 74,505 3.9 1,411 1.0 19 10.9
27. Irian Jaya 421,981 22.0 1,174 0.8 3 21.4
Maluku &
Irian Jaya
496,486 25.9 2,585 1.8 5 15.5
Indonesia
1,919,443 100.0 147,490 100.0 77 22.4
n.a.: not available
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Figure 1.2. Features of the Indonesian archipelago.
rivers), Kalimantan (with its fairly short coastline, poor
drainage, and lack of natural harbors), Sulawesi (with its frac-
tured and fragmented mountainous interior), and Irian Java
(with its rugged terrain in the north, swampland in the south,
and location away from the main trading routes).
Java is endowed with many volcanoes, which are more active
and provide more chemically basic ejecta than those in most
other parts of the archipelago (particularly in Sumatra where
the volcanoes are less active and produce more acidic ash and
lava). The absence of volcanoes in other parts of the island
chain means that soils have developed from very different
parent rocks, which are often deficient in plant nutrients. The
volcanic ejecta in Java generally produce more fertile soils that
are renewed at a rate faster than the leaching process. 11 Sim-
ilarly, the enormous amount of sediment carried by Indonesia’s
rivers provides valuable plant nutrients in the case of Java, since
much of it is derived from the volcanic interior. Java’s relief pro-
vides another advantage in that its scattered volcanic peaks are
separated by gently sloping, interconnected valleys that facil-
itate terracing and the efficient use and reuse of nutrient-laden
water.
Climatically, there is considerable variation in both the
amount and the seasonality of the rainfall, and the ubiquitously
hot sea-level temperatures (Indonesia is bisected by the
equator) are modified by altitude and aspect. Although many
localized dry seasons occur as a result of the topography in
relation to the direction of the prevailing monsoon winds, the
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major climatic contrast is between much of the archipelago,
which experiences constant, year-round rainfall, and the south-
eastern area, which experiences a marked dry season that in-
creases in duration with proximity to the Australian continent
and the influence of its high-pressure system in the months of
April to September. This leads to more open deciduous forest
and even to savanna vegetation in the eastern part of
Nusatenggara and to reduced leaching, but increased vari-
ability in the rainfall results also in wind erosion and difficult
periods of drought that affect the double-or triple-cropping po-
tential of the land for agriculture. Java occupies an intermediate
position between the continually wet lands of Sumatra and Kali-
mantan and the marked seasonal droughts that characterize
Nusatenggara. 12
It is, thus, easy to see that Java possesses a unique com-
bination of favorable climate, soils, drainage, and accessibility,
which underlies and helps to explain Java’s greater potential for
development and the decision of the Dutch colonial power to
focus its attention on that island.
Physical factors contribute also to the two very different
agricultural systems that are found in Indonesia: the swidden
(shifting) cultivation system, which involves the use of unirri-
gated fields (ladang) and is typical of the Outer Islands; and the
intensive wet-rice cultivation system (sawah), found predomi-
nantly in Java (and Madura and Bali).
Physical diversity in Indonesia is matched by cultural and
economic variety. Scattered among the islands of Indonesia are
numerous tribal and ethnic groups that vary on almost every
possible index. In kinship systems, some are patrilineal (such
as the Balinese), some matrilineal (such as the Minangkabau),
and others bilateral (such as the Acehnese). In location and eco-
nomic activity, some inhabit isolated villages in remote, moun-
tainous interiors where they practice shifting cultivation or rely
primarily on hunting and food gathering; others live along the
coasts and depend mainly on fishing; many are wet-rice farmers
located in broad river valleys and extensive lowland areas; mil-
lions more are city dwellers. Some (particularly in Java and Bali
but also in pockets of the Outer Islands such as parts of Mi-
nahasa and the area around Ujung Pandang in Sulawesi) live
at extremely high population densities while others inhabit vast
jungle areas at very low densities. Some societies have had
a long history of communication and contact with the outside
world; others are just now being settled in villages and brought
into contact with people from other parts of Indonesia. Although
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22 percent of Indonesia’s population was classified as urban in
1980, there are considerable differences in the degree of so-
phistication of both the urban and rural masses. The people
vary, too, in their religious adherence, both in terms of the
religion they follow (nearly all of the world’s major religions
are represented, including Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Bud-
dhism, and Confucianism) and in terms of the degree of their
commitment and the purity of their faith. Each ethnic group has
its own language or dialect, customs, and culture; each varies in
its degree of involvement and participation in national events.
Gross correlations have been observed between sociocul-
tural patterns and ecological-economic divisions, and broad
complexes of peoples have been distinguished. Hildred Geertz
has recognized three major groups: 13 the coastal Malays, iden-
tified by their Islamic, maritime lifestyle and culture, which is
more egalitarian and individualistic; the great variety of the in-
terior tribespeople who are mainly swidden cultivators, often
animistic, and relatively isolated; and the Hinduized (and now
largely Islamic) wet-rice cultivators found primarily in Java and
Bali, with their distinct, very highly developed, and symbolically
elaborate artistic culture and hierarchical, stratified societies.
However, there is no simple correlation between religion and
ecology, for wet-rice agriculture is practiced by Christian,
Hindu, and Muslim societies, although animistic traits are gen-
erally more pronounced among swidden groups.
There are many peoples in Indonesia, however, such as the
Bataks, Ambonese, Minahasans, and Chinese, who do not fit
into any one of the three main classificatory groups of Geertz,
but rather combine characteristics of each. Herein lies one
of the strengths of pluralistic Indonesia, as compared with
Malaysia, the Sudan, or Canada, for in these latter, more di-
chotomized societies, differences in one sociocultural element
are reinforced by contrasts in other elements and thus are more
divisive. In Indonesia, cultural and social variations are inter-
digitated and form complex crisscross patterns, so that no one
large group is totally divided from others by all features. 14
A basic awareness and acceptance of others’ differences is ev-
ident in the common maxim, lain desa, lain adat (different vil-
lages have different customary rules); or, more expressively, lain
padang, lain belalang; lain lubuk, lain ikannya (different fields
have different locusts; other pools have other fish). 15 This tol-
erance is part of Indonesia’s strength and durability.
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In the face of this enormous diversity within Indonesia,
building national integration is of tremendous importance.
What is it that holds the country together? What bonds of in-
tegration have emerged as a result of common historical ex-
periences? What patterns of integration exist among the socio-
cultural, interaction, and economic components of integration?
What synthesis is it possible to obtain on the overall strength
of integration and in its spatial patterns in the nation-state of
Indonesia? And finally, what has the government response been
to these uneven patterns of internal cohesion; how have In-
donesia’s independent governments attempted to promote na-
tional integration?
The purpose of this book is to provide tentative answers
to these questions. Most of the data and information used in
this study comes from the 1980 census and other materials
available in the early 1980s. The areal unit chosen for study
is the province, of which there are presently twenty-seven in
Indonesia (including the special districts of Aceh, Jakarta, and
Yogyakarta). The province is a logical unit for comparison for
several reasons. It is the most likely unit to be able to secede
and become an independent unit, because of its size. A typical
Indonesian province is as large as any of a number of smaller
African states that exist on their own and larger than many in-
dependent island states. On a practical level, the province has
been selected as the unit for consideration because most sta-
tistical data are available only at this (or at the national) level.
Unfortunately, intraprovincial differences, though known to be
important, are masked when data are summarized for a whole
province. Provinces vary considerably in size both in area (rang-
ing from 590 square kilometers for Jakarta to 422,000 square
kilometers for Irian Jaya) and in population (from 555,000 in
East Timor and 768,000 in Bengkulu in southern Sumatra to
29,189,000 in East Java). Thus, all data in the quantitative
section have been standardized to either a per-unit-area or a
per-capita basis and are given in the appendixes. This study (as
most geographical studies) is inevitably scale specific: the use
of the province as the unit of area has a major effect upon the
results of the analysis.
Warnings are also in order about the availability and quality
of the data. As with most developing countries, data are not
always complete or consistent, and in places their accuracy is
questionable. In the past, interregional data have not always
been highly valued, especially when containing politically
volatile information; the government in the 1950s implicitly rec-
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ognized the inflammatoriness of interregional economic data
when it closed a leading newspaper for printing information on
the differences among the provinces in terms of export earnings
and government expenditures. 16 However, a lot of data is
available on Indonesia thanks to the Biro Pusat Statistik (the
Central Bureau of Statistics, whose publications include the
comparatively detailed 1980 population census) and the work of
economists both within Indonesia and at the Australian National
University.
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2
The Uneven Effect of
Historical and Political
Experiences
NATIONAL integration involves the way people in different areas
of a country and of different ethnic, sociocultural, and economic
backgrounds feel themselves to be united and function as one
nation. One important component in promoting this sense of
unity and national identity is that of common historical and
political experiences. For it is in this historical heritage that
the roots of culture and national social structures are found.
In addition, feelings of oneness, of shared glory and ignominy,
triumph and suffering, achievements and struggles, all help to
deepen national awareness and national pride, which are basic
to building national integration.
Historical experiences can be evaluated in two principal
ways: first, an analysis of the extent to which particular his-
torical events have been integrative; and second, a consider-
ation of how much the different regions of the country have
participated in those national events that have both shaped the
geographical configuration of the present state and created an
awareness of national identity. This chapter evaluates the inte-
grative effect and the spatial impact of significant historical and
political events on the nation-state of Indonesia.
Indonesia’s history can be divided into four major time pe-
riods, each of which has had its own distinctive effect in forming
the modern state and giving it its unique national character: the
ancient empires, the experience of growing Western influence
and colonial control, the Japanese occupation and subsequent
struggle for independence, and the period of independence.
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THE ANCIENT EMPIRES
In prehistory and very early historical times, there was nothing
to distinguish those islands later to become the state of In-
donesia from the surrounding areas of the present-day coun-
tries of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea (see
Figure 2.1). Certainly the racial mix and early settlement pat-
terns were similar to those of the Malay Peninsula. The first mi-
gration into the archipelago, probably 1.5 to 2 million years ago,
1 consisted of Australoid peoples, possibly represented today by
Negritoes such as the Arafura in parts of the Lesser Sunda and
Moluccan islands. 2 Later came the great waves of immigrants
from southern China, including the basically Caucasoid Proto-
Malays, who brought their Neolithic culture to the islands of
Borneo and Sumatra and later to Java and Sulawesi. They dis-
possessed earlier immigrant groups, absorbing them or forcing
them into marginal habitats. 3 Their stock is best represented
today by the various Batak and Dyak ethnic groups of interior
Sumatra and Borneo. Further to the southeast, in the Moluccas
and Lesser Sundas, the Proto-Malays (and their descendants)
were modified by Papuans and Melanesians who were already
entrenched there; but in New Guinea the Proto-Malays were
unable to penetrate beyond the coast because of the hostility of
tribal warriors.
The Deutero-Malays, who were more Mongoloid in feature,
brought their Bronze Age civilization particularly to the coastal
districts of the large western islands, displacing those who had
settled there previously. Their coastal settlements eventually
became the nuclei of trading kingdoms, while the interior set-
tlements of the Proto-Malays became centers of agriculture.
4 Ethnic groups typifying the Deutero-Malays include the Ja-
vanese (in East and Central Java), Sundanese (in West Java), Mi-
nangkabau (in West Sumatra), and Balinese.
Although a similar pattern prevailed on many islands, es-
pecially in the Greater Sundas—of later arrivals of more so-
phisticated peoples settling on the coast, absorbing previous
groups or forcing them inland to displace still earlier people
into the mountainous interiors—this pattern was not unique
to Indonesia. It was as true for the non-Indonesian areas of
the Malay Peninsula and northern Borneo as it was for the In-
donesian islands. Indeed, there is more affinity between the
inhabitants of the western islands of Indonesia and those of
the Malay Peninsula than there is between the peoples of the
western and eastern islands within the Indonesian archipelago.
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Figure 2.1. Modern Indonesia and surrounding states.
When, for example, the Portuguese finally captured the Malayan
emporium of Malacca in 1511, the key entrepôt at that time
of Indonesian trade, they found that the dominant political el-
ement in that great Islamic city was Javanese, its army largely
Javanese, and most of its shipbuilders and other craftsmen Ja-
vanese, together with a major component of its extensive mer-
chant class, 5 all this outside the area later to become Indonesia.
By contrast, the easternmost islands of Indonesia and especially
Irian Jaya, though involved in trade, were much less affected by
the Javanese until well into the twentieth century. 6
Some historians have traced Indonesia’s beginnings to em-
pires and kingdoms dating back to the pre-Christian era, in-
cluding the Dong-Son period, and to the growing Indian influ-
ences felt in Dvipantara and its several rival states of Yavadripa,
Jaya, Malayu, and Taruma. 7 Most Indonesian historians,
however, emphasize the somewhat later kingdoms of Sri Vijaya
and Majapahit as far more significant in the country’s com-
munal past. This Indian-influenced period of Indonesia’s history
is often idealized as a sort of Golden Age. Indeed, it has been
suggested that, having won independence from the Dutch, In-
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donesia probably would have called itself by some old Indian or
Hindu-Javanese name such as Dvipantara or Nusantara if these
designations had originally been of sufficient geographical
scope. 8 But these early second-to fifth-century principalities
seem to have had only local extent and influence. Much of In-
donesia’s early history is still shrouded in obscurity. 9
It remains to be shown to what extent historical myth and
historical reality correspond. However, even a minimal corre-
spondence would not invalidate the sense of corporate history
and national identity so strongly expounded by Sukarno in his
efforts to strengthen the concept of Indonesian unity:
The national state is only Indonesia in its entirety, which existed
in the time of Shrivijaya and Majapahit, and which now too we
must set up together. 10
The kingdoms of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit were only two
of the many kingdoms and petty states that arose, expanded,
and declined during the millennium before Western influence
began to penetrate the area. They epitomize, however, the two
major types of state that came into existence—the sea-based
empires dependent upon control of trade and shipping, of which
Sri Vijaya, based on its monopolistic control of the important
Malacca Straits, is the prime example; and the inland, agricul-
tural, and especially sawah (wet-rice)-based kingdoms such as
Mataram and Majapahit. Sri Vijaya and other maritime princi-
palities, which were dependent upon international trade routes,
were cosmopolitan in character and had a high degree of social
equality and tolerance. By contrast, the Hindu-Javanese inland
kingdoms were complex, hierarchical structures, aristocratic
and military in character and buttressed by magico-religious
powers. 11
Careful historical analysis suggests that the thalassocratic
state of Sri Vijaya, from its center near present-day Palembang
in Sumatra (and secondary node of Kedah on the Malay
Peninsula), included only limited parts of western Indonesia and
incorporated much of the Malay Peninsula (see Figure 2.2), 12
with possible colonies in the southern Philippines as well. 13
But its commercial links with the Spice Islands (Maluku) and
other parts of the archipelago lend some credence to its claim
of drawing the far-flung islands into one economic unit. Sri
Vijaya’s power lay in its ability, from the fifth century on, to
control the Malacca Straits and enforce customs duties and port
dues from ships using the prevailing monsoonal winds in their
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Figure 2.2. The extent of the kingdoms of Sri Vijaya (ca. A.D. 1000)
and Majapahit (ca. A.D. 1350), according to Prapanca and C. C. Berg.
Based on maps by Paul Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese , p. 299; and
Jon M. Reinhardt, Foreign Policy and National Integration‚ p. 17 (used
with permission).
voyages from Arabia, Persia, India, and Ceylon to the Spice Is-
lands and China. 14 Through levying tolls and providing outlets
for their products, the Sri Vijayan empire transformed what
would otherwise have remained small, subsistence villages into
“glittering jewels strung along the thin gold thread of interna-
tional trade.” 15 The centrifugal forces of isolation and desired
autonomy of the vassal states threatened constantly to cause
the breakup of this loosely linked coastal empire. But these
were counterbalanced with varying degrees of success by the
wealth and prestige of the Sri Vijayan ruler, whose authority
was also derived in part from generally accepted Buddhist sanc-
tions.
Trade and the trade routes undoubtedly drew the people of
the region together and helped to determine the course of their
development and their exposure to foreign culture, techniques,
skills, and ways of life. 16
The kingdom of Sri Vijaya fluctuated in its fortunes from its
inception sometime in the fifth century until its decline during
the twelfth. Toward the end of the eighth century, the Sailandra
dynasty united this Sumatran empire with Mataram, one of the
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earliest land-based kingdoms in Java. It was during this period
that the great Mahayana Buddhist temple of Borobudur was
built, in whose glory and magnificence all Indonesians are en-
couraged to take pride. After the Sailandra empire split into two
components in the late ninth century, the Javanese kingdom re-
turned to Brahmanistic Shiva worship and built the Prambanan
temple complex, while in Sumatra the Sri Vijayan empire grew
to new heights, especially in the early eleventh century through
its monopoly of the growing spice trade. By the time Marco Polo
visited the area in 1292, however, the once-powerful kingdom
of Sri Vijaya had disintegrated into eight Sumatran kingdoms,
each with its crowned king, and the center of power had moved
north from Palembang to Malayu (near present-day Jambi). It
seems that technological improvements in shipbuilding and nav-
igation, fluctuations in trade, and international politics all con-
tributed to undermining the strategic locational advantage of
Sri Vijaya as an entrepôt. Because it had no agricultural base or
other industries, a decline in its trading preeminence led almost
inevitably to the empire’s demise.
Yet the commercial empires based on the Straits of Malacca,
though leaving little in the way of material remains, contributed
more to present-day Indonesia than mere historic memories.
Malay was used as the lingua franca of trade among the prin-
cipal ports of the Sri Vijayan empire. It was this lingua franca
that was later adopted as the national language of Indonesia,
itself recognized as one of the strongest unifying forces in the
archipelago (although not unique to it).
The other type of kingdom was the land-oriented, agrarian-
based variety, found primarily in Java. The first of these, eighth-
century Mataram in central Java, coexisted with Sri Vijaya and
for many Javanese has more historical and inspirational signifi-
cance than the latter. 17 Indeed, Legge argues that even during
Sri Vijaya’s period of preeminence the political center of gravity
in Indonesia was really to be found for the most part on the
island of Java, where
a series of major kingdoms, at first in Central Java and then in the
eastern part of the island, marked the growth of a sophisticated
material culture and of a political strength which, after fluctua-
tions and divisions, reached its apex with the rise of the kingdom
of Majapahit in the thirteenth century. 18
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The early kingdom of Mataram (to be distinguished from the
later kingdom of Mataram of the seventeenth century) shifted
its center from central to eastern Java in the mid-ninth century
and gradually expanded its agricultural base by becoming in-
volved in maritime trade. It also promoted a resurgence of
indigenous elements in art, literature, and politics. Later it
was superseded by several other kingdoms, including Janggala,
Kediri, and Singhasari. After Sri Vijaya’s decline, Java gained a
predominant position in the archipelago that has not since been
eclipsed. Though its kingdoms have been rivaled at various
times, most notably by the Islamic commercial empire of
Malacca in the fifteenth century, the island has remained the
center of political influence and the balancer of fluctuating ri-
valries in the area. 19
However, the most extensive kingdom that Sukarno claimed
as the foundation of present-day independent Indonesia is Ma-
japahit. This consisted at first of a number of individual entities
held together through a variety of coercive and manipulative
techniques on the part of early Majapahit rulers. 20 But later it
established itself not only as a coordinated, agriculturally based
land power but also as a commercial empire. It attained its
zenith in the fourteenth century, under the premiership of Gajah
Mada, that architect of pan-Indonesia policies who is memori-
alized as the great unifier of Indonesia in its first university, es-
tablished at the kraton (palace) in Yogyakarta. Almost inevitably
there is controversy over the actual extent of this powerful and
impressive kingdom. The Javanese court poet, Prapanca, in his
long, narrative poem composed in 1365, Nagarakertagama, in-
serted a list of vassal states of Majapahit (see Figure 2.2). It
included nearly all the coastal districts of Indonesia, western,
eastern, and northern Sumatra, Brunei and parts of southern
and western Kalimantan, Bali, the Sundas, parts of Sulawesi
and Maluku, 21 and eventually the kingdom of Sunda in west-
ern Java, 22 as well as the fifteen dependencies of Majapahit in
Pahang, the name by which the whole of the southern half of
the Malay Peninsula was known. Several historians have argued
that at the height of its power Majapahit’s territory was at least
coextensive with that of the modern Republic of Indonesia and
included parts of present-day Malaysia as well. But many In-
donesian as well as other intellectuals consider these claims
vastly exaggerated. Indeed, according to Wheatley, the Dutch
scholar C. C. Berg considers the impressive catalogue of Ma-
japahit’s conquests as reflecting nothing more than the geo-
graphic knowledge available in Prapanca’s time. 23 The state
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of Majapahit at its maximum extent, he believes, comprised
little more than eastern Java, Madura, and Bali (see Figure
2.2). It seems more probable, though, that there may have
been a loose, temporary linkage between Java and many of the
small coastal states mentioned earlier. Certainly the unknown
author of the early Javanese chronicle Pararaton (Book of Kings)
portrayed Kertanagara (king of Singhasari) and Gajah Mada
(chief administrator of Majapahit at its zenith) as leaders who
had endeavored to suppress the evil forces of division and to
strengthen the mystic forces of unity. 24
In any case, whatever the historic truth, the myths have
been enormously important, for the kingdoms of Sri Vijaya and
Majapahit have been a powerful source of inspiration and na-
tional pride for a great number of Indonesians. They thus
function as an integrating force. A belief in the inherent unity
of the nation, interrupted by periods of chaos and then restored
again to unity, provided a tradition by which Sukarno could
claim to be following in the footsteps of Airlangga (the tenth-
century restorer of unity), Ken Angrok (the Just Prince of the
twelfth century who founded the dynasty of Singhasari), 25
Hayam Wuruk (the king of Majapahit in the fourteenth century),
and Gajah Mada (Hayam Wuruk’s prime minister from 1331 to
1364, who was hailed as the last man until Sukarno to unite “In-
donesia” under a single ruler). 26 Certainly Gajah Mada’s unified
administration and codified laws and customs lasted until the
nineteenth century in essentially the same form as they had
during his premiership in the fourteenth.
It was in the days of Majapahit that Indonesian sculpture,
architecture, religion, and philosophy departed most markedly
from the Indian prototypes from which they had developed
and assumed distinctive characteristics of their own. It is little
wonder, therefore, that modern Indonesians regard Majapahit
as a national and historical symbol, pointing in the direction of
Indonesian unification. 27
Thus, looking back over the history of the ancient empires,
one may argue that the perception and interpretation of history
may indeed be as important as the historical truth, as least for
the purpose of integrating the nation. The idea that Indonesia,
with approximately its present boundaries, existed and func-
tioned as one entity at various times in the past is a powerful
concept for a young country, especially one seeking to unite its
very different peoples into one nation and establish its unique
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identity and place in the world. Equally important are the com-
munal pride engendered in acknowledging this glorious inheri-
tance, and the feeling of shared greatness.
Certainly some of this pride is justifiable. Indisputably, an-
cient empires did arise and cast their influence over many of the
islands of present-day Indonesia; and the impressive heritage of
Borobudur, Prambanan, and the many other temples, statues,
and monuments that testify to the artistic heights reached by
these Indianized kingdoms is a legitimate source of national
self-esteem.
Yet, from a more objective viewpoint, it is highly ques-
tionable whether these kingdoms did in any sense integrate
their disparate parts. Rather, they imposed a vassal or sub-
ordinate status on the many parts of their empires, a status
bitterly disputed and fought over at different times. The Sun-
danese of western Java, for example, still retain historical mem-
ories of the ruthlessness of Gajah Mada. And it may well be that
the splendor of Majapahit, appealed to by nationalist leaders
as a source of inspiration and unity for all Indonesians, has ac-
tually deepened the divisions between the Javanese inheritors
of these treasures and the “inheritors-by-extension” from the
other islands. Certainly the feelings of superiority that the Ja-
vanese display toward the Outer Islanders do not help the cause
of integration. 28 As Bujung Saleh, one of Indonesia’s own
critics, expressed it:
The illusionary greatness of Majapahit cannot form a strong bond
of unity for all our people at this time. On the contrary, it even
harms national unity, for people from other regions will feel that
the greatness of their own regional history is being denigrated. 29
Finally, although the myth that the present territory of In-
donesia was defined by the independent ancient empires of
the past (particularly Majapahit) is immensely appealing, the
cold reality is that it was the Dutch colonialists who gave In-
donesia the shape it has today, with the one exception of former
Portuguese (East) Timor, which was annexed in May 1976 to
become Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province.
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THE EXPERIENCE OF GROWING WESTERN
INFLUENCE AND CONTROL
The effect of European traders and colonialists, first the Por-
tuguese, then the Dutch (with a brief British interregnum from
1811 to 1816), was ambivalent. On the one hand, the domi-
nation of the whole area by one European power gave the area
a unity not experienced before. The islands were linked more
systematically in terms of administration, law, and communica-
tions into at least a nominal functional entity. Dutch colonial
rule also provided exposure to Western European culture, edu-
cation, values, and ways of economic development. Common
colonial control in turn provided a focus for the nationalist in-
dependence movement in the twentieth century, a cause that
temporarily superseded deep feelings of diversity and division.
Dutch hegemony provided the rationale for adopting the bound-
aries of the Netherlands East Indies as the limits of the new
independent Republic, and the Dutch administrative system,
based upon the existing autochthonous regions of different eth-
nic groups within the archipelago, was taken over and sub-
stantially kept intact by the new Indonesian government at
independence.
On the other hand, however, Dutch control was uneven.
Not only did the Dutch preserve existing differences among
the already diverse peoples and kingdoms in the archipelago,
but by their unequal treatment of different areas and ethnic
groups they exacerbated old rivalries and created new, deeper
cleavages. They focused most of their attention on Java and
later on certain select areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan, North Su-
lawesi, and the southern Moluccas, while ignoring vast areas
of the Outer Islands. They not only treated different Indonesian
ethnic groups differently, but they also encouraged and made
use of the entrepreneurial skills of the Chinese immigrants and
their descendants as middlemen. They even set up separate
judicial systems for Europeans, Chinese, and “natives‚” thus
legally preserving the differences among the different ethnic
groups rather than helping them to be assimilated into one
social fabric. In addition they increased the disparity between
rich and poor in both rural and urban areas.
Thus, while at the macro level the European influence can
be construed as generally integrative, at the micro level its
effect was often divisive.
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Dutch intentions in the first hundred years of their influence
in the archipelago, as with the Portuguese before them, were to
gain a monopoly of trade rather than to carve out an empire.
30 Only slowly did the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde
Oost- Indische Compagnie, formed in 1602) gain control of the
sea lanes and then turn to protect them by becoming more in-
volved in the internal affairs of the islands. At first, the Dutch
concluded alliances with several independent kingdoms and
Sultanates in the archipelago, including Ambon, Bali, and
Ternate, and contended with hostility from others, such as
Madura and Aceh. Later, they began to intervene in internal
disputes, manipulating them to their own advantage, exacting
adherence to Dutch trading monopolies, and collecting tribute
and later “forced deliveries and consignments” as the price
of Dutch help and protection. The Compagnie thus gradually
changed from being a purely trading enterprise to being the
ruler of a territorial empire. By the mid-seventeenth century,
the Dutch were firmly established in western Indonesia (at
Batavia, Banten, and Gresik in Java), on the Malay Peninsula
(at Malacca, Patani, and Johore), and in eastern Indonesia (at
Banda and Ternate). The local empire of Mataram on Java grad-
ually extended its control over the eastern part of that island
and Madura and as far as Banjarmasin in Kalimantan. But al-
though the historians of the period who wrote Babad Tanah
Djawi and other histories saw Mataram as the legitimate suc-
cessor to all preceding states and in particular to Majapahit, in
reality its territorial extent was very limited, and it too fell to
the Dutch as a result of internal disagreements. 31
Only very slowly were the islands of the future Indonesia es-
tablished as part of the Dutch colonial territory, partly through
battles won against other European nations—at sea, through
intrigue, or through diplomatic channels back in Europe. The
Portuguese, once their naval power declined, were gradually
confined to eastern Timor (in the 1680s), although their in-
fluence lingered far longer in places such as Flores, Ambon, and
western Timor. The Spanish were limited to the Philippines and
the Sulu archipelago (in 1663), and the British eventually to
the Malay Peninsula and the northern part of Borneo. The Brit-
ish, however, controlled an outpost in Bengkulen for 150 years
after they were driven from the western Javanese kingdom of
Bantam in 1689, before they exchanged it for previously Dutch-
controlled Malacca in the Malay Peninsula (in 1824); 32 and they
continued to guarantee the independence of the kingdom of
Aceh until 1871.
The Uneven Effect of Historical and Political Experiences
26
The last half of the seventeenth century saw the loss of in-
dependence and the disintegration of all the remaining major
Indonesian states—Ternate, Makassar, and Bantam, as well as
Mataram—both in the face of superior Dutch naval power and
in the transition of the role of the Compagnie from a purely
mercantile organization to a budding colonial power. But the
imposed internal peace did little to unify or integrate the sep-
arate kingdoms; they remained mutually hostile, linked only in
their shared resentment of the common vassal status they held
under the Dutch, as demonstrated by their constant uprisings
and struggles to regain their independence. It has been claimed
that the Dutch deliberately preserved the differences among the
different areas under their control in pursuit of their policy of
“divide and rule.” 33
By the mid-eighteenth century, three distinct areas of
Western influence could be distinguished as a result of uneven
treatment by the Dutch.
In parts of eastern Indonesia Dutch influence was intensive
and oppressive. By regulating and destroying the means of pro-
duction and prosperity of the islanders (by cutting down unau-
thorized clove and nutmeg trees to maintain high prices in
Europe, and by improving their monopoly on trade), the Dutch
succeeded not only in breaking the power of the previously
proud and independent kingdoms of the Moluccas (such as
Ternate and Tidore), but also in decimating their populations
and reducing the survivors to bondage and poverty. 34 In other
parts of eastern Indonesia, Dutch influence ranged from nonex-
istent (such as in western New Guinea and many of the Lesser
Sunda islands) to warmly welcomed (in northern Celebes) to bit-
terly resented (in southwestern Celebes around the Dutch-de-
stroyed town of Makassar).
In much of western Indonesia (Sumatra and Kalimantan),
Western influence hardly penetrated at all beyond a few
strategic fortress settlements along the coast (and Padang in
West Sumatra) until the development of plantations and mines
and the extension of Dutch authority to more parts of Sumatra
during the mid-to late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
35 Sumatra (and particularly Aceh) was more affected than Kali-
mantan by Dutch monopolistic trading policies, yet these were
less stringently enforced than in the Moluccas, partly because
of the presence of the British in Bengkulen and the proximity
of the Asian continent (which made unauthorized trading more
difficult to control), and partly because the source of peppers
and other trading commodities produced in western Indonesia
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was not so restricted geographically. Kalimantan was culturally
and economically less developed than Sumatra. There, with the
exceptions of the sultanates of Banjarmasin and Sambas, the
few Dutch settlements established earlier were abandoned by
the end of the eighteenth century because trade was not suf-
ficiently valuable to justify the expense of manning and de-
fending such settlements. 36 Also, the Dutch could not compete
with the highly successful Chinese traders already entrenched
there. Thus, in many of the Outer Islands petty states, principal-
ities, chieftainships, and tribal societies flourished undisturbed
by the Compagnie. 37
It was in Java, however, that the influence of Western domi-
nation was the greatest. The Dutch set up their headquarters in
Jakarta (which they renamed Batavia) in 1619 and soon eclipsed
the power of the Western Javanese sultanate of Bantam. They
gradually extended their control over the island, despite three
wars of independence (1705–1755), as the last and greatest of
the Javanese states, Mataram, succumbed to Dutch pressure.
They increasingly penetrated the traditional way of life of the
inhabitants and encouraged Chinese immigration and entrepre-
neurship, and the development of a plural, nonintegrated so-
ciety in which the Dutch were on the top, the Chinese in the
middle, and the indigenous Javanese at the bottom. 38 The mas-
sacre of thousands of Chinese by Javanese in 1740, along with
later legal restrictions, testifies to the nonassimilation of the
Chinese into Indonesian society. 39
In their fear of the potentially unifying force of Islam, the
Dutch colonial government (which replaced the Dutch East
India Company at the end of the eighteenth century when the
latter went bankrupt and had its assets and liabilities taken
over by the Dutch government) consistently supported the adat
rulers (those who administered traditional, customary law)
against the Islamic leaders. 40 They also played off rival king-
doms against one another. They systematically reduced the
power and influence of the Javanese rulers and aristocracy
until, by the end of the Java War (1825–1830), they had reduced
virtually all of the principalities to the status of puppet domains
in the Dutch East Indian Empire. 41 Dutch emphasis on Java,
first with the contingents and forced delivery system, and later
through the Cultuurstelsel (Cultivation System, introduced in
1830), 42 led to enormous differences between Java and the
other islands, especially in economic development, because only
a tiny proportion of the large land area of the Outer Islands
was under effective Dutch control during the period of the Cul-
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tivation System in Java. Much of the Dutch effort outside Java
was limited to punitive expeditions against piracy. Only later
with the great economic expansion between 1870 and 1930 was
there a change in the Dutch focus on Java and in the char-
acter and emphasis of Dutch trade and interest in Indonesia.
As the more traditional exports of coffee, sugar, and tobacco
(grown in Java), and spices (mace, cloves, and nutmeg from the
eastern islands) gave way in importance to the more industrial
products of rubber, oil, and tin (primarily in Sumatra), copra
(in Celebes and the Moluccas), and coal (in eastern and south-
eastern Kalimantan), attention shifted to the establishment of
firmer administrative control in the Outer Islands. 43 Planta-
tions, concentrated primarily in Java and northern Sumatra,
were developed as corporate enterprises to produce industrial
rather than garden products. 44 Although Dutch influence was
motivated primarily by economic considerations and hence did
not work to achieve the integration of peoples in the Indonesian
islands, some recent observers nevertheless consider that the
Netherlands’ expansion from Java to the Outer Islands repre-
sented, in fact, the creation of modern Indonesia: this allowed
the imposition of an effective unity, greater political and ad-
ministrative control, the laying of the foundations of a modern
economy, and the radical alteration of traditional social pat-
terns. 45
Yet despite the growing incorporation of the Outer Islands
into Indonesia, contrasts between Java and the Outer Islands,
as well as among the Outer Islands themselves, continued to
grow. Direct rule in Java contrasted with a greater degree of in-
direct rule in the Outer Islands. 46 Contrasts between Java and
the Outer Islands widened in terms of population size, growth,
and density as health and sanitation measures were introduced
into Java. Disparities increased also in the development of in-
frastructure, as communications and transportation networks
were developed in Java to a much greater extent.
Thus the imprint of the Dutch was uneven both historically
in terms of the length of colonial administration and politically
in the impact colonialism made in the different parts of the arch-
ipelago. Some areas experienced 350 years of Dutch influence
or control, while for others it was a matter of only a few decades
(see Figure 2.3). Indeed, it was not until 1901 that the Dutch
finally crushed the last independent state, Aceh (although spo-
radic outbreaks of rebellion continued until 1908). Only after
the turn of the present century, then, was Dutch rule effectively
extended over all the islands of the Dutch East Indies.
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When the Europeans defined the territory and delimited
the boundaries of the Dutch East Indies colony, they took little
or no notice of ethnic loyalties or historical relationships. As
with colonies in Africa and other parts of Asia, decisions were
made largely in Europe. The Johore-Riau empire was dismem-
bered and the Riau-Lingga archipelago cut off from the Malay
Peninsula. The Minangkabau on the peninsula came under
British control, while those in western Sumatra became part
of the Dutch East Indies. 47 The Bugis (from southern Celebes)
were expelled from their eighteenth-century position of domi-
nance in Kedah on the Malay Peninsula. 48 It took decades for
agreement to be reached on the precise boundaries delimiting
the colonial spheres of influence. Only in 1905 did Dutch nego-
tiations with the Germans and the British determine the fron-
tiers in the island of New Guinea. It was not until 1907 that the
British finally withdrew from Sumatra and 1915 that the British
and Dutch finally agreed in detail on the present Malaysian-In-
donesian border in Borneo. It is ironic that the Netherlands East
Indies took on almost the exact shape of the future Republic of
Indonesia precisely when the first stirrings of nationalism began
to be felt at the beginning of the twentieth century. As Grant put
it:
It is as if the invader, having laboriously established the outline of
his territorial possessions in the East Indies, provided the people
for the first time with a definite area by which to assert their
rights to national independence. 49
Not that the struggle for independence was new. The history
of the 350 years of Dutch influence and control in the arch-
ipelago is filled with revolts and insurrections against them,
as individual kingdoms and sultanates fought to maintain or
reestablish their independence and integrity. 50 These revolts,
however, were largely isolated and uncoordinated; the unity
claimed by later Indonesian historians in this “common resis-
tance to the Dutch,” at least at this stage, was experienced
more in retrospect than consciously at the time. It was not
until the twentieth century that these rebellions took on more
than a local flavor, and Indonesians began to develop national
awareness and a feeling of national unity. As the Dutch per-
sisted in their efforts to weld Indonesia into one centrally gov-
erned administrative unit, and as the traditional authorities de-
clined in public estimation, a new elite came into prominence—a
small group of educated, upper-class Indonesians, who became
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Figure 2.3. The expansion of Dutch authority in the former Dutch East
Indies. Based on a map from Soedjatmoko et al., An Introduction to In-
donesian Historiography‚ p.358 (reprinted from Royal Dutch Geo-
graphical Society, Atlas van Tropisch Nederland) (used with
permission).
aware more of the basic similarities among their countrymen
than of the differences dividing them; and more aware also of
their common colonial experiences and hope for a shared inde-
pendent future.
These feelings of unity were encouraged by several factors:
one was the worldwide rise of nationalism and national con-
sciousness in the early twentieth century, which became in-
creasingly apparent in other Asian countries; a second was the
exposure elite Indonesians had to ideas and information about
other countries through meeting people of different origins in
the hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca); 51 a third was the growing
appreciation among Indonesians of similarities underlying re-
gional differences, as contrasts with the intensified self-con-
ciousness of both Dutch and Chinese became increasingly ap-
parent; 52 and a fourth was increased education, encouraged
by the Ethical Policy of the Dutch beginning in 1901. This last
factor led to a recognition of Indonesia’s own historic glories, a
familiarity with the Netherlands’ struggle against Spain (whose
victory and independence the Indonesians ironically were made
to celebrate), an awareness of the common suffering and op-
pression experienced by Indonesians at Dutch and Chinese
hands, and increased consciousness of the discrimination facing
Indonesians socially and in the job market. They became in-
creasingly aware, too, of the disruption of village social patterns
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and the undermining of many of the village’s customary cer-
tainties, caused by the new economic developments and in-
creased penetration of Indonesian society by the government.
53 In addition, the limited number of schools, all on Java for
higher education, brought together in a creative atmosphere
students (and potential leaders) from different islands, who
there became detached to a large extent from the framework of
their own tradition and adopted a new urban culture where indi-
vidual ethnic loyalties were less important. 54 Their association
also fostered discussion of revolutionary ideas about a future in-
dependent Indonesia.
The Ethical Policy was a recognition that the Netherlands,
having profited for 300 years by exploiting Indonesia, should
now do something in return. 55 Thus, a welfare-type program
was introduced, theoretically aimed at economic, social, and po-
litical progress, including agriculture, irrigation, public works,
village sanitation, personal hygiene, and a very limited edu-
cation for the indigenous people. However, because there were
very few jobs for educated Indonesians except in the civil
service, and because the Dutch did not want to create an intel-
lectual proletariat to agitate for further reforms, the numbers
educated were very few. 56 Exploration and surveying were in-
tensified, railways and roads built, and interisland shipping ex-
panded. But by its very acknowledgment that a colony should
be governed for the sake of its inhabitants, the Ethical Policy
opened the door to the inevitable, logical corollary of the prin-
ciple of self-government.
The early twentieth century, therefore, witnessed the flow-
ering of many nationalist organizations with more than just
local appeal: some were cultural organizations, some mass
movements, and others expressions of political nationalism. All
served to increase national consciousness. Budi Utomo (Glo-
rious Endeavor Society) was founded in 1908 with the dual as-
piration of helping the common Javanese people and creating a
movement to embrace the whole archipelago. 57 Its goals were
cultural and thus appealed to the educated rather than to the
mass of society. 58 The Muhammadiyah, founded in Yogyakarta
in 1912 and supported both by Javanese and by Muslims in
Sumatra, became the largest and most strongly organized
movement in colonial Indonesia from the 1920s on. Modernist
in inspiration, it was devoted primarily to teaching and social
work. It too spread throughout Java and many of the Outer Is-
lands.
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Indonesian student organizations were also active in the na-
tionalist movement. Soon after the foundation of Budi Utomo,
Indonesian students in the Netherlands formed the Indische
Vereeniging (the Indies Association), which took increasing in-
terest in politics. In 1918 it espoused Indonesian nationalism
openly and called for full parliamentary government in the arch-
ipelago. Indonesian students in the Netherlands later founded
the Indonesische Vereeniging (the Indonesian Association),
which in 1925 adopted the Indonesian form of its title, Perhim-
punan Indo nesia. In 1924 this organization began publishing
a militant journal entitled Indonesia Merdeka (Independent In-
donesia), which not only justified the name Indonesia for the
Netherlands East Indies but also gave it political content. The
members of Perhimpunan Indonesia, drawn from all parts of
the archipelago, argued for the unity of the emerging political
parties and the formation of a single front to attract mass
support on a national basis and thus extract concessions from
the colonial government. 59 National youth congresses, held in
1926 and 1928, proclaimed Indonesia to be “one nation, one
language, one motherland” (“satu bangsa, satu bahasa, satu
tanah air”). They adopted a national anthem, renamed the
lingua franca (hitherto called Malay) Indonesian and pro-
claimed it to be the national language, and chose the red and
white colors of the Majapahit kingdom as the colors of the na-
tional flag. The motto, Bhin neka Tunggal Ika, was taken from
Sutasoma, a Javanese poem also of the Majapahit period; the
national emblem chosen, the Garuda, was the legendary mount
of the Hindu god Vishnu and had also been used as a symbol of
Majapahit. 60 They also adopted the original name of Jakarta for
Batavia.
The growth of mass movements in the period of 1911–1927
was linked also to two growing world ideologies, pan-Islam and
international communism. Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union)
was founded in 1911 by the new, Western-educated, nationalist
elite, who were able for a brief period to establish enough
contact with the peasantry in Java to create the first and only
peasant-based nationalist organization during the entire period
of colonial rule. 61 It had tremendous appeal among the masses
and was greatly affected by the increasing numbers of haji. It
reflected the growing resentment toward the Dutch colonialists
and disillusionment with employment opportunities in the gov-
ernment civil service. This movement grew so fast, enrolling
the support of more than two million members not only in Java
but also in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Bali, and Celebes, that the
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Dutch became thoroughly alarmed and began severely to re-
strict contact between the Indonesian nationalist leaders and
the peasantry. The government severed the ties between the
central and local branches of Sarekat Islam, recognizing the
branches but refusing to recognize the organization’s central
headquarters. 62 Indeed, repression by the colonial authorities
so limited the political activities of the nationalist leaders that
never again during the period of Netherlands rule were they
able to develop the contacts with the peasantry that had been
basic to the burgeoning of Sarekat Islam. 63
However, it was the Indo-European party, many of whose
members were Eurasians living in the large cities of Java, that
developed the earliest yearnings for independence. And it is in-
teresting to note that just as the concept of independence was
first encouraged by a Eurasian, Douwes Dekker, communism
was brought to Indonesia by a Dutchman, Sneevliet. From its
introduction in 1914 until the Communist party’s ill-conceived
revolt in 1926, Marxism attracted those increasingly aware
of the contrast in living standards between Javanese and for-
eigners, especially in the growing urban areas. But from 1920,
when the Perserikatan Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Com-
munist Union) broke off from Sarekat Islam and used the term
“Indonesia” in its name, it emphasized awareness of national
identity as one of its main planks.
Perhaps one of the most significant political institutions of
the early twentieth century in the Indonesian islands was the
Volksraad, established in 1918 as an advisory body to the
governor-general. 64 Its importance lay not so much in its power,
which was strictly limited, but in its existence as the colony’s
first popular representative organization, a symbol of national
unity, and a forum for Indonesian opinion. Although the system
of indirect elections to the Volksraad resulted in the return of
lower government officials rather than the emerging political
leaders of the Indonesian community, it did provide an oppor-
tunity for people from different parts of the country to work to-
gether and to give expression to their common grievances and
aspirations. It thus provided some valuable political experience
for a small number of Indonesians, even though the mainstream
of nationalist feeling and nationalist organization passed it by.
65
Gradually throughout the 1920s the term “Indonesia”
became filled with content and extended its appeal to more and
more of the inhabitants of the archipelago. Secular nationalist
groups arose following the disintegration of the mass move-
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ments. The most important of these was the party founded by
Sukarno in 1927—the Perserikatan Nasional Indone sia (the In-
donesian National Union)—which became the Partai Nasional
Indonesia (PNI) in 1928. This had as its ultimate objective an
independent Indonesia and was a name and symbol that “served
to transform ‘Indonesia’ from a concept of a few intellectuals
into a living idea shared by a whole people.” 66 The PNI grew
rapidly in size and took the initiative in attempting to draw
other nationalist societies into one organization. However, the
resulting loose federation of parties (the PPPKI, Permufakatan
Perhimpunan Politiek Kebangsaan Indonesia—Union of In-
donesian Political Organizations) lacked real coherence and lost
momentum, particularly after the banning of the PNI and the
arrest of Sukarno in 1929. 67 Indeed, as Legge suggests, the
history of organized nationalism in Indonesia was a record of a
multiplicity of societies, able to enter loose alliances from time
to time, but more frequently drawing apart from each other,
splitting, and regrouping. 68 Division and rivalry characterized
much of Indonesian nationalism, partly because of the char-
acter of Dutch rule and the nature of the Netherlands’ attitude
to the nationalist movement. The Indies Government alternated
between tolerance and repression, becoming increasingly re-
pressive as nationalist criticism became more radical, yet never
trying to crush the nationalist movement totally But the indeci-
siveness and inconsistency of government action in turn seems
to have reduced the need for a tightly knit, focused nation-
alist organization, instead permitting, and possibly even encour-
aging, a variety of organizations to compete with one another.
69 Part of the disunity and rivalry can be attributed also to the
elitist character of the nationalist leadership and the gap be-
tween the leaders and their mass following.
By 1930, however, the “day of Indonesia” had dawned. In-
donesian party, youth, and women’s congresses were held. Most
associations founded after that included the almost magic word
Indonesia in their titles.
The 1930s were also a period of growing confrontation be-
tween the Dutch colonialists and Indonesian nationalists. The
Dutch, who were affected by the stock market crash and the
worldwide depression, felt the need to extract ever more wealth
from the colonies and therefore sought to suppress vigorously
all the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesians (which many
in the Netherlands erroneously regarded as limited to a handful
of revolutionaries). As Dutch attitudes hardened and a police
state was imposed, the nationalist movement once again frag-
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mented, as Indonesian leaders disagreed among themselves
about the means they should follow to attain their common goal
of independence. Some advocated working within the system,
pushing for self-government through an enlarged Volksraad;
some wanted the gradual mobilization of the people; some the
training of self-reliant, well-informed leaders; and some more
direct confrontation. Many of the leaders, including Sukarno,
Hatta, and Sjahrir, were jailed or exiled.
It was not until 1939 that the different Indonesian political
associations formed a new union to improve the coordination
of their activities. The Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Gapi, the
Union of Indonesian Political Associations) had representatives
from ninety different regional and nationalist organizations, in-
cluding even such traditionally pro-Dutch organizations as the
Ambon and Minahasa leagues and the Indonesian Catholic
Party. Gapi launched an intensive campaign for an Indonesian
parliament and national self-government, and officially adopted
the Indonesian language, flag, and anthem. In an attempt to
diffuse these demands, the Dutch instead encouraged the estab-
lishment of provincial councils, convinced that if a responsible
system of government were created in the provinces, aspira-
tions for centralized self-government could be channeled off. 70
The rift between Indonesian nationalists and the colonial gov-
ernment widened further.
Thus, by the beginning of the Second World War in Europe
and the subsequent Japanese occupation of Indonesia, genuine
nationalist consciousness had spread across much of the archi-
pelago. Nationalist sentiment was much stronger in Java than in
the Outer Islands, but members of many different Outer Island
groups, especially those living in Java, participated actively in
the various nationalist activities and through their ties with
their areas of origin expanded nationalist sentiment there too.
However, internal dissensions and ideological disputes among
nationalist, Muslim, and socialist currents of opinion, along with
a lack of mass support, weakened the nationalist movement as
a whole. It has been estimated that of a total population in 1940
of about sixty million, the number of politically organized In-
donesians totaled only about 80,700, while only around 200,000
(less than 0.5 percent) were politically or socially conscious. 71
Yet despite these small numbers, Indonesian nationalist aspira-
tions were remarkably strong.
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THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION AND ITS
AFTERMATH
The Japanese occupation (1942–1945) had a predominantly di-
visive effect on Indonesia, although there were certain coun-
teracting unifying elements. The Japanese brutally subjugated
the Indonesian people, disrupted trade and communications
among them through strict censorship and attempts to make
each regency self-sufficient, and encouraged division among
the national leaders. The actions of the Japanese evoked an
allied blockade that further isolated the different parts of the
archipelago. From being welcomed enthusiastically as liber-
ators from hated colonial rule on their arrival in 1942, the
Japanese took barely four weeks to alienate almost the entire
population. Instead of liberating and “restoring the indepen-
dence of Asian peoples,” as their propaganda claimed, they
were more repressive than the Dutch had been even at the
height of their anti-nationalist campaign. All nationalist move-
ments were suppressed, political assemblies and demonstra-
tions forbidden, display of the Indonesian flag prohibited, and
any discussion, speculation, or propaganda regarding the po-
litical organization or administration of the country outlawed. 72
Punishment was ruthless. Further aspects of Japanese rule that
particularly offended the Indonesians included the degrading
punishment of flogging; Japanese emperor worship, which
obliged the population to perform the ceremonial bow (saikerei)
in the direction of the imperial palace in Tokyo (which deeply
upset Muslims, whose prayerful bow was toward Mecca in the
opposite direction); and the shaving of students’ heads. 73
But both in the intensity of their actions and in the duration
of their presence, the Japanese occupation was uneven. As with
the Dutch before them, the Japanese focused their attention on
Java (and particularly on Jakarta), exploiting both its raw mate-
rials and labor resources. In their administrative organization of
the country, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three separate
commands, with little interaction among them: Java and Madura
were under the Sixteenth Army based in Jakarta; Sumatra was
administered from Singapore by the Twenty-fifth Army; and
eastern Indonesia was controlled by the Navy, whose second
fleet was headquartered in Makassar (southern Celebes). 74
The entrenched rivalry between the Japanese army and navy
was also transferred to Indonesia. The army was more brutal
and ruthless in its methods than the navy, although it gave
considerable latitude for the Indonesian nationalist movement
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to develop (allowing, for example, the long-exiled nationalist
leaders substantial freedom of movement and contact with the
Indonesian masses). The navy, though less brutal, followed a
severely repressive policy, discouraging any kind of indigenous
political organization. 75 The divisiveness of the Japanese impact
thus reinforced differences between the western and eastern
parts of the country. In terms of the length of Japanese in-
fluence, although most of the country experienced a full three
and one-half years of occupation, some of the eastern islands
were liberated and reoccupied by allied forces more than a year
before the rest of the country.
Yet the Japanese occupation was not without its unifying
elements. The brutal treatment inflicted by the Japanese pro-
voked deep and bitter opposition and caused common suffering
that afterwards at least was recognized as a shared experience.
Almost all parts of the country had their economies and ways
of life disrupted, although not everywhere to the same extent.
A shortage of labor, caused by conscription, resulted in neglect
of estate production and irrigation works and a consequent de-
crease in food production; hardship and suffering thereby in-
creased.
On the more positive side, the efficient Japanese adminis-
trative and communications networks reached down to almost
every village and increased contact among the ordinary people.
The Japanese organized neighborhood associations (tonari
gumi), the concept of which still survives today in the rukun
tetangga. 76 Similarly, the Japanese ordered the Indonesians to
establish kumiai in every tonari gumi and village, a form of
cooperative society imposed from above that survived in mod-
ified form in the koperasi (cooperatives) of the later Guided
Democracy period. In some ways Japanese policy also consol-
idated nationalist feeling by creating an all-embracing Muslim
organization, the Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia),
comprising the Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and other
groups. This was intended to provide more effective control of
Muslim feeling, but in practical terms it laid the foundation for
united Muslim political activity, which was to carry over into
the early years of independence. 77 The Japanese propaganda
system was used in disguise by the nationalists to raise vil-
lagers’ political consciousness. In addition, although requiring
all Indonesians to learn the Japanese language (and prohibiting
the use of Dutch), the Japanese were forced in the interim to
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rely on the national language, bahasa Indonesia, to disseminate
their propaganda: by so doing they unwittingly promoted and
spread knowledge of Indonesian.
Further, expediency obliged the Japanese to push through
a virtual social revolution as they mobilized the population and
pressed everyone into their service—Muslim leaders, nation-
alists, princely families, and common people—without regard
for their local particularisms or traditional social barriers. 78
They promoted Indonesians to many of the administrative and
technical positions previously held by the Dutch. This increased
opportunities for upward socioeconomic mobility among the na-
tionalist elite, Muslim leaders, and even the old nobility and un-
dermined the stability of society (as well as one of the most
important sources of support for the Dutch regime). Old values
were questioned and former social relationships were inverted
and destroyed; the Japanese lost no opportunity to humiliate the
former colonial masters in the eyes of the Indonesians. This in-
spired a new and powerful sense of self-reliance and authority
among Indonesians, who found themselves both capable and
competent to perform duties previously regarded as beyond
their ability by the Dutch. 79 It also developed a determination
among them to preserve what had already been gained.
The Japanese also set up, in 1943, what the Dutch had
always resisted, an auxiliary, volunteer army, Sukarela Pembela
Tanah Air (Peta), which was composed mainly of members of
Muslim organizations. This numbered some 120,000 men by
1945. It was this Japanese-trained but Indonesian-officered mil-
itary that was to provide the principal military force behind the
revolution, both in its early stages, when ironically it turned on
the Japanese forces and fought them, and later, when it fought
the British and subsequently Dutch forces. In addition, the Japa-
nese gave very limited military training (but no arms) and the
function of security guards to a considerable number of village
and urban youth; when the Peta later expanded its ranks as a
revolutionary army, it was able to draw on this source. 80
On the Indonesian side, although opposition to the Japanese
occupation intensified, there was no unanimity on how to re-
spond. Some nationalist leaders, like Sukarno and Hatta, osten-
sibly collaborated with the Japanese while surreptitiously using
the opportunities afforded them to rally support for nationalist
ideas. Other leaders, like Sjahrir, organized underground re-
sistance. Even the organizations established by the Japanese
divided Indonesian opinion. At first many nationalist leaders
thought they could achieve their goals by working through Japa-
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nese-approved institutions, such as the commission to study In-
donesian customary law (adat), the Empat Serangkai (literally
Four-leaved Clover, referring to the four Indonesian leaders:
Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur, and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro), the Pusat
Tenaga Rakyat (Center of People’s Power, Putera), and the Tjuo
Sangi-In (Central Advisory Committee). Unlike the Volksraad
(People’s Council), where the majority had never actively sup-
ported the nationalists’ goal of independence, the Tjuo Sangi-In
consisted exclusively, apart from the ubiquitous Japanese ob-
servers, of deputies who were of one mind in desiring indepen-
dence. 81 But the perceived cooperation of nationalist leaders
with the hated Japanese was itself divisive, as most of the
Muslim groups and many regional leaders regarded them as
traitors and accomplices in increasing the suffering of the In-
donesian people.
The Japanese attitude toward the nationalist leaders was
not consistent. Having tried at first to mobilize the population
for the war effort without the help of acknowledged Indonesian
leaders, the Japanese soon realized that the only way to get
their economic program carried out was by using established
leaders. They thus incorporated nationalist leaders in the
Putera, which had a central bureau in Jakarta (the Japanese had
adopted the native name for Batavia since the end of 1942) and
branches in most provinces, and in the Tjuo Sangi-In, set up in
Jakarta in 1943 with similar bodies (sangi-kai) in the provinces.
Later, the Japanese replaced the Putera with the Jawa Hokokai
(Javanese People’s Loyalty Movement) to mobilize and control
better the priyayi (gentry), particularly the lesser priyayi or, as
they were now more often called, the pamong praja (adminis-
trative corps). 82 The Indonesian nationalists, although retaining
key positions in the new movement, were incensed by the cre-
ation of Jawa Hokokai, partly because it deprived them of the
organizational independence they had enjoyed in the time of
the Putera, partly because this Japanese-titled organization re-
flected only too clearly the occupiers’ policy of Nipponization,
and partly because they were sandwiched between the military
and the priyayi, neither of whom were interested in encour-
aging ideas of independence among the masses. 83
Furthermore, the Japanese were not consistent in their at-
titude toward independence for Indonesia. At first they held out
the possibility of independence (1942), but quickly changed this
to membership in a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
(March 1943), then incorporation into the Japanese empire
(May 1943), followed by permission to “cooperate in gov-
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ernment” (June 1943), and finally, after growing Nipponization,
a deceptive promise of independence (September 1944). Yet de-
spite the disappointment and frustration of gradual annexation
and Nipponization, and despite the denial of future indepen-
dence, nationalist sentiment grew and the nationalist leaders,
particularly in Java, never lost their fervor nor stopped putting
pressure on the occupation regime for self-government and in-
dependence. As Hatta put it in 1943:
It was perhaps necessary for strategic reasons to divide Indonesia
into separate areas of military administration, but Indonesians
will not give up the desire and determination they have shown
over the past forty years to unite these territories into one glo-
rious nation. 84
Thus, tremendous changes took place during the brief three
and one-half years of Japanese occupation, out of all proportion
to the pace of developments earlier in the century. Not only
was political consciousness raised on a wide scale, but also,
especially toward the end of the occupation, plans were made
and organizations created to prepare for forthcoming indepen-
dence.
Although the first nationalist organizations under the
Japanese were limited to the Java-Madura command only, they
were not restricted to those living only on Java. There were
many active nationalist leaders from different ethnic groups
throughout the archipelago. Although nationalism was
strongest in Java and most of the organized movements and
resistance to the Japanese took place there, nationalism had
developed a pan-Indonesian appeal. There were frequent rebel-
lions against Japanese rule in the Outer Islands that were often
hard to suppress. Although people from Java predominated in
the councils and organizations that pressed for a share in gov-
ernment, the Outer Islands had similar advisory committees and
provincial municipal councils, beginning in 1944. Sumatra, for
example, had a single council set up in March 1945 at Bukit
Tinggi consisting of Acehnese and representatives of western,
eastern, and southern Sumatra. 85
It was not until May 1945, however, that a nationwide com-
mittee was established to deal with the problems of indepen-
dence (and not until August that Indonesian nationalists from
the navy-administered areas were permitted to come to Java
to consult with Javanese and Sumatran leaders). 86 This was
the Badan Penyelidikan Kemerdekaan Indone sia (the BPKI,
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the Committee for the Investigation of Independence for In-
donesia), which consisted of sixty-three nominated members
from all classes of the population and all shades of opinion in
the nationalist movement, and included Outer Islanders living
in Java. Nationalists, federalists, unitarians—all had different
ideas about the size, shape, partitioning, and administering
of the new country-to-be. 87 It was at the first session of the
BPKI that Sukarno proposed the Panca Sila (Five Principles of
State) as the basic ideology of the future state: belief in one
God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice, and popular
sovereignty. It is probable that this national philosophy, with
its fusion of ideologies in keeping with the ancient Javanese
tradition of syncretism, met with acceptance only because of
the strength of outside pressures—the approaching end of the
Japanese occupation and the possibility of independence. It
papered over deeply rooted differences rather than resolving
them.
The BPKI adopted a republican form of government and
drafted a constitution based in theory on the Indonesian demo-
cratic principles of consultation (musyawarah), consensus (mu-
fakat), and cooperation (gotong royong). Sovereignty was to
reside in the Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (the Indonesian People’s
Congress), which was to consist of the Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat (DPR, a parliament chosen by direct vote) together with
additional deputies who were to represent provinces and
groups in proportion to their population and size. The Congress
was to elect a president and vice-president by simple majority
for a five-year term and a Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Ad-
visory Council of State). Ironically, however, the whole consti-
tution reflected more the authoritarian principles of Dutch and
Japanese rule that had been so violently criticized than the more
flexible consultation and consensus processes regarded as more
“Indonesian.” 88
Considerable disagreement arose over the precise shape of
the future independent state. Hatta wanted to limit Indonesia to
the former Dutch East Indies but without New Guinea, though
possibly including Malaya. Yamin, supported by Sukarno, de-
manded the whole of New Guinea, Portuguese Timor, the British
possessions in Borneo, and Malaya as far as the frontier with
Thailand. A third group, consisting mostly of former civil ser-
vants, wanted the territory of the Dutch East Indies precisely as
it stood. Interestingly, in the voting Yamin’s Greater Indonesia
won an overwhelming majority, 89 illustrating again how unsolid-
ified the concept of Indonesia still was in 1945. It was not until
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later that year, when the Indonesian Independence Preparatory
Committee was constituted, with eight of its twenty represen-
tatives coming from the Outer Islands, 90 that the decision was
made to confine the new independent country to the territory
of the former Dutch East Indies. Independence was declared on
August 17, 1945, and took only hours to be relayed throughout
the archipelago and abroad.
In Jakarta, the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, the
Central Indonesian National Committee) was set up, with 135
members chosen by Sukarno and Hatta to represent the chief
ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups in Indonesia; 91
while in the eight provinces established by the Preparatory
Committee (West, Central, and East Java; Sumatra; Kalimantan;
Sulawesi; Maluku; and the Lesser Sunda Islands) arrangements
were made for local national committees. A governor was ap-
pointed for each province by Sukarno; the KNIP appointed a
delegate to assist each governor. Thus in the six weeks between
the Japanese surrender and the Allied arrival, the Indonesians
had established a fledgling republican government with its own
civil service and with extensive militant support among the In-
donesian people. The Indonesian flag was flown, the black cap
or peci (originally a Muslim symbol but extended by Sukarno
to have national significance) was worn, and Radio Republik
Indonesia went on the air. The nationalists, led by the Peta
(Indonesian army) and students, first struggled for control of
Japanese weapons and for key cities in both Java and Sumatra
and then wrestled with the British occupational forces. Only
after this did they begin their major conflict, with the returning
Dutch, who were unable to comprehend either the extent or
depth of nationalist feeling that had so intensified in their brief
four-year absence.
The next four years of struggle against the Dutch, from 1945
to 1949, were a time of growing solidarity and psychological
unity for many Indonesians in their demand for a united and
fully independent Indonesia. Differences of opinion inevitably
arose that temporarily distracted the people and created di-
visive tensions, such as that between the youth and the older
leaders both inside and outside the army, and by the com-
munists (who attempted to lead a revolt against Sukarno and
Hatta in Madiun in 1948), but the momentum of the nationalist
movement and resistance both to the Dutch “Pacification Ex-
ercises” and to the imprisonment of Indonesian leaders
strengthened national resistance and provided a strong inte-
grative force.
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Yet, as with nationalist consciousness, revolutionary fervor
was by no means uniformly felt throughout the country. Support
for the newly independent Republic centered in central and
eastern Java, Jakarta, and parts of Sumatra. By contrast, there
was no strong or active Indonesian nationalist organization in
eastern Indonesia, where the Japanese had not permitted In-
donesian nationalists to organize or to form militias. 92 Much of
this area was occupied up to a year before the Japanese sur-
render by the Allied forces (Australian) and was returned easily
to Dutch civil administration after the war. Most of Java and
Sumatra, by contrast, remained part of the revolutionary Re-
public. The Ambonese continued to support the Dutch and even
fought against their fellow countrymen’s revolutionary struggle
for independence. Inevitably by so doing, they aroused bitter re-
sentment. Indeed, so strong was their anti-Republic sentiment
that after the Round Table Conference in 1949, southern
Maluku withstood considerable pressure to merge with the Re-
public of Indonesia in a unitary state as the other “federal
states” did. It preferred instead to transfer its leaders (and
40,000 of its population who were mainly former members of
the Dutch colonial army [KNIL] and their families, and former
officials in the Dutch administration) to the Netherlands and
form a government-in-exile there, waiting for the opportunity to
reestablish an independent entity in those islands. (The 1975 in-
cidents of the ambushed train and the attack on the Indonesian
embassy in the Netherlands, and the 1977 school takeover and
train hijacking illustrate the survival of this hope a generation
later.)
Anti-Republic sentiment was also expressed by the Darul
Islam movement focused in West Java, Aceh, and later in South
Sulawesi and Kalimantan. This aimed at establishing an Islamic
state in Indonesia and as such opposed both the Republic and
Dutch domination. It supported its claim with guerrilla warfare,
which lasted from 1950 to 1962.
Part of the Dutch strategy to regain control of the arch-
ipelago was to accentuate differences among Indonesians in
different parts of the country. They attempted to isolate the self-
proclaimed Republic from other areas of Indonesia in the hope
of creating a federal order wherein pro-Republican elements
would be outnumbered by Dutch-controlled component states.
93 The other part of Dutch strategy was to destroy the Republic
by military means. They abrogated a number of agreements (in-
cluding the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements) made with
the Republic over the 1946–1949 period and ultimately forced
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on the revolutionary Republic’s leaders a federal state in which
fifteen of the sixteen member states were of Dutch creation. 94
Each of these was far smaller in size and significance than the
Republic, which by 1949 comprised approximately half of Java
and three-quarters of Sumatra (and a population of more than
thirty-one million).
Among Indonesia’s leaders there remained wide differences
of opinion as to the future form and orientation of the country.
Pro-Dutch, pro-Islamic state, and pro-Panca Sila (revolutionary
Republic) nationalist sentiments existed in different parts of the
archipelago. The experiences of the isolation of different areas
under the Japanese and the four years of revolution against
the Dutch during which the separate regions acted as highly
autonomous units further hindered the growth of unity. How-
ever, counterbalancing these centrifugal forces were the psy-
chological unity created by the goal of a united and fully in-
dependent Indonesia, an increasing sense of national identity,
the consciousness of a common political purpose, and the com-
mitment to a common revolutionary struggle against the Dutch.
Yet in these strong centripetal forces and psychological bonds
of unity lay the seeds of weakness. For once independence had
been fully attained, the powerful negative dynamic of oppo-
sition to colonial rule was no longer applicable, and Indonesian
nationalism lost much of its strength as a force for national
cohesion. In the absence of strong outside pressures, ethnic
and regional differences that had been submerged to some
extent in the common struggle for independence soon reap-
peared to challenge the concept of national unity. Indeed, it has
been claimed that the very success of the Indonesian revolution
against the Dutch not only strengthened national political con-
sciousness, but above all awakened regional pride based on an-
cient ethnic particularisms. 95
Also, belief that independence would be a panacea for all dif-
ficulties, economic, social, and political, turned quickly to dis-
illusionment as expectations for a better life remained largely
unfulfilled (and the standard of living in Java continued to de-
cline). In addition, appreciation of the centripetal power created
by opposition to a common enemy contributed to the adoption
of adventuristic policies in the new Republic, such as the con-
tinued cries to perpetuate the revolution (“against the enemies
of imperialism, capitalism, liberalism, and individualism” 96 ),
the growing confrontation with the Dutch over the status of
West Irian, and the Konfrontasi with Malaysia of the early and
mid-1960s. 97
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THE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE
The period of independence has been marked by deep divisions,
regional rebellions, and even a short period of civil war (in
1958), but also by growing integration and the centralization of
power. The country has survived as one political entity, unlike
many other areas of the world that had also been united and
kept together forcibly by colonial rule but that broke up after
independence, such as the British West Indies, French West and
Equatorial Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
and even the former unitary state of Pakistan. Part of the reason
for Indonesia’s survival has been its shared history along with
certain common cultural underpinnings. Part has to do with
the growing power and widening control of the military Part,
too, has been strong leadership, including the charismatic type
of leadership exercised by Sukarno, and his political skill in
keeping the country one 98 and in balancing the various forces
of the nationalists, religious leaders, communists, and military.
One way he preserved national unity was by changing the po-
litical system from the original federal to a unitary type of state
in 1950, and from experimentation with parliamentary democ-
racy in 1950–1957 to Guided Democracy (or martial law) in
1957–1965. However, the price for such unity under Sukarno
was extremely high, because his concern for solidarity and na-
tional unity largely ignored both legitimate regional concerns
and the basic economic foundations upon which all states
depend. As economic decline, inflation, and falling standards of
living intensified, tensions increased that ultimately helped to
precipitate Sukarno’s downfall, the murder of hundreds of thou-
sands of Javanese and Balinese in the aftermath of the abortive
coup of 1965, and the imposition of military rule under the pres-
idency of General Suharto.
The change from a weak federal system to the stronger,
more centralized unitary state in 1950 was one deliberate step
toward consolidating the fragile unity of the Republic.
Sukarno’s emphasis on keeping up the revolutionary spirit and
momentum, on infusing the diverse peoples throughout the
archipelago with a common national symbolism, on reinter-
preting history to foster national pride, and on obtaining world-
wide recognition contributed to national integration in one re-
spect. Indonesia hosted the Asian Games and the celebrated
Bandung Conference of Third World leaders in 1955. Sukarno
successfully repudiated the debt imposed on Indonesia as the
price of independence by the Netherlands in 1949. He nation-
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alized Dutch economic interests and repatriated many Dutch
and Chinese, and he succeeded in attaining the transfer of West
Irian to Indonesian control. He inspired and demanded loyalty
and nurtured a sense of national unity.
But these achievements, though integrative in their intent
and in many of their aspects, were not without both disinte-
grative elements and serious costs. With the removal of the
powerful unifying struggle for independence, regionalisms
reemerged and threatened at times to dismember the state.
Indeed, Indonesia experienced twenty-one regional rebellions
and revolts within its first twenty years of independence—ample
evidence of the lack of integration within the country. 99
Sukarno’s emphasis on perpetuating the revolution through
“symbol-wielding” conflicted with the goals of the “adminis-
trators” or liberals, based more in the Outer Islands, who
sought to promote integration through rationalized economic
development and efficiency. 100 Important divisions arose also
between rival ideologies; among and within political parties, the
military establishment, and government leaders; and perhaps
most important of all, between Java and the Outer Islands,
which itself is a key constituent of these other divisions.
The first national elections, in 1955, though designed to en-
courage participation in a national event and though shared in
by the population throughout the country, were also a source of
division. This was partly because of the two years of intensive
and often bitter campaigns, accompanied by the growth of cor-
ruption; partly because the election campaign clarified and em-
phasized the divisions existing in society and forced a choice
upon the people; and partly because of the frustration that
ensued when the prosperity and progress the elections had
promised did not materialize. The central issue of the campaign
itself was deeply divisive: whether the state should continue to
be based on the Panca Sila or become a state based on Islam.
The voting pattern demonstrated both the strength and nature
of regional divisions and the depth of divisions among the dif-
ferent groups in society, particularly among the nationalist, so-
cialist, and religious elements. 101 The Nationalists (PNI), the
Communists (PKI), and the Muslim Scholars’ Association (Nah-
datul Ulama, representing the more traditional Muslims) were
all heavily supported in densely populated Java, but gleaned few
votes in the Outer Islands. By contrast, the Masjumi (the re-
formist Islamic party) emerged as by far the largest party of the
Outer Islands. 102
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Even the Asian Games and the Bandung Conference pro-
voked division, in that these took place on Java and accentuated
the Java-Outer Islands dichotomy that had been growing over
the years.
This basic division between Java and the Outer Islands has
been traced back to the old rivalries existing in the times of
the ancient empires, between the sea-based, trade-oriented,
Outer Island-centered empire of Sri Vijaya, and the land-based,
agricultural, Java-centered Majapahit. But other historians see
its roots as much older, going back to differences between
the ladang (swidden) cultivation typical of the Outer Islands,
and the sawah (wet rice) culture of Java, which dates back
to Neolithic times. Sawah cultivation implies a rigid ecological
technique: communal control over land, water supply, and cul-
tivation systems is reflected in the highly formalized and hier-
archical pattern of the intervillage social relations of Javanese
rural society. Communal solidarity, a sensitivity to adat (cus-
tomary law), and suffusion with a magico-religious cosmology
that stresses harmony, continuity, order, and the unity of the
land, people, and food cultivated, are all features of this life
orientation. 103 Different strands of opinion represented by the
priyayi (aristocracy) of the kraton (palace) and the abangan
(traditional Muslims) of the village are thus held together in
a harmonious, communal whole by the common ceremonies,
superstitions, and mutual cooperation of traditional Javanese
culture. Javanese society has also a highly absorptive character.
Out of this ethos came the Panca Sila.
By contrast, the ladang system of shifting cultivation, which
is much more common in the Outer Islands, has encouraged
egalitarian social structures and a more individualistic, entre-
preneurial spirit. The purer Muslim tradition found in many
parts of the Outer Islands had little in common with the syn-
cretic Javanese current of thought. It opposed the all-embracing
Panca Sila philosophy with its lack of distinction between
secular and sacred, and opposed colonialism through a cru-
sading zeal against the infidel. Within this Muslim tradition
were the modernists (who were prepared to combine modern
technological and scientific ways with a distinctively Muslim
outlook on life), the orthodox (who were able more easily to ac-
commodate to the conservative, older generations, particularly
in the rural areas), and the militants (who advocated the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state and were willing to back up this
desire with force).
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Whatever its origin, the Java-Outer Islands dichotomy was
a division to which the Dutch added a further dimension by fo-
cusing their attention on Java. Java benefited from certain as-
pects of Western tradition such as health measures, sanitation,
education, enforced peace between rival groups, more scientific
methods of agriculture, better transportation and communica-
tions networks, and so on; but it also suffered the problems of
greater exploitation and foreign control. The Outer Islands, by
contrast, retained more independence in their traditional ways
of life, trading patterns, and indigenous retail and distributive
operations. They were able to respond positively to new eco-
nomic opportunities, including the cultivation of export crops
and improved trading opportunities, and developed increased
political consciousness and regional and ethnic pride. 104
As a result of this differential treatment by the colonial
power, Java’s population grew explosively, from 18 million
people in 1875 to 35 million in 1920, and 49 million in 1940. (Ex-
plosive population growth continued after independence, with
population increasing to 63 million in 1961, 76 million in 1971,
91 million in 1980, and an estimated 106 million in 1988.) 105
This growth in population on Java altered the established eco-
nomic pattern of Javanese domination of the export economy.
Whereas Java had been a rice-producing and rice-exporting
area, producing 82 percent of Indonesia’s total exports as late
as 1892, Java’s increase in population soon outstripped rice pro-
duction, with the result that Java became a net rice-importing
area. By 1955 Java contributed only 12 percent of Indonesia’s
exports. 106 Because 88 percent of Indonesia’s foreign exchange
earnings thus originated in the Outer Islands (71 percent from
Sumatra alone), it is easy to understand the growing re-
sentment aroused especially in the productive areas of the
Outer Islands against the perceived parasitism of Java, when
over 80 percent of Indonesia’s foreign earnings was being spent
on goods and services for the population in Java. 107 In addition,
the regions outside Java became intensely dissatisfied with the
government’s failure to encourage their economic development
or even to provide sufficient administrative and fiscal decentral-
ization to allow them to undertake this themselves. 108
Economic disparity and Javacentric economic policies,
therefore, were one source of friction between Java and the
Outer Islands. Others were fear of Javanese imperialism and
domination of politics and culture, resentment of “Javanese ar-
rogance and feudal class-consciousness,” 109 growing discontent
with the centralized administrative control exercised from
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Jakarta, inadequate communications within and among the
Outer Islands and between them and Java (heightened after the
take-over of Dutch concerns in 1957 as the West Irian campaign
backfired and the Dutch withdrew their interisland shipping
fleet), and the almost inevitable inefficiency of a newly created
bureaucracy. The coalition of divergent interests symbolized
by the Javanese syncretic, symbol-wielding, politically oriented
President Sukarno and the Sumatran, economics-minded ad-
ministrator, Vice-President Mohammed Hatta, came under more
and more strain, until it culminated in Hatta’s resignation in
December 1956 and the unilateral imposition of Guided
Democracy by Sukarno the following year.
These sources of dissatisfaction, together with fear of the
growing influence of communism, contributed to the PRRI-Per-
mesta rebellion of 1958–1961, the most serious threat to the
territorial integrity of Indonesia since independence. This cen-
tered in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi and dramatically
highlighted the intensity of regional feelings. 110 Yet the lack
of widely expected support from other regions and the over-
whelming defeat of the rebellion demonstrated the strength of
Indonesian cohesion. As a result of the rebellion, the centralized
government’s control over the provinces was tightened and the
government became increasingly authoritarian. From speeches
extolling national unity, Sukarno turned to demanding that all
Indonesians give their loyalty exclusively to his government.
He insisted that their devotion to national goals set by him
should supersede whatever personal commitments they might
have to local, ethnic, or religious communities, to professional
standards, and even to humanitarian values. 111
Sukarno relied increasingly on political and symbolic means
of attaining national unity: he tried to inspire nationalistic
feelings through the use of oratory and appeals to patriotism,
slogans, and ceremony. The Political Manifesto of 1959 (Ma-
nipol USDEK) was rich in symbolism, from the mystical number
of five (as in Panca Sila) to the major ideas themselves in the
acronym USDEK: the 1945 constitution (Undang-undang dasar
1945), Indonesian socialism (Sosialisme Indonesia), Guided
Democracy (Demokrasi terpimpin), Guided Economy (Ekonomi
ter pimpin), and Indonesian identity (Kepribadian Indonesia).
Nasakom, the title of the national front formed in 1961, deriving
from the initial syllables of the words for nationalism (nasion-
alisme), religion (agama), and communism (komunisme), was
another example of Sukarno’s love of acronyms and synthe-
sizing symbolism. 112 Sukarno’s oratory was superb, and
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through this, his consistent concern with national unity and sol-
idarity, and his warmth and patriotism he won tremendous re-
spect and affection from a vast number of Indonesian citizens.
113
Guided Democracy (1957–1965), however, was accompanied
by continued insensitivity to regional needs, bureaucratic in-
efficiencies, and deteriorating economic conditions. Even the
Eight-Year National Plan, put forward in 1960, was significant
more for its symbolism (it had seventeen parts, eight chapters,
and 1,945 paragraphs, commemorating the declaration of inde-
pendence on 17 August 1945) and wishful thinking than for its
realistic approach to development. 114 Sukarno spent much of
the country’s resources on huge, unproductive national monu-
ments and extravagant world tours, while inflation soared and
tension increased among the major political groupings—the na-
tionalists, Muslims, communists, and the army. Tensions finally
erupted in the pro-communist abortive coup of September 30,
1965 (Gestapu: Gerakan September Tigapuluh, the September
30 Movement). The ensuing bloodbath, in which hundreds of
thousands of communist supporters were massacred and innu-
merable personal scores settled, revealed the depth and bit-
terness of the hostilities that had built up over the years,
particularly during the “imposed consensus” of the Guided
Democracy period. 115 Bloodletting was greatest in syncretic
Muslim Java, but was by no means confined there: Hindu Bali
also witnessed extensive killings, as did North Sumatra, al-
though far fewer deaths occurred in the Outer Islands.
The New Order (Orde Baru), ushered in by Sukarno’s suc-
cessor, General Suharto, has rejected the Sukarno model of at-
taining national unity and integration by symbol-wielding and
revolution in favor of consistent emphasis on political stability,
order, and economic development, even at the price of the lim-
itation of democracy and the imposition of military rule (albeit
with civilian technocrats incorporated into the government).
Indeed, the army has presented itself as a truly national force
identified with the interests of the community as a whole and
therefore most fitted to rule. 116 At a seminar in 1965, the army
produced the doctrine of the Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) of the
armed forces, justifying their dual role as both a military force
and a social-political force (covering the “ideological, political,
social, economic, cultural, and religious fields”). Since then the
army has justified its continued domination of the state on the
grounds that civilians still need the strong leadership that only
the army can provide. 117 Since 1965 the army has expanded
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its role in politics and administration; many military leaders
hold positions as governors, ambassadors, secretaries-general
of government departments, and managing directors of state
firms at both the national and regional levels. 118
Indeed, the military has been increasing its political role
in the country ever since 1945, when the youths who took up
arms were motivated less by the desire for a military career
than by patriotism and support for the Republic proclaimed
by Indonesia’s nationalist leaders. 119 After independence was
attained, the army continued its political involvement, at first
in an essentially guardian role, but later as a full participant
in the affairs of state. The weak hierarchical structure and
sharp rivalries among groups of officers curbed the army’s ef-
fectiveness as a political force in its early days. But gradually
army leaders were able to take advantage of the various na-
tional crises (generated in part by politically oriented dissident
groups within the army) and the weaknesses of successive po-
litical systems to take wider powers. After the introduction of
martial law in 1957, the armed forces, and particularly the
army, became deeply involved in politics, civil administration,
and economic management, and thus became a key part of the
government coalition under Guided Democracy. 120 The army
gained in strength and unity also as a result of its role in putting
down the rebellions of 1958–1961.
After 1957 (the imposition of Guided Democracy), and par-
ticularly after 1965 (the abortive communist coup and the be-
ginning of the military government under President Suharto),
the army rapidly expanded its role in the economy, as well as its
political power. This took place at two levels. First, the military
sought to supplement the limited funds they were allocated by
the government by establishing various enterprises and con-
trolling certain elements of the economy such as the state oil
corporation (Pertamina), the national food trading agency, and
the general trading corporation. 121 Similar arrangements were
made also in the Outer Islands, where military officers became
involved in a wide range of business activities. By obtaining
funds and foreign exchange directly from Pertamina and other
enterprises controlled by the military, the army sought to free
itself from domestic criticism, bureaucratic controls, and
foreign pressure by creating the impression that military expen-
diture was less than it really was. Indeed, by the mid-1970s,
at least half the army’s operating funds derived from extragov-
ernment sources. 122
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Second, army officers developed their own private economic
interests, establishing business partnerships with Chinese and
foreign businessmen, and arranging contracts, credits, and li-
censes for colleagues, friends, or relations, or in exchange for
commissions. Indeed, Crouch has suggested that many officers
felt much more at home dealing with Chinese and foreign busi-
nessmen than commanding troops in the field. 123 The military
thus acquired a stake in the regime and in defending the ex-
isting social order.
The military was also very concerned after 1965 not just to
consolidate its own power but to provide the political stability
necessary for economic development to flourish. Specifically,
the military leaders incorporated civilian technocrats into the
government, hoping that they would create a favorable eco-
nomic climate for Western and Japanese investment capital and
so provide lucrative economic opportunities for the military-
dominated elite. 124 The rapid expansion of the economy through
the influx of foreign aid and private capital not only enabled the
army to raise funds for its own operations and provided officers
with material satisfaction from their own private activities, but
also, by providing greater revenues, enabled the government
to raise salaries substantially for civil servants throughout the
country, thus helping to create a broader civilian base of
support for the regime.
The role of the military has had both positive and negative
effects in terms of the overall integration of the nation-state. On
the positive side, the New Order military government with its
civilian technocrats has established a large measure of political
stability and continuity, which in turn has restored investment
confidence and led to real progress in economic development.
Loans from the World Bank and loans and aid from the coun-
tries in the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), as
well as investment by private investors, have all contributed to
the country’s economic growth. The post-1965 period has been
characterized by the rehabilitation of the much-neglected trans-
portation system and great achievements in the development
of new microwave and satellite communications systems, the
end of the chronic inflation of the mid-1960s, improvement in
production levels, a spectacular increase in export earnings,
and a succession of four five-year economic development plans.
There has been a slow but appreciable increase in the general
standard of living for many people.
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Yet not all the effects of the New Order or even of the im-
proved economic situation have been integrative, either eco-
nomically or politically. Economically, the emphasis on effi-
ciency in development has resulted in greater and increasingly
apparent inequalities between the military and civilians, be-
tween urban and rural areas, between landowners and local
government officials on the one hand and the mass of peasantry
on the other, and between Java (where most development
monies have been invested) and the Outer Islands, inequalities
that have provoked widespread resentment against the gov-
ernment. The army’s conception of economic development has
been primarily oriented toward the interests of the elite and
white-collar middle class, and toward the modern sector of the
economy, at the expense of indigenous entrepreneurs and the
national good. Indeed, Crouch claims that the entire system is
designed primarily to serve the interests of the military elite
and the civilian bureaucratic and business groups closely linked
with it. 125 Only in the last two five-year development plans, Re-
pelita III (1979–1984) and Repelita IV (1984–1989), has the em-
phasis shifted to the goals of greater equality in development
and the more even distribution of the fruits of devel-
opment—and there are questions as to how far these goals are
being implemented.
Politically, despite the elaborate facade of democratic elec-
tions in 1971, 1977, 1982, and 1987, the military retains control
of the country. Political parties have been forcibly amalgamated
and streamlined, and support has been coerced for the
government-sponsored party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Union of
Functional Groups). Many of the political channels previously
available as outlets for criticism and as safety valves for feelings
of resentment against the regime are now severely limited;
unacceptable political opposition is suppressed. The press is
more strictly controlled and muzzled and student criticism more
muted than before. Until late 1977, when thousands were re-
leased, more political prisoners were in custody than at any
time in the past. In contrast to Sukarno’s mobilization of the
peasant population for various patriotic causes, the New Order
has encouraged political passivity. Fear of arrest and of the pow-
erful secret police (Kopkamtib, the Operational Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order, established in 1965), as
well as of the army-controlled State Intelligence Coordinating
Body (Bakin, founded in 1967), has further discouraged political
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activity. It remains to be seen whether such lack of meaningful
political participation can be extended indefinitely, especially in
the face of blatant corruption and mismanagement.
Greater streamlining of the bureaucracy and stronger
control in government, although leading perhaps to greater na-
tional coordination, have resulted also in increased Javanese
control over Indonesian life. 126 This can be seen in the growing
proportion of Javanese in the government (especially in the
cabinet) and in the military leadership. This preponderance
of Javanese officers occurred originally because most of the
fighting during the revolution took place in Java. But it became
even more pronounced when many non-Javanese lost their po-
sitions because of their involvement in the 1958 rebellion. Be-
cause of Indonesia’s uneven population distribution, it is to be
expected that the Javanese should make up between 60 and
65 percent of the national leadership in proportion to their
numerical strength. But this proportionate representation is
not easily reconciled with the need to grant representation on
the basis of territorial extent or ethnic balance. And in any
case Javanese domination of government offices and army lead-
ership exceeds their proportional makeup of the population of
Indonesia and has increased significantly since 1956. 127 By
the 1960s about 70 percent of army officers were Javanese.
In addition, the carefully worked-out balance in the highest
leadership positions, by which the president (Sukarno) was a
Javanese and the vice-president (Hatta) a Sumatran, a repre-
sentative of the Outer Islands, was upset for more than twenty
years after Hatta’s resignation in 1956; the position of vice-
president was first abolished and then, after the position was
restored in 1965, filled by Hamengko Buwono IX, the Sultan
of Yogyakarta, a Javanese, until Adam Malik, a Sumatran, was
elected in 1978. From 1983 to 1988, however, the vice-pres-
ident was from West Java, retired General Umar Wira-
hadikusumah. In 1988, another Javanese, Soedharmono, was
elected vice-president. Javanese domination of the military and
government has changed somewhat since the mid-1970s as
the 1945 (mainly Javanese) generation has begun to reach re-
tirement. They are being replaced by the so-called Magelang
generation (trained at the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy
[Akabri] in Magelang), which includes officers from all parts of
Indonesia. This group includes a greater proportion of officers
dedicated to greater regularization and reform. 128
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The growing centralization of authority within the military
has been another cause for concern. After the PRRI-Permesta
rebellion, which ended in 1961, the central army leadership im-
proved its position vis-à-vis the Outer Islands. It garrisoned the
Outer Islands with forces from Java (thus in effect establishing a
military occupation of the Outer Islands by Java’s “central gov-
ernment” forces in the name of national unity); it reduced the
authority of the regional military commanders; and it created a
para-commando regiment under direct central control. 129 Since
the 1965 abortive coup power has been so much further cen-
tralized and concentrated among the Javanese that some Outer
Islanders claim that they have exchanged Dutch colonialism for
Javanese colonialism and “colonelism.” 130 In addition, Suharto
has also consolidated authority within the armed forces them-
selves. Up until 1965 Sukarno had manipulated interservice
rivalries and undermined the cohesion of the armed forces, ex-
pecting the air force, navy, and police to balance the power
of the army. 131 After 1965 Suharto reduced the power of the
other three branches and ended open factionalism within the
army through the transfer of commanders. He also halted in-
terservice rivalry with a reorganization and integration of the
armed forces under a single command.
Finally, the army’s integrative political power has been ex-
ercised partly through its “territorial” organization. Alongside
its fighting units the army developed a network of territorial
units concerned with internal security and generally watching
over civilian activities. Thus, the army sought to integrate itself
with the people through its territorial units, which more or less
paralleled the civilian administration at every level. Martial law
had been administered through these territorial units between
1957 and 1963; later in the 1960s, after emergency regulations
were abolished, local commanders continued to carry out in-
ternal security functions as agents of Kopkamtib. Through this
territorial organization and the power of the armed forces, the
Indonesian government has had at least a fair level of effective
control over the whole of its national territory, unlike several of
its Southeast Asian neighbors. It can, perhaps, be argued that
without military force it is entirely possible that the fragile state
of Indonesia would have fractured.
However, this raises the question of the extent to which In-
donesia’s unity is coerced or free and genuine, and whether
a measure of coerced unity is really the same thing as inte-
gration. Undoubtedly there is considerable pressure from the
central government to maintain Indonesia’s territorial integrity
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and achieve political stability through both coercion and the
distribution of patronage. But in addition, a variety of govern-
ment policies throughout Indonesia’s period of independence
has consistently sought to promote national integration within
the country (although the methods of reaching this goal have
changed over time).
In this brief survey of Indonesia’s recent history, a major
underlying theme has been the tension between Java and the
Outer Islands as it has affected the political, sociocultural, eco-
nomic, and military spheres of the national life. Even potentially
integrative events and structures have been undermined by
this division. Yet the dichotomy between Java and the Outer Is-
lands is not the only source of division within the country. As
might be expected in a nation as large and diverse as Indonesia,
the situation is much more complex. This complexity, which
strongly modifies any rigid distinction between Java and the
Outer Islands, is more integrative than the situation existing,
for example, within neighboring Malaysia, where historical de-
velopments have reinforced more clear-cut, ethnically based di-
visions. Within Java there are deeply felt divisions among the
Sundanese of western Java, the Madurese, and the ethnic Ja-
vanese of central and eastern Java, in cultural as well as politi-
cal orientation. In the Outer Islands there is considerably more
diversity, not only among sukubangsa (major tribal groups) such
as the Batak and Minangkabau or Ambonese and Dyak, but
also among suku (subtribal groups) such as the Karo, Toba, and
Mandailing Batak. The Acehnese are well known for their hos-
tility to any outside control, be it Dutch or Indonesian. And
resentment has been felt historically by the peoples of South
Sulawesi against the Minahasans (of North Sulawesi) as well as
against the Javanese. These examples highlight one of the key
problems of Indonesian unity: in many areas, ethnic loyalty still
rivals national loyalty in importance.
At the same time, certain areas outside Java have partici-
pated disproportionately in the national life of the country, both
in terms of their areal involvement in the various integrative
experiences of Indonesia’s history and also in the number of
leaders originating from them. Three or four ethnic groups
stand out for their more entrepreneurial and dynamic roles
in national affairs—the Batak and Minangkabau in Sumatra
and the Minahasans and (to a lesser extent) the Ambonese in
eastern Indonesia. These have provided national leaders far out
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of proportion to their numbers, and the trading network created
by the Bugis and Makassarese (and, of course, the Chinese) has
likewise been disproportionately influential.
Within ethnic groups there have been divisions between re-
ligious and traditional (adat) leaders. Furthermore, there have
frequently been broader differences between coastal and in-
terior dwellers within a single island than among coastal
peoples in different islands separated by hundreds of miles.
Thus, an affinity created by a similar life style (such as depen-
dence on the sea for fishing and for communications) and by a
network of trading connections has often enabled the sea to be
an integrative rather than a divisive force.
The history of Indonesia, therefore, consists of a mosaic
of experiences, both integrative and divisive, which have been
shared to greatly varying extents by different parts of the In-
donesian archipelago. Although it can be argued that many
of the experiences have been uneven and even ambiguous in
their effect, the cumulative impact of the past has been gen-
erally integrative. The shared history of the ancient empires
and kingdoms, Dutch colonialism, the Japanese occupation, the
struggle for independence, and over four decades of functioning
as an independent nation-state, together with the country’s an-
cient roots, both mythical and historical, and its existence as
one political entity with basically the same political boundaries
for almost four centuries, have served to provide an important
common heritage for the vast majority of Indonesia’s inhabi-
tants. Most people consider themselves to be Indonesians and
have a genuine sense of national pride and identity.
However, two provinces have not shared to anything like
the same extent in most of the historical experiences discussed
thus far: Irian Jaya, because of its geographical location at the
eastern extremity of the country, its different ethnic and cultural
composition, its relative neglect by the Dutch, and its somewhat
later full incorporation into the nation-state of Indonesia; and
East Timor, which was a Portuguese colony until 1976, when it
was annexed by the Indonesians. They therefore merit separate
consideration.
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THE EXCEPTIONAL PROVINCES: IRIAN JAYA AND
EAST TIMOR
The problems posed by Irian Jaya and its continued incorpo-
ration into Indonesia remain considerable. The indigenous Iri-
anese are ethnically and culturally quite different from the
other peoples of Indonesia, yet their history has been bound up,
albeit loosely, with that country for over 300 years and perhaps
much longer. Indonesian nationalists claim that Irian Jaya was
part of the great thirteenth-and fourteenth-century kingdom of
Majapahit. The recorded history of Irian Jaya dates back to
1660, when Tidore, which had nominal jurisdiction over the
area, became a dependency of the Dutch East India Company.
This nominal rule of Tidore over Irian Jaya formed the basis of
the Netherlands East Indies’ boundary agreement with Great
Britain in 1885 and with Germany in 1910. But an effective
Dutch presence in Irian Jaya did not begin until 1898, and even
then, apart from being used for camps for exiled Indonesian
nationalists, Irian Jaya was basically neglected. Not until after
the Second World War, in an attempt to ward off claims by In-
donesian leaders that Irian Jaya was inherently a part of their
newly proclaimed independent country, did the Dutch establish
for the first time a permanent administration for the territory.
When the Dutch finally conceded independence to Indonesia in
1949, therefore, Irian Jaya was not included. 132
This policy led to an intensified confrontation between In-
donesia and the Netherlands, which was not settled until 1962
when Irian Jaya was transferred to United Nations auspices.
In 1969 an “Act of Free Choice” was conducted in which rep-
resentatives of the Irianese voted in a referendum on whether
they wanted to remain with Indonesia or become a separate,
autonomous state. However, since this referendum was taken
under Indonesian supervision and control, with few safeguards
to ensure that the Irianese would be given a fair opportunity
to exercise their choice, charges of Indonesian rigging of this
“Act of Free Choice” abound. Irianese nationalists, determined
to fight for an independent Irian Jaya, formed in 1963 the Or-
ganisasi Papua Merdeka (the OPM or Free Papua Movement).
During the early 1970s sporadic armed clashes occurred
throughout Irian Jaya between the Indonesian authorities and
West Papuan freedom fighters. These escalated into more sig-
nificant local uprisings in 1977 and 1978, coinciding with the
national elections and associated with Melanesian resistance
to pressures to vote for the ruling Golkar party. They drew re-
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newed attention to the demand for Irianese separatism, and
Indonesia’s handling of the situation elicited widespread sym-
pathy for the Irianese, especially among Irian Jaya’s Melanesian
neighbors. 133
The OPM continues to operate, partly from outside the
country, with political and propaganda activities organized from
bases in the Netherlands, Senegal, and Papua New Guinea, and
partly as a guerrilla force throughout Irian Jaya and particularly
in the region near the Papua New Guinea-Irian Jaya border. Al-
though the leaders claim to have 35,000 freedom fighters, most
reliable sources accept an estimate of 400–600 guerrillas with
an extensive network of supporters. 134 Despite numerous at-
tempts to eradicate them, the OPM continues to grow stronger,
claiming wider international recognition. Its strategy includes
threatening vital oil, gas, and mineral facilities in Irian Jaya,
causing a diversion of scarce resources to maintain security.
The OPM’ s resistance to the Indonesian government is based
on several grievances: forced territorial incorporation into In-
donesia, cultural imperialism, loss of identity, alienation of land,
and political repression.
Indeed, there appears to be considerable evidence to
support Irianese claims that Irian Jaya’s wealth of natural re-
sources—petroleum, natural gas, hard minerals (especially
copper), and timber—is being exploited by U.S., Japanese, and
South African firms for the benefit primarily of the Indonesian
central government in Jakarta, the military establishment,
foreign investors, and local (often non-Irianese) officials. Few if
any benefits accrue to the Irianese people; to the contrary, such
investments have frequently caused havoc in the lives of the Iri-
anese by uprooting them and undermining their way of life.
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government is determined to
consolidate Indonesian control over Irian Jaya and integrate the
area into the national whole, and not just for economic reasons.
There are symbolic and security reasons as well. For if Irian
Jaya were allowed to secede, a chain reaction of other dissat-
isfied regionally based minorities could follow.
Consequently, the Indonesian government has taken a
number of steps to ensure the continued integration of the
province. It has moved, or encouraged to move, thousands of
non-Irianese from Java, Maluku, and Sulawesi to resettlement
sites in Irian Jaya. By the early 1980s, over 250,000 non-Iri-
anese had been added to Irian Jaya’s 750,000 indigenous
people. The newcomers dominate the urban areas, and increas-
ingly the economic activities of the province. The transmi-
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gration (resettlement) plan for 1984–1989 anticipated the
movement of a further one million people to Irian Jaya, thus
threatening to reduce the Irianese to a minority in their own
province (although that goal has not been reached). As critics
have complained, the transmigration policy goes “in tandem
with a systematic policy of Indonesianization (and even Java-
nization) and Islamization of Irian Jaya,” the inevitable loss of
indigenous land, and political repression that is part of the cost
of “pacifying” the province. 135
Other steps taken by the Indonesian government to inte-
grate the province include efforts to assimilate the local pop-
ulace by bringing Irianese at the local level into the provincial
administration, the police, and the armed forces. A massive ed-
ucational program has been designed to “induct the Irianese
into the cultural mainstream.” 136 This includes increasing their
knowledge of the Indonesian language and providing opportu-
nities for tertiary study and training in Java and overseas. The
Trans-Irian Jaya Highway is being built along the length of the
border with Papua New Guinea in an attempt to cut off the OPM
from its support source in Papua New Guinea. It remains to be
seen how successful these measures will be.
The situation in East Timor poses less of a threat than does
that in Irian Jaya to the continued integrity of Indonesia, de-
spite its very different colonial history, partly because of its lo-
cation and the much greater inherent poverty of the province.
But the damage done in the past decade has been proportion-
ately greater.
Despite centuries of historical contacts, both trading and
political, between the great Hindu empires and succeeding
Muslim kingdoms in Java on the one hand and the eastern part
of Timor on the other, the Indonesians made no attempt to in-
corporate East Timor into the country until 1975. Indeed, few
Indonesian nationalists ever viewed East Timor as part of In-
donesia. But in 1975, uncertainty about the nature of Portugal’s
revolution and its consequences for its small Portuguese colony
in Southeast Asia, and fear that a nominally independent East
Timor could lead to a leftist (possibly Chinese-dominated) sub-
versive government as well as possibly serve as a model for
other minor but smoldering secessionist movements in eastern
Indonesia led the Indonesian government to annex the territory.
137
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Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in December 1975 was
followed by an “Act of Free Choice,” arranged by an Indonesian
government that ignored the fact that more than two-thirds of
the population of the territory was behind rebel (Fretilin) lines.
138 The ensuing massacres, atrocities, and looting, and the re-
sulting misery, suffering, and humiliation of the Timorese, as
well as the famine and resulting starvation and outbreaks of
disease, combined to reduce East Timor’s population from an
estimated 688,770 in 1974 to 329,270 in 1979, according to
Roman Catholic Church officials. 139 Even if the 1980 official
census figures of 550,000 are accepted as accurate and not in-
flated, this still represents a decline of over 130,000 from the
population size on the eve of Indonesia’s invasion. With popu-
lation growing normally at about 2 percent per year, however,
the population should have been around 750,000 in 1980. When
finally in 1979 aid workers from the International Red Cross
and Catholic Relief Services were allowed into East Timor, they
were shocked at the extent and depth of the human misery: be-
tween one-tenth and one-third of the population had perished
and over 300,000 were in the resettlement camps, debilitated,
demoralized, and deeply alienated. 140
Despite ten years of repression and deplorable conditions,
some 800–1,000 Fretilin guerrillas are still active in East Timor,
against whom the Indonesian government has reportedly sent
some twenty army battalions with around 15,000 men (despite
the claim of General Benny Murdani, commander of Indonesia’s
armed forces, that only fourteen battalions with about 7,000
men were confronting 500–700 guerrillas). 141
The Indonesian government claims that much has been done
to integrate the province into the nation-state of Indonesia and
to raise the standard of living of the people. Journalists have
reported improvements in the living conditions of many, with
better housing and water supplies and plans for a government
sugar plantation and sugar mill. 142 However, persistent reports
continue of ongoing dissatisfaction with the resettlement
camps, which are termed no better than internment camps. This
is because they are located so far from the inhabitants’ fields,
they greatly restrict people’s freedom of movement, and they
demand an unacceptable change in lifestyle from that of the tra-
ditional hamlets. Moreover, most of the worthwhile enterprises
of East Timor have been taken over by army officers, and the
economy has been generally mismanaged. 143
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The greatest challenge now for the Indonesian government
is to win the hearts of the deeply alienated population and to re-
place unwilling submission to Indonesia’s rule with nationalism
and Indonesian patriotism.
Integration is a dynamic concept, one that has to be con-
stantly nurtured and its component dimensions kept in balance.
The history of many countries demonstrates that changing real-
ities can raise dangerous tensions among regions, even in well-
integrated nation-states. Even more in Indonesia, a diverse and
widely dispersed archipelagic state, there is no room for com-
placency in the ongoing struggle to strengthen national inte-
gration.
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The Sociocultural Dimension
JUST as integration depends upon shared historical experiences
and participation in one national political system, so also it de-
pends upon the degree to which people within that political
entity share certain sociocultural characteristics and feel them-
selves to be one nation. It is important, therefore, both to ex-
amine the integrative nature of the dominant sociocultural fea-
tures of the population and to analyze the extent to which
these characteristics are shared by peoples in each province of
the nation-state of Indonesia. Important shared characteristics
include use of a common language, adherence to a common
religion (or at least to shared cultural features that have a
religious basis), and participation in a “national culture” in
the sense of shared national values, customs, organizations,
and institutions that transcend local and ethnic boundaries,
extend nationwide, and promote national consciousness and in-
terregional contact. A shared culture also includes exposure to
common radio and television shows and nationally produced
movies, and access to other nationwide services and amenities
such as health care and nationally organized education.
The tremendous diversity of Indonesia’s population has al-
ready been discussed. Yet underlying this mosaic of differences
in Indonesian society are certain unifying features. From an
anthropological perspective, these common characteristics in-
clude aspects of food, dress, sports, and attitudes toward pets,
disease, and sexual roles. 1 To these can be added common at-
titudes toward time, the elderly, and the family, an almost ubiq-
uitous belief in spirits, a general acceptance of authority, and an
appreciation of the value of symbols.
Promoting national integration, a consistent goal of all na-
tionalists and independent Indonesian governments, has meant
trying to increase and strengthen these and other shared na-
tional characteristics, to make Indonesia’s motto (Bhinneka
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Tunggal Ika, Unity in Diversity) a reality. The aim has been to
redirect local primordial bonds and ethnic and regional loyalties
toward the larger nation-state, toward national consciousness,
loyalty, and interests; and to encourage participation in a na-
tionwide culture and way of life. Data for this chapter are tabu-
lated in Appendix 1.
LANGUAGE
A common national language has long been recognized as one
of the strongest integrating forces within a nation. Its use is
obvious in permitting interregional communication and the
growth of mutual understanding and a common identity. Lan-
guage is also a major vehicle for culture.
Yet although Indonesian is spoken by many, especially in the
coastal areas of most of the islands of the archipelago, it is the
second or third language for the vast majority. Most Indone-
sians speak one of the more than 250 mutually incomprehen-
sible languages belonging to the Malayo-Polynesian language
family. Also represented are Papuan tongues in Nusatenggara,
Melanesian speech in parts of Irian Jaya, and a distinctive
northern Halmaheran language group in northern Maluku. 2
However, as a result of a history of extensive commercial
ties among many of the islands in Indonesia as well as with
the Malay Peninsula and northern Borneo, a common trade lan-
guage developed, bahasa Melayu pasar (market Malay), incor-
porating Sanskrit, Hindi, Arabic, and a wide range of words of
other origins. It was this language that was used widely in Sri
Vijayan days and was the vehicle not only for trade but also for
the spread of Islam, which was brought by Indian merchants in
the fourteenth century. In 1928 the Second National Youth Con-
gress adopted Malay as the country’s one national language and
renamed it Indonesian. This and other events, like the launching
of a literary magazine, the Pujangga Baru, in 1932 and the first
Indonesian Language Congress, Kongres Bahasa Indonesia, in
Surakarta in 1938, all increased acceptance of the national lan-
guage and had far-reaching effects on the growth of unity in the
country, for they symbolized the growing nationalist movement
and helped to stimulate a new national consciousness. 3
The choice of Indonesian as the national language was of
fundamental importance for several other reasons. Not only was
it spoken over a much wider area than any other language, but
its adoption avoided the overtones of domination by the major
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ethnic group, the Javanese, in a united republic. Indonesia,
by using this politically neutral language, was thus able to
avoid the internal conflict over language experienced by such
countries as India, Burma, and Belgium. Further advantages
of Indonesian over Javanese lie in its simplicity and egalitarian
character. The Indonesian language has high status in modern
Indonesian society partly because of the prestige and great au-
thority of the elite groups who used it increasingly both among
themselves in place of Dutch and in their capacities as adminis-
trators, functionaries, and so on. 4
At the time of its official adoption as the national language
of Indonesia in 1928, bahasa Indonesia was the mother tongue
of only about six million of the estimated sixty million Indone-
sians, those living primarily in eastern Sumatra. By contrast,
at that time there were well over twenty million people in In-
donesia who spoke Javanese as their mother tongue. Even today
only 11.9 percent of the population reportedly use Indonesian
as their first language. 5
Use of Indonesian has been and still is being actively pro-
moted, partly by a permanent language commission (func-
tioning as part of the Linguistic and Cultural Institute of the
Faculty of Literature and Philosophy at the University of In-
donesia) that continues to develop the language, decide on
new terms, and establish modern scientific and technical vo-
cabularies; and partly by the expanding communications links
throughout the archipelago that have served to extend
knowledge of Indonesian. Indonesian is currently used in all
government departments, on all official occasions, in education,
and for all nationwide communications. The number of people
speaking Indonesian has been increasing rapidly: in 1971, ac-
cording to the census, only 40.5 percent of the population spoke
Indonesian, 6 but by 1980 this figure had reached 60.8 percent
7 (although these figures, as all census data, should be handled
cautiously). However, Anwar claimed that much earlier a far
higher percentage, a “very great majority,” knew the language
and that practically everyone had some knowledge of it. 8
The proportion of people speaking the national language in
each province varies widely (from 33 percent in East Timor
to almost 100 percent in Jakarta), as Figure 3.1 illustrates. 9
Whether Indonesian is used as a lingua franca depends on two
major factors: first upon whether there is a sizable number
of homogeneous people in a limited area who have a strong
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of the population able to speak the national
language, Indonesian, 1980. Calculated from data in Tables 8.3 in the
twenty-seven volumes of the 1980 population census, Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S.
culture and their own language, and second upon the degree
of contact among different peoples where Indonesian might
function as a common tongue.
The first factor clearly helps to explain the situation in Java
and Bali, areas with their own distinct cultural heritage and
rich, well-defined literary languages. Less use of Indonesian
here is to be expected, especially when local government offi-
cials, for example in Java, are all Javanese (or in western Java,
Sundanese) and where the majority of the population is agricul-
tural.
The second factor helps to account for the below-average
knowledge of Indonesian in provinces with more isolated and
highly rural populations, such as West and East Nusatenggara
and, despite its somewhat more urban character, South Su-
lawesi as well. It also explains the above-average use of In-
donesian in more urbanized provinces (especially Jakarta and
East Kalimantan); provinces where trading was historically of
primary importance (as in eastern Sumatra); and areas favored
by the Dutch, with sizable Christian populations and better edu-
cational facilities (such as Maluku and North and Central Sula-
wesi).
Yet in terms of language used in the home, Indonesian is
only the third most widely used language in the country; far
more people speak Javanese as their first language (40.5
percent of the total Indonesian population), while Sundanese is
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the first language of 15.1 percent (also more than Indonesian’s
11.9 percent). 10 The percentage speaking Indonesian at home
varies enormously among the provinces, from 1.1 percent in
Central Java (and percentages of 3.0 or less in Yogyakarta, East
Java, West Sumatra, and West Nusatenggara) to 91.6 percent
in Jakarta (a very dubious figure, given the great ethnic di-
versity of the capital city and the large numbers of new in-mi-
grants from Java especially; however, even if a much smaller
proportion of Jakarta’s population does speak Indonesian at
home, the range is still considerable). Other provinces with
relatively high usage of Indonesian at home include Maluku
(49.2 percent), Irian Jaya (31.1 percent), North Sumatra (30.2
percent), and East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi (each with
27.5 percent) (see Figure 3.2).
In theory, regional languages are accepted and, according to
the constitution, supported. They are used as the medium of in-
struction in the first two or three years of primary school and
in broadcasts from many government radio stations, especially
when they are directed toward the population living in the rural
areas. However, for good political reasons, and for fear that the
resurgence of regional language loyalty might lead to political
regionalism, the government has done little to encourage the
development of regional languages. 11 Instead, the Indonesian
government vigorously promotes the Indonesian national lan-
guage as a means of strengthening national integration and of
uniting the diverse ethnic and cultural groups in the country,
as a symbol of national dignity and national identity, and as the
medium of communication among the provinces. 12 Use of In-
donesian is thus seen as a critical integrating force.
RELIGION
Shared commitment to a common religion has also long been
recognized as a strong centripetal force, especially in nations
of great ethnic and cultural diversity. At times, nationalism has
functioned almost as a religion in colonial territories insomuch
as the desire for independence and a free nation-state has
become the focus of devotion and loyalty for the population.
But once independence is achieved and the emotive force of na-
tionalism spent, the role of religion proper frequently assumes
greater significance as a unifying force.
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Figure 3.2. Percentage of the population speaking Indonesian at
home, 1980. Calculated from data in Table 14.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
The strength of religion as an integrative bond has been
demonstrated in many countries, including Thailand, Ireland,
and such countries in the Middle East and North Africa as
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, and Tunisia. But
within Indonesia its role is more ambiguous. As to be expected
in a nation as large and diverse as Indonesia, no single religion
claims the loyalties of the entire population; indeed nearly all
the world’s major religions are represented here. And even
within the religion acknowledged by the great majority (88.2
percent were classified as Muslim in 1980) there are deep dif-
ferences in belief and practice.
Islam had already reached Indonesia before any Europeans
arrived, but it spread more rapidly after the arrival of the Por-
tuguese. Their capture of Malacca in 1511 caused the diffusion
of Muslim traders from that major trading center, and trading
rivalries further stimulated Islam’s expansion. For as the Por-
tuguese sought to concentrate all trade on Malacca, Muslim
traders set up rival trading areas, first in Aceh (1515–1641),
then in Banten (1526–1687) and Makassar in southern Celebes
(1540–1667), and later in Banjarmasin in Kalimantan (from
1667 onwards). 13 As the Portuguese, and later the Dutch,
moved further east, attempting to consolidate their strongholds
along the trade routes and to monopolize the spice trade, so did
Islam, which became a rallying point for those who opposed the
intruders. As local Indonesian kingdoms confronted competition
from European traders, their rulers called on Indian and Arab
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help with their trading; in exchange, they opened their princi-
palities to Islam. By the end of the fifteenth century more than
twenty Muslim kingdoms existed, scattered over Java, Sumatra,
Madura, Kalimantan, Celebes, the Moluccas, the Philippines,
and the Malay Peninsula. 14
The Dutch were well aware of the potentially unifying threat
of Islam. In every regional dispute they allied themselves with
the adat leaders or traditional chiefs of a kingdom against the
religious leaders of Islam (who used religion as a symbol of op-
position to the Dutch, as, for example, in the Paderi War of West
Sumatra, 1821–1837, the Java War of 1825–1830, and the Aceh
War of 1873–1903).
Islam was important in the development of the nationalist
movement. The first organization to extend its appeal outside
Java was based on adherence to Islam: the Sarekat Islam (the
Islamic Union), founded in 1911. This Union had considerable
success in binding together the disparate population of the
Indies through the solidarity feelings of those who identified
themselves as Muslims. Indeed, Islam was an integrative,
emotive force among many of the economic and political
protagonists of nationalism. It is still a powerful integrating
force, at least at the macro level and particularly in provinces
having an overwhelming Muslim majority (see Figure 3.3).
However, at the micro level there are wide divergences
within Islam. The major difference is between the coastal
Muslims with their characteristically purer, simpler faith and
the interior Muslims, particularly in Java, who practice a tra-
ditionalist syncretic faith, an Islam mixed with beliefs carried
over from a past of animism and ancestor worship or Hindu be-
liefs, an Islam suffused with magico-religious elements. In Java
this dichotomy is expressed in the contrast between the santri,
those who hold the purer, more orthodox beliefs and adhere to
the strict Muslim laws, and the abangan, who are more affected
by their strong pre-Islamic heritage and their ancestral tradi-
tions. 15
Yet this syncretism forms a bond among peoples with dif-
ferent religions in the country, for the superstitions and beliefs
carried over from an animistic or Hinduistic past, including
belief in the spirits of the ancestors, the efficacy of cursing,
and the power of the dukun (traditional shaman), have pen-
etrated Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism, as well as
Islam. Indeed, it can be argued that it is these cultural features
of religious practice that are far more important as integrating
elements than religious dogma, which is frequently divisive.
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Figure 3.3. Percentage of the population classified as Muslim, 1980.
Calculated from data in Table IV.4.1 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statis tik
Indonesia 1982.
More than 17 million non-Muslims live in Indonesia: Christians,
Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucianists. Confucianists and Bud-
dhists in the past have been scattered throughout the archi-
pelago primarily among the Chinese, but adherents of the other
religions tend to be concentrated in particular areas: Hindus in
Bali, Catholics in East Timor and East Nusatenggara (especially
Flores) and to some extent in West Kalimantan, and Protestants
in parts of North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, and Maluku (see
Figure 3.4).
Relationships among the adherents of the different religions
vary greatly. In certain areas there is genuine tolerance; in
others, especially where the Muslim community feels itself
threatened (for example, by the growing numbers of Christians
or by the economic power of Buddhists), tolerance is replaced
by bitter hostility, which breaks out from time to time in the
burning of churches and even occasional killings. Yet far more
blood has been spilt among the different strands of Islam: in
the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup it was largely santri
against abangan. It is also interesting to notice in recent years
a growing official emphasis not just on a passive toleransi (tol-
erance) toward adherents of the different religions, but upon
the more positive kerukunan (social harmony). 16
Lack of adherence to Islam, though a source of tension at
one level, is not necessarily disintegrative at the national level.
For Christians have shown a disproportionately large degree of
leadership in the nationalist movement as well as in the eco-
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Figure 3.4. Percentage of the population classified as Christian (both
Protestant and Catholic), 1980. Calculated from data in Table IV.4.1 in
Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1982.
nomic development of the country, especially in the navy, in
business, and in interisland shipping. On the other hand, Bud-
dhism and Confucianism among the Chinese in the past have
served to reinforce their cultural isolation, although this is now
breaking down as many Chinese have converted to Christianity
and Islam. Nowhere is this more apparent than in West Kali-
mantan, where the 1971 census recorded almost 40 percent of
its population as Buddhist, Confucianist, or other; in 1980 these
groups made up less than 3 percent of the total (and the per-
centage of Muslims rose from 43 to 62 percent, while the per-
centage of Christians increased from 18 to 35 percent). 17
Despite its large majority of Muslims, Indonesia remains a
state based on the Panca Sila, the first principle of which af-
firms the belief in one Supreme Being. Indeed five religions
are officially recognized in the country: Islam, Protestantism,
Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Yet one of the major po-
litical struggles is between those who want to make Indonesia
into an Islamic state and those who want to keep it tolerant
of all belief in God. Obviously in a country with the religious
diversity of Indonesia, a Panca Sila state would be, at least
theoretically, far more integrative and inclusive than an Islamic
state, which would discriminate in a more divisive way against
all non-Muslims.
Notwithstanding the differences between the orthodox and
the traditionalists, between those in favor of an Islamic state
and those in favor of a Panca Sila state, Islam as the pre-
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dominant religion still has a significant integrative role, partly
through the hajj, which brings Muslims together from all over
the archipelago in an awareness of their common nationality
and religion, and partly through an increasing identification
with and pride in being Muslim in the post-1973 OPEC era.
This recent intensification of Islam has been characterized by
a great increase in attendance at the rapidly growing number
of mosques, in the popularity of the morning lecture on Islam
on the radio, in the number of readers of Islamic journals and
books, in the widespread occurrence of religious instruction ac-
tivities, and in the higher percentage of people who pay their
zakat (religious tax). 18
However, the integrative role of Islam is modified by im-
portant spatial differences in the distribution of Muslims
throughout the country. Adherence to Islam ranges from less
than 1 percent in East Timor and 5.2 percent in Bali to 98.5
percent in Jambi and Bengkulu. In twelve of Indonesia’s twenty-
seven provinces Muslims make up over 96 percent of the pop-
ulation. Only in five is the proportion under 50 percent: Bali,
where 93 percent of the population is Hindu; and East Timor,
East Nusatenggara, Irian Jaya, and North Sulawesi, where 99,
91, 88, and 54 percent, respectively, are Christian. Maluku,
West Kalimantan, and North Sumatra also have sizable
Christian populations. Overall, Christians (Protestants out-
number Catholics approximately two to one) make up 8.8
percent of the population, Hindus 2.1 percent, and Buddhists
just under 1 percent.
Religion, therefore, is a complex sociocultural feature with
both integrative and disintegrative characteristics. But it is a
very important issue because of the strong emotional responses
it evokes. It is probably one of the least predictable elements
of sociocultural integration because of the wide diversity of in-
tensity and tolerance among its greatly varying adherents.
EDUCATION AND LITERACY
Participation in a national culture and the sharing of national
customs and values are obviously important components of na-
tional integration. One way of encouraging such participation
is through education and literacy programs. In contrast to the
colonial days, when the Dutch educated very few Indonesians,
the Indonesian government from the very beginning has placed
major emphasis on education at all levels. A national educa-
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tional system was introduced in 1945 and has been used to
strengthen national integration and unity as well as to aid na-
tional development. Common curricula and textbooks have
served as vehicles for expanding national consciousness, pro-
moting the Indonesian language, and encouraging national
pride.
Education is therefore an important integrative force, par-
ticularly at the elementary level, when children are at their
most impressionable age. Children in grades one through six
nationwide learn national slogans and national history; sing na-
tional songs; learn about national heroes, values, and principles
of state; and take part in national events and celebrations. By
learning to read and write, they open themselves to national
literature, newspapers, and magazines, all of which are poten-
tially integrative forces.
Yet the proportion of the population completing primary
school remains small. In 1980 only 43.4 percent of the pop-
ulation ten years of age and over had completed elementary
school, although far more had at one time been enrolled and
subsequently dropped out; yet this represents a great im-
provement over the 1971 figure of 26.3 percent. This 17-percent
increase reflects the government’s commitment to expanding
and improving education.
In an effort to increase the educational opportunities
available in the provinces, the government has invested major
resources in education, increasing the number of primary
schools by 65 percent between 1970 and 1980, junior high
schools by 62 percent, and senior high schools by 53 percent.
Indeed the percentage of seven to twelve year olds in school
was reported to have risen since the 1978–1979 school year
from 79.1 percent to 97.2 percent by 1983–1984 (involving a
jump from 22.4 million to 28.9 million students). 19
Because of the clearly integrative role education plays in
Indonesia, however, it is important to note the very uneven
pattern revealed by the educational data. The proportion of the
population ten years of age and over who had completed the six
years of primary education in 1980 ranged from 30.8 percent
in West Kalimantan to 65.9 percent in Jakarta (see Figure 3.5).
Outside Jakarta, Yogyakarta stands out as a cultural and educa-
tional center (with its 57.4 percent primary school completion
rate). The provinces that have had a high level of Christian
missionary activity over several generations (North and Central
Sulawesi and Maluku) still reflect that heritage in the propor-
tions of the population who have completed secondary school.
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At the elementary educational level, however, other provinces,
such as East Kalimantan, North Sumatra, Irian Jaya, Aceh, and
Bali have now joined the more Christian provinces in their
educational achievement levels. At the other extreme are the
provinces of West Kalimantan, Lampung, Bengkulu, Jambi,
Central Java, and South Kalimantan.
Similarly, school participation rates of seven to twelve year
olds have risen dramatically between 1971 and 1980, partic-
ularly in West and Central Java (by 26.8 and 27.2 percentage
points), Riau (by 27.1 percentage points), Bali (by 27.8 per-
centage points), and West Nusatenggara (by 30.2 percentage
points). One result of this is that the provinces are indeed much
more similar in their educational levels in 1980 than they were
in 1971 (in 1980 the spread was 24.5 percentage points from
66.9 percent in Irian Jaya and West Kalimantan to 91.6 and 91.4
percent in Yogyakarta and Jakarta respectively, compared with
a range in 1971 of 35.6 percentage points, from 42.3 percent
in West Nusatenggara to 78.0 percent in North Sulawesi) (see
Figure 3.6). Impressive gains have also been made in the older
age groups, and the differences among the provinces have nar-
rowed. It is interesting to note, too, the closing gap between
education of males and females. Overall, 28.2 percent of males
were attending school in 1980 compared with 23.8 percent of
females, but there are striking differences at the different age
levels. Among five to eight year olds a higher percentage of girls
than boys attend school, but the reverse is true for nine year
olds upward, with the gap increasing (a 1.5-percent gap at age
ten, a 10-percent gap at age fourteen, and a 14-percent gap
at ages seventeen and eighteen). 20 Urban-rural differentials in
primary education participation are high.
Literacy rates are a further index of integration, because
they measure the ability of the population of a province to par-
ticipate in national events as these are expressed in writing. A
literate population is exposed in a far fuller way than a nonlit-
erate one to the potentially integrating forces of books, news-
papers, magazines, and government communications. Indeed,
in a country with strict censorship laws, literacy may be re-
garded as particularly integrative, because only government-ap-
proved materials reach the citizens. Any critical comments in
the world press relating to Indonesia (as well as unseemly mate-
rials and anything written in Chinese characters) are regularly
censored from overseas-produced newspapers and magazines,
and internally produced written materials are also subject to
censorship, especially newspaper articles regarded as inflam-
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Figure 3.5. Percentage of the population ten years of age and over
who have completed primary school, 1980. Calculated from data in
Tables 6.9 in the twenty-seven volumes of Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus
Penduduk 1980, Series S.
Figure 3.6. Percentage of seven to twelve year olds in primary school,
1980. Based on data in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980,
Series S, no. 2.
matory or critical. On several occasions newspaper and mag-
azine offices have been shut down and editors jailed for injudi-
ciously publishing unacceptable materials.
Literacy rates have increased impressively since indepen-
dence, from an estimated 10 percent literate in 1941 21 to 61
percent in 1971 and 71 percent in 1980 (see Figure 3.7). 22
As expected, literacy rates vary considerably, from 21 percent
in East Timor and 52 percent in Irian Jaya to 91 percent in
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North Sulawesi. At the extremes, literacy rates reflect educa-
tional achievement: two of the provinces with the lowest educa-
tional standards also have among the lowest literacy rates, West
Nusatenggara (55 percent) and West Kalimantan (58 percent),
but the correlation is not always strong. Adult literacy programs
may help to explain this anomaly. The highest literacy rates
occur in the urban metropolis of Jakarta (88 percent) and in
other provinces historically favored in education, notably North
Sulawesi, North, West, and South Sumatra, Central Sulawesi,
and Maluku, all of which have literacy rates of over 80 percent.
NATIONAL SYMBOLISM
Indonesian culture is rich in symbolism, and national symbolism
has been used as a powerful tool to promote national unity.
23 Symbols have an important integrative role, especially in a
nation as riven with internal contrasts as Indonesia, for they
serve as a focus and expression of national as opposed to
parochial feelings. Symbolism played an especially important
role in the early days of the nationalist movement and in the
Sukarno era. Sukarno, the great unifier and solidarity maker,
took every conceivable opportunity to instill national pride
through the intensive use of symbols. His government engaged
in a tremendous amount of symbolic activity—gestures, cere-
monies, rituals, propaganda, monuments, prestigious projects,
slogans, movements, and demonstrations. Yet the integrative
effect of all this activity has been disputed. Certainly it en-
couraged national pride, provided a sort of national anchor
during times of disruptive social change, and helped to legit-
imize Sukarno’s government. But the frenetic crescendo of sym-
bolic activity that reached a pitch of almost hysterical intensity
in the early 1960s corresponds closely to the growing eco-
nomic decline and disintegration of that period. Excessive use
of symbols lowered administrative and economic efficiency, not
only in the amount of time and money spent on ceremonies and
symbolism, but also in creating an atmosphere unfavorable to
the solving of practical problems by rational means. 24
Although used in excess by Sukarno, symbolism still has an
important role in binding the disparate parts of the country
together. Particularly meaningful symbols now in the post-
Sukarno era, as before, are the Panca Sila, the national emblem
and motto, the use of acronyms and names of Indonesian heroes
nationwide, and the emphasis on common Indonesian values.
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Figure 3.7. Percentage of the population ten years of age and over
who are classified as literate, 1980. Based on data in Table 18.3 in
Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduluk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
The Panca Sila (Five Principles) remains the basic phi-
losophy of state. It was designed to appeal to Indonesians of
all persuasions and ideologies. The very number five is of sym-
bolic importance (because of the five senses, the five obligations
of Islam, the five heroes in the Hindu epic Mahabharata, and
so on). The symbols representing the five principles are em-
bodied in the coat of arms on the garuda (a mythical bird
related to the eagle and the phoenix), which is the national
emblem of Indonesia. The five principles are as follows: belief
in one Supreme Being, symbolized by the star in the center
of the coat of arms; nationalism, symbolized by the revered
banyan tree; internationalism or humanitarianism, emphasizing
the broad common basis of human values of all men and women,
symbolized by a golden chain with alternate square and round
links; social justice, symbolized by a spray of cotton and a
stalk of rice, representing the basic necessities of life; and
popular sovereignty or democracy, symbolized by the head of
the banteng or wild buffalo, an animal patient and hard to
rouse, yet when roused, prepared to fight to the death to protect
his herd. 25 As a national symbol, the garuda is portrayed as
having seventeen wing feathers, eight tail feathers, and forty-
five neck feathers, symbolizing the date of the proclamation of
independence, August 17, 1945 (see Figure 3.8). In the claws of
the golden garuda is a scroll inscribed with Indonesia’s motto,
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, a Sanskrit phrase meaning “Unity in Di-
versity” or “they are many; they are one.”
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Figure 3.8. Indonesia’s national symbol:
the garuda.
The Panca Sila has become of increasing importance in
recent years partly as a means of legitimizing Indonesia’s
secular and military government, and partly to counteract and
undercut other ideologies, particularly Islam. As a unifying na-
tional philosophy, it is taught in schools throughout the nation
and, along with a picture of the president, is enframed and hung
in every government-related office from the highest adminis-
trative levels down to the level of the village leader and school
head. In addition, courses on the Panca Sila are obligatory for
all civil servants.
Another unifying, if superficial, force has been the use
throughout the nation of the names of Indonesian national
heroes for mountains, rivers, airports, city streets, and so on.
Thus, national personalities are commemorated and made fa-
miliar to the local inhabitants, reinforcing national awareness
and prompting interest in the historical background of In-
donesia. Use of acronyms is popular and often infused with
symbolism. Repelita, the acronym for Indonesia’s Five-Year De-
velopment Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun), for ex-
ample, incorporates the acronym pelita, which means a light
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or lamp, itself of significance in the process of development.
Indeed, Indonesians have created enough acronyms to fill a two-
volume dictionary.
Finally, certain cultural norms characteristic of most In-
donesians have been glorified and appealed to in the name
of national unity. Some of these common values include the
idea of community interdependence and reciprocal obligation
(gotong royong); the “Indonesian way” of reaching decisions
through musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus);
and the emphasis placed upon harmony and unity, control of
the emotions, status, order, conformity to group norms and
expectations, and the importance of face-saving devices. 26 Un-
fortunately, no data exist on the spatial distribution and varying
intensity of the use of symbols throughout the archipelago.
THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Since Dutch colonial days Indonesia has been linked in one
national legal system, although the influence of that system
did not penetrate deeply into local Indonesian society. Before
the Dutch, many different legal orders existed independently
within a wide variety of social and political systems. Social
cohesion depended not on written law but upon kinship or
aristocratic status concepts in which authority was ascriptive,
suffused with family and religious significance, and highly lo-
calized. 27 Yet adat, though varying from society to society, had
certain common elements: the preponderance of communal
over individual interests, the close relationship between people
and the soil, a pervasive magical and religious pattern of
thought, and a strongly family-oriented atmosphere in which
every effort was made to resolve disputes through reconcilia-
tion and mutual consideration. 28 In addition to customary law,
orthodox Muslims followed Islamic law, especially in Java and
Sumatra, where religious courts functioned.
The Dutch established nationwide patterns of social and
legal transactions, but created a plural legal system in which
each major social group had its own law, which was applied dif-
ferentially by three distinct judicial hierarchies: the European,
the Islamic (family courts), and the Indonesian (based on adat,
which varied from area to area).
Since independence the legal system has been unified, mod-
ified, and centralized. A hukum nasional (national law) and a na-
tional judicial system have been established, where local institu-
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tions and traditional courts have been replaced with pengadilan
negeri (district courts). Religious courts, based on Islamic law
(syariat) work side by side with the district courts; they deal
primarily with marital and inheritance cases, but their deci-
sions must be approved by the corresponding district courts. 29
However, controversial efforts have been made to unify matri-
monial law and to subordinate adat to nationally oriented legal
concepts and policy directives. But the traditional practice of
village-level arbitration, mediated by the village headman, still
prevails in most cases. Thus, adat, sometimes modified by Is-
lamic influences, continues to govern the everyday life of vil-
lagers and remains to a large extent the basis for maintaining
harmony and stability at the village level. 30
Almost inevitably these efforts to unify Indonesian law have
had somewhat contradictory effects, with tension arising be-
tween the momentum of local participation in national inte-
gration on the one hand and claims that the imposition of a
national legal system is nothing more than a cloak for the ex-
pansion of the Javanese system on the other. At one level, the
national organization of the judiciary, public prosecution, the
police, and the administrative civil service (pamong praja) pro-
vides a force for integration and national unity; but at another
the local lower courts are more oriented toward the needs of
their local clienteles than to the national perspective of the
Supreme Court judges in Jakarta.
The law is still a weak institution and thus its integrative
role remains muted; other ways and values are available for
settling disputes and ordering society besides the formal legal
channels. However, the growth and increasing influence of na-
tional law is strongly linked both to the growth of modern-
ization, with its need for greater legal uniformity in such
matters as property rights and inheritance, and to the growth of
a national orientation in the country’s social structure and eco-
nomic behavior.
THE SPREAD OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
One measure of sociocultural integration is the degree to which
people in the various provinces participate in common, na-
tionwide activities and organizations. National (as opposed to
regional) organizations usually provide means of contact for
leaders from different areas through national meetings, training
sessions, and so on. They also provide for their members an
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Figure 3.9. Number of members of agricultural cooperatives per 100
population (average of 1979 and 1980 figures). Calculated from data
in Table VIII.3.2 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku
Saku.
integrative sense of belonging to a group that shares certain
goals or values with a nationwide community. Two organiza-
tions that have more than a local or specialized appeal, and
extend nationwide, are cooperatives and scouting (see Figures
3.9 and 3.10). However, there seems to be no easy explanation
for the very different patterns of participation in these activities
in 1980 compared with the patterns in 1971, when these na-
tionwide organizations tended to have greater participation
from people in the provinces in and near Java than in the remote
or less-developed provinces. In 1971, for example, 80 percent
of all cooperative members were found in Java, whereas in
1980 the figure was 68 percent, far closer to Java’s 62 percent
share of Indonesia’s population. Membership in a social orga-
nization, as measured by a survey in 1981, likewise shows no
clear pattern (see Figure 3.11). Not only are there no clear
spatial patterns of participation, but also neither membership
in scouting nor membership in any social organization has a
significant correlation with any other variable, sociocultural,
interaction, or economic (of the more than eighty examined).
The only significant correlation between membership in any na-
tional organization and any other sociocultural feature is the
negative relationship between membership in a cooperative and
the percentage of Asians in the population.
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Figure 3.10. Number of Scouts per 100 population, 1981. Calculated
from data in Table IV.1.14 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indo nesia
1983.
THE CHINESE
The presence of any culturally distinct and economically pow-
erful ethnic group needs to be considered in a study of national
integration: in Indonesia the Chinese form that minority. In
certain respects they constitute an integrative force because
they provide a common target for the hostility and frustration of
Indonesians from all over the archipelago and at times serve a
scapegoat function. In addition, their ethnic solidarity and com-
mercial ties throughout the country have created a nationwide
network of business and trade connections. 31 But their interre-
gional links are not restricted to Indonesia’s boundaries; they
extend also to Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China. They have thus
been seen to pose a threat to the national security as well as to
the integration of the nation.
Yet the Chinese community itself is by no means homoge-
neous. It is composed of many diverse subgroups that differ
from one another by reason of the length of time they have
resided in Indonesia; the different ethnic groups in China from
which they have come; and the differences in their occupations,
political outlook, and degree of loyalty to mainland China. 32
Chinese have immigrated to Indonesia from the seventh
century onward. The vast majority of early arrivals were single
men who usually married local Indonesian women and were as-
similated into the local culture. It was only in the late nine-
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Figure 3.11 Percentage belonging to a social organization in the three
months preceding a survey, 1981. Based on data in Table III.1.9 in
Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
teenth and early twentieth centuries that substantial immi-
gration of both Chinese men and women took place in response
to the demand for manpower in the sugarcane industry of Java
and the gold mines of West Kalimantan. 33 Assimilation into
the local community slowed down, and separate communities
developed. The Chinese gradually took over the tax-collecting
function of the colonial government and increasingly monop-
olized trade. Dutch colonial policies deliberately kept the
Chinese separate, especially in Java, by creating a plural society
with themselves at the top, the Chinese in the middle, and
the indigenous inhabitants on the bottom. 34 Upward mobility
for the Chinese, therefore, meant movement away from the
indigenous Javanese society toward the European elite. The
Chinese thus formed a middle class predominantly of business
entrepreneurs. The Dutch, seeking partly to protect the in-
digenous population, but also for administrative, economic, and
political reasons, restricted the Chinese both in their movement
(limiting their contact with interior communities) and in their
place of residence (to urban centers), prohibited the alienation
of land by all non-Indonesians, and legally reinforced a plural-
istic society.
Since independence the Chinese have been subjected to
considerable harassment both in their economic activities and
in their personal lives. For example, Chinese communal associ-
ations have been severely curtailed, Chinese-language schools
outlawed, and import of Chinese-language video cassettes pro-
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hibited. There is also continual criticism of the so-called Ali
Baba partnership of cukong (Chinese businessmen) in league
with politically powerful Indonesians, whereby Chinese busi-
nessmen use indigenous Indonesian businesses as a front to
circumvent official government policy that gives preference to
indigenous entrepreneurs. 35
A broad distinction can be made between those Chinese
born in Indonesia (the peranakan) and those who have migrated
to Indonesia in this generation (the totok). Many of the per-
anakan, who make up about 70 percent of the total Chinese pop-
ulation of approximately three and a half million in Indonesia,
are much more willing to assimilate than the Indonesian society
is ready to receive them. Many have adopted Indonesian names
and Indonesian cultural habits, although they are still discrim-
inated against in a society that is very conscious of Chinese
identity, whether peranakan or totok. For example, in 1979 the
State Prosecutor’s Office conducted a nationwide registration of
everyone of Chinese descent, an action that was particularly of-
fensive to the peranakan who hold Indonesian citizenship. 36
The totok, by contrast, form typically insular, culturally dis-
tinct communities, held together by a powerfully integrated
kinship system and separate cultural traditions. 37 However,
since 1980 there has been pressure on these alien Chinese
to become Indonesian citizens. In 1984 the commander of the
armed forces called on his fellow countrymen to stop using what
he called the divisive terms pribumi (indigenous Indonesians)
and non-pribumi (referring primarily to the Chinese, naturalized
or otherwise). The government subsequently has resorted to
the more neutral expression orang Indonesia asli (native In-
donesian), which purportedly includes Chinese who have al-
ready assimilated. 38
The distinction between peranakan and totok in the past
probably corresponded approximately to that between those
Chinese who adopted Indonesian citizenship and those who
have retained Chinese citizenship. It is interesting to notice
that in both the 1971 and 1980 censuses no questions were
asked about ethnic origin (a reflection of the sensitive and po-
tentially inflammatory nature of such questions). Thus, in 1971
the presence of approximately 2,500,000 (mainly peranakan)
Chinese was not noted; data on language, literacy, and even
religion similarly fail to reveal their existence. By contrast,
the presence of the approximately one million Chinese citizens
was extremely accurately defined: even at the subdistrict (ke-
camatan) level citizenship along with age and sex is known.
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This provides an indication of how sensitive an issue citizenship
is in a country concerned about national integration and secu-
rity. Statistik Indonesia 1982 gives data about the number of
foreigners by province and continent of origin without specifi-
cally mentioning the Chinese population, but it is known that 95
percent of all foreigners in Indonesia are Asians and the vast
majority of these are in fact Chinese. 39
Although not revealed by the census, the spatial distribution
of peranakan and totok has been quite different. 40 In Java,
Madura, and Kalimantan most adult Chinese were born in In-
donesia, with only about 30 percent born elsewhere. In Sumatra
and other areas the totok are in the majority (80 percent of
Chinese over thirty years of age in Sumatra were born outside
the country).
In terms of citizenship, by 1981 no province had less than
97 percent of its population Indonesian citizens, and in eighteen
of the twenty-five provinces for which data are available (ex-
cluding Bengkulu and Southeast Sulawesi), the figure is over
99 percent. On a per-capita basis, Chinese citizens are concen-
trated in West Kalimantan, Jakarta, South Sumatra, East Kali-
mantan, and Riau (see Figure 3.12).
In the past, the Chinese, therefore, have formed a generally
nonassimilated and thus disintegrative force in Indonesian so-
ciety, with their cultural differences, their connections to
mainland China, their economic power, and their network of
business contacts that extends beyond the boundaries of In-
donesia; but serious attempts are being made to assimilate this
ethnically and culturally distinct minority.
ACCESS TO AMENITIES
Access to amenities provides another measure of sociocultural
integration, since many of these are organized on a national
basis in Indonesia and extend nationwide. In the entertainment
industry there is a national film distribution network, and al-
though the provision of cinemas also reflects comparative eco-
nomic affluence and the existence of adequate electricity, the
number of viewers of Indonesian-made movies (which make up
approximately one-third of all movies viewed in the country)
41 is an index at least to some extent of general exposure to
a “national culture.” The number of people who attended at
least one Indonesian-made movie in 1981 ranged from 10.0 per
100 population in East Nusatenggara to 157.1 in East Kali-
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Figure 3.12. Number of foreigners claiming Asian citizenship per
1,000 population, 1981. Calculated from data in Table III.1.11 in Biro
Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1982.
mantan. 42 The viewing of Indonesian-made movies is dispropor-
tionately high in Jakarta, but the rest of Java ranks surprisingly
low in light of the fact that most Indonesian movies are filmed
there. However, this may be a reflection of Java’s own rich
culture, where the wayang kulit (shadow puppet play) is a more
popular, traditional, and less expensive form of entertainment.
In addition to Java and East Nusatenggara, low attendance at
Indonesian-made movies is recorded for West Nusatenggara,
Lampung, Bali, and Southeast Sulawesi. Riau in Sumatra and
all the provinces of Kalimantan stand out for their consistently
above-average rate of viewing Indonesian-made movies (see
Figure 3.13).
Exposure to nationally controlled radio programs is another
index of national integration. All radio transmitters, nongov-
ernment as well as government-owned, are required by law
to broadcast certain Radio Republik Indonesia programs and
thus, at least theoretically, have an integrating role. In devel-
oping countries broadcast media are widely expected to make
a positive contribution to national integration, as well as to so-
cioeconomic modernization and cultural creativity. 43 Radios are
relatively inexpensive and require no skills (such as education
or literacy) of their audience.
The percentage of households owning a radio in 1980
ranged from 13.9 percent in East Nusatenggara to 66.0 percent
in Jakarta, with an average of 40.7 percent (see Figure 3.14).
As might be expected, in general the pattern reflects relative
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wealth and urbanization. However, perhaps more indicative of
exposure to radio programming are the results of a survey un-
dertaken in 1981 to ascertain the percentage of the population
ten years of age and over engaging in various social and cul-
tural activities. This shows that 75.2 percent of Indonesians
had listened to the radio at least once during the preceding
week. By province, the figures ranged from 37.5 percent in East
Nusatenggara and 46.1 percent in Maluku to 87.4 percent in Yo-
gyakarta and 86.3 percent in West Java (see Figure 3.15). But
one has to question the validity of the results of this survey,
partly because there is a fairly low correlation between radio
ownership and those listening to the radio, and partly because
some of the figures seem unrealistic. For example, in Irian
Jaya only 17.7 percent of households owned a radio, but an
amazing (and unlikely) 70.8 percent of the population ten years
of age and older said they had listened to the radio in the pre-
ceding week (a difference of 53.1 percentage points). Other
comparatively high contrasts occurred in West Nusatenggara (a
45.6 percentage point difference), West Java (44.4 percentage
points), Central Sulawesi (44.3), Central Java (41.3), and South
Sulawesi (40.7). At the other extreme are East Kalimantan,
where although 54.3 percent of households owned radios, only
60 percent tuned in the previous week, Maluku (with 38.1 and
46.1 percent, respectively), and Jakarta (with 66.0 and 76.3
percent, respectively). The data on radio ownership are thus
considered to be a more accurate indicator overall of exposure
to radio programs.
In contrast to radio listenership, a far smaller proportion of
the population both owns and watches television. For Indonesia
as a whole only 9.8 percent of households own a television
set, although television service is now available throughout
the archipelago. Ownership of a television set again reflects
wealth and urbanization, and accounts for the range of tele-
vision ownership from lows of 1.7 percent of households in
East Nusatenggara and 2.7 percent in West Nusatenggara to
highs of 45.5 percent in Jakarta (a dubiously high figure) and
23.0 percent in East Kalimantan (see Figure 3.16). Approxi-
mately 50.3 percent of the population sample surveyed in 1981
claimed to have watched television during the preceding week,
a figure that incorporated a range from 14.3 percent in East
Nusatenggara and 21.0 percent in Maluku to 87.5 percent in
Jakarta and 66.1 percent in South Kalimantan. Again the corre-
lation is not very close, as illustrated by the situation in Irian
Jaya where only 3.2 percent of households owned a television
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Figure 3.13. Number of people watching an Indonesian-made movie
per 100 population, 1981. Calculated from data in Table 4 in Biro
Pusat Statistik, Statistik Bioskop Indonesia 1981 dan 1982.
Figure 3.14. Percentage of households owning a radio, 1980. Based on
data in Table 66.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980,
Series S, no. 2.
set but where 63.8 percent of the population ten years old
and over claimed that they had watched television sometime
during the previous week (a very unlikely figure, and the same
percentage as Riau with its comparatively high 17.2 percent
rate of television ownership). By contrast, two provinces with
approximately the same percentage of television ownership,
7.5 percent in Central Kalimantan and 7.7 percent in Maluku,
had very different proportions of their provincial populations
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Figure 3.15. Percentage of the population ten years of age and over
who listened to the radio in the week preceding a survey, 1981. Based
on data in Table III.1.9 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia
1983, Buku Saku.
watching television: 51 percent in the case of Central Kali-
mantan but only 21 percent in the case of Maluku (see Figure
3.17). 44
Newspapers and magazines play a far less important role
in national integration. Only 4.6 percent of Indonesia’s popu-
lation regularly takes a newspaper, and only 18 percent on av-
erage had read a newspaper or magazine in the previous week,
according to the 1981 survey, a figure that ranged from 8.6
percent in West Nusatenggara to 48.9 percent in Jakarta. 45
Access to health care is another reflection of nationwide
organization, for medical personnel are civil servants and are
thereby integrated into a national network. Indeed, doctors and
dentists are assigned by the government to their initial job for
two years (in rural and more needy areas). On a per-capita
basis, however, most doctors and dentists are found in the ur-
banized provinces of Jakarta, East Kalimantan, and Yogyakarta,
and in the Protestant provinces of North Sulawesi and North
Sumatra. Similarly, the provinces with the best provision of
hospital beds are those with either large Christian populations
(with the exceptions of East Nusatenggara and East Timor) or
relatively high urbanization (see Figure 3.18). The least-served
provinces are West Nusatenggara, Bengkulu, Lampung, and
Jambi. Although Java’s population in general is no better sup-
plied with health facilities than that of many other provinces on
a per-capita basis, from a spatial perspective a far larger pro-
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Figure 3.16. Percentage of households owning a television set, 1980.
Based on data in Table 66.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk
1980, Series S, no. 2.
Figure 3.17. Percentage of the population ten years of age and over
who watched television in the week preceding a survey, 1981. Based
on data in Table III.1.9 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia
1983, Buku Saku.
portion of Java’s inhabitants is within a reasonable distance of
health facilities than is the case in the Outer Islands because of
Java’s much higher population density. This difference is accen-
tuated by the superior transportation system in Java, which also
provides greater physical access to health care.
As with education, the government has invested major re-
sources in improving health care throughout the country. Evi-
dence for this can be seen in the great increase in the number
National Integration in Indonesia
91
of public health-care centers and mother and baby clinics, in
the emphasis on family planning, and in the increasing access to
piped drinking water and proper sanitation. The results can be
seen in the 25 percent decline in the infant mortality rate during
the 1970s and the increase in life expectancy. However, health-
care facilities remain very inadequate, as the 1980 figures of
seven hospital beds per 10,000 population and 31,000 persons
per health center indicate. 46
URBANIZATION
The level of urbanization existing in each province is relevant
to the theme of sociocultural integration because urban popula-
tions participate in an urban culture that transcends provincial
(and even national) boundaries. Opportunities for cross-cultural
and cross-ethnic contacts exist in an urban environment in a
way not found in more rural surroundings. There is also greater
exposure to national symbols, values, and mores in an urban
milieu than in more isolated rural environments. The correlation
with knowledge of the Indonesian language has already been
noted.
However, growth in the rate of urbanization does not neces-
sarily mean increased integration. First, urbanization is known
to correlate with economic development, which may or may not
be integrative. 47 In other words, increasing urbanization may
reflect an increase in a dualistic economy rather than in an inte-
grated one. Second, urbanization unaccompanied by other inte-
grative forces may be separatist in character, because an urban
environment may provide an opportunity for greater contact
among people with similar needs and goals, which may be re-
gionalist rather than nationalist in orientation. Third, urban-
ization per se is an inaccurate index of integration, unless em-
ployment opportunities are commensurate with urban growth.
Unemployment, as well as an unbalanced employment structure
with an inflated tertiary sector, is unstable and thus potentially
disintegrative in character.
Thus, the role of urbanization in national integration is not
all positive: increased physical proximity may accentuate social
distance and provoke hostility and resentment, especially when
economic or political differences coincide with ethnic or other
cultural differences. Questions also arise as to the extent to
which each urban node is enclaval in nature and how much of
an integrative role each exerts upon its hinterland and in the
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Figure 3.18. Number of hospital beds (government and private) per
10,000 population, 1980. Calculated from Table IV.2.1 in Biro Pusat
Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1982.
urban network. Only when balanced with positive, nationwide
economic development and reinforced by other integrative fea-
tures is increasing urbanization a positive force.
In 1980, 22.4 percent of Indonesia’s population was con-
sidered to be urban. 48 The level of urbanization of each
province ranged from 93.7 percent for Jakarta and 39.9 percent
in East Kalimantan to a low of 7.5 percent in East Nusatenggara
(see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.19). Java, with 25.1 percent of its
population classified as urban, is the most urbanized island
in Indonesia, followed by Kalimantan and Sumatra. This rep-
resents a dramatic change from the situation in 1971, when
Kalimantan was comparatively more urbanized than Java, and
reflects both the changes in the definition of urban in the
1971–1980 intercensal period and the strong growth of Java’s
cities over the past decade. Only four of the Outer Island
provinces were more urbanized than Java in 1980, compared
with eight in 1971.
The proportion of the population living in urban areas has
been increasing steadily, from 14.8 percent in 1961 to 17.3
percent in 1971 to 22.4 percent in 1980. 49 However, cities have
been growing at very different rates. 50 In general, the cities
that have experienced the greatest growth (Jakarta, Surabaya,
Tanjung Karang, Jambi, Samarinda, and Balikpapan) have been
the “metropoles,” 51 those cities that are more cosmopolitan and
nation-oriented than the “provincial” cities, which are more ori-
ented to serving the provinces in which they are located, such
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as Yogyakarta, Cirebon, Kediri, Pematang Siantar, and Sura-
karta. Between 1971 and 1980, the fastest growing cities were
Ambon, Padang, Medan, Balikpapan, and Samarinda, all cities
in the Outer Islands (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.20).
One integrative aspect of urbanization in Indonesia is its
hierarchy of urban places. Unlike many developing countries,
and especially those in Southeast Asia that have a primate city
dominating the entire nation (such as Bangkok in Thailand,
Rangoon in Burma, and Manila in the Philippines), Indonesia
has an extensive network of towns and cities of different sizes
distributed throughout the country, thanks partly to the Dutch
administrative system, partly to the growth of small transport
nodes, and partly to the development of trade and small indus-
trial centers. Such an urban network encourages integration by
permitting the filtering down of national values, ideas, and con-
cepts, and can also be used to distribute the process and ef-
fects of development and promote widespread integrated devel-
opment. 52 However, Jakarta’s primacy ratio has been steadily
increasing, from 1.20 in 1961 to 1.34 in 1971 to 1.44 in 1980.
53 This reflects centralizing trends in government and in the di-
rection of economic growth. The attraction of Jakarta is such
that it is drawing many of the best-educated people of the other
provinces in a classic “brain-drain” situation, depleting the out-
lying areas of the ingenuity and creativity they need for devel-
opment. In the decade of the 1970s over half a million Outer
Islanders migrated to Jakarta. Although this may leave the out-
lying regions more malleable and docile, it does not encourage
strong regional participation in development or a dynamic form
of integration.
The government, through its various Five-Year Development
Plans (beginning in the second), has aimed at rectifying the
problem of Jakarta’s increasing growth and overwhelming dom-
inance (it grew from 2,907,000 in 1961 to 4,576,000 in 1971
to 6,503,449 in 1980) by the assignment of major growth-pole
functions to three of the largest urban centers—Medan,
Surabaya, and Ujung Pandang. Seven other cities in addition to
these three have been selected as centers for regional devel-
opment, and seventeen others throughout the country have
been designated as minor growth centers. Thus, there is a delib-
erate realization of the integrative role of an urban network and
an attempt to use urbanization to promote national integration.
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Table 3.1. Percentage urban by province, 1961,
1971, and 1980
Province 1961 1971 1980
1. Aceh 7.7 8.4 8.9
2. North Sumatra 16.9 17.1 25.5
3. West Sumatra 14.1 17.2 12.7
4. Riau 9.7 13.3 27.2
5. Jambi 21.6 29.1 12.7
6. South Sumatra 37.0 27.4
7. Bengkulu 18.6 11.7 9.4
8. Lampung 9.8 12.5
Sumatra 17.8 19.6
9. Jakarta 87.2 100.0 93.7
10. West Java 11.9 12.4 21.0
11. Central Java 10.2 10.7 18.8
12. Yogyakarta 16.4 16.3 22.1
13. East Java 12.8 14.5 19.6
Java 18.0 25.1
14. Bali 8.8 9.8 14.7
15. West Nusatenggara 5.6 8.1 14.1
16. East Nusatenggara 5.4 5.6 7.5
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17. East Timor n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nusatenggara 12.0
18. West Kalimantan 13.2 11.0 16.8
19. Central Kalimantan 14.1 12.4 10.3
20. South Kalimantan 22.7 26.7 21.4
21. East Kalimantan 32.8 39.2 40.0
Kalimantan 21.8 21.5
22. North Sulawesi 19.5 16.8
23. Central Sulawesi
14.9
5.7 9.0
24. South Sulawesi 18.2 18.1
25. Southeast Sulawesi
15.9
6.3 9.4
Sulawesi 16.4 15.9
26. Maluku 20.7 13.3 10.9
27. Irian Jaya n.a. 16.3 21.4
Maluku & Irian Jaya 9.4 15.5
Indonesia 14.8 22.4 22.4
n.a.: not available
Many important sociocultural features, therefore, have
helped to integrate the distinct and diverse peoples of In-
donesia. Perhaps most important are the use of the common
national language; participation in the national culture through
common educational experiences; exposure to common liter-
ature and news magazines, radio and television programs, and
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Figure 3.19. Percentage of the population classified as urban, 1980.
Calculated from data in Tables 1 in the twenty-seven volumes of Biro
Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S.
Indonesian-made movies; the impact of powerful national sym-
bolism; involvement in national sociocultural and economic or-
ganizations; and increasing participation in a common urban
culture and environment.
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Figure 3.20. Location and population size of Indonesia’s thirty largest
cities, 1980. Based on a map by Sukanto Reksohadiprodjo in Prisma 6
(1981), p. 16 (used with permission); and data in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S.
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Table 3.2. Size and growth rate of Indonesia’s thirty largest
cities, 1971–1980
City Size
(1980)
Rank
in 1971
Size
(1971)
Growth rate
(1971–1980)
Jakarta 6,503,449 1 4,579,303 3.9
Surabaya 2,027,913 2 1,556,255 2.9
Bandung 1,462,637 3 1,200,380 2.2
Medan 1,378,955 5 635,562 8.5
Semarang 1,026,671 4 646,590 5.2
Palembang 787,187 6 582,961 3.4
Ujung Pandang 709,038 7 434,766 5.5
Malang 511,780 8 422,428 2.1
Padang 480,922 14 196,339 10.3
Surakarta 469,888 9 414,285 1.4
Yogyakarta 398,727 10 314,629 1.7
Banjarmasin 381,286 11 281,673 3.4
Pontianak 304,778 12 217,555 3.8
Tanjung Karang 284,275 13 198,986 4.0
Balikpapan 280,675 22 137,340 8.2
Samarinda 264,718 21 137,782 7.4
Bogor 247,409 15 195,873 2.6
Jambi 230,373 19 158,559 4.2
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Cirebon 223,776 17 178,529 2.5
Kediri 221,830 16 178,865 2.4
Manado 217,159 18 170,181 2.7
Ambon 208,893 31 79,636 11.6
Pakan Baru 186,262 20 145,030 2.8
Madiun 150,562 23 136,147 1.1
Pematang Siantar 150,376 24 129,232 1.7
Pekalongan 132,558 25 111,201 1.9
Tegal 131,728 27 105,752 2.4
Magelang 123,484 26 110,308 1.2
Sukabumi 109,994 28 96,242 1.5
Probolinggo 100,296 30 82,008 2.2
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik
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4
The Interaction Dimension
INTERACTION among the many diverse peoples within a nation-
state is part of the very essence of national integration, for iso-
lation and interaction are antithetical by definition. Interaction
includes all forms of transportation and communications that
bring peoples from different geographical areas of the country
into contact with one another. The focus in this chapter is upon
interprovincial interaction, both structural linkages and func-
tional flows (of peoples, goods, messages, and information). Be-
cause interaction data on functional integration are limited,
estimates of the degree of integration of the various provinces
have to be based largely upon structural information and
reached from an analysis of the various transportation and com-
munications networks within each province.
Inevitably, analysis of data at the provincial level conceals
huge intraprovincial contrasts. In reality, the term transport ac-
cessibility refers only to those areas within about nine miles
of major transportation nodes (such as seaports and cities) or
arteries (such as navigable rivers, railroads, and major paved
roads). 1 Wide contrasts therefore exist between the few areas
of continuous accessibility (such as broad river valleys) and the
comparatively dense transportation networks around provincial
capitals on the one hand, and the vast areas of limited or ex-
tremely difficult accessibility on the other. These contrasts are
particularly marked in the Outer Islands, whereas Java has a
much greater density of transportation and communications
networks.
Present networks are the result of long historical devel-
opment, whereby areas of greatest accessibility (broad river
valleys and areas of protected, indented coastlines) became in-
digenous core areas. The transportation accessibility of these
early core areas was reinforced by the colonial establishment
first of trading posts and later of administrative networks.
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Transportation infrastructure remains largely that inherited
from the colonial period, which was geared more to the ex-
traction of estate agricultural products and mineral wealth for
the colonial homeland than to the needs of Indonesia as a
nation. Short road or rail links from the estates or mines to
the nearest port, together with some interisland shipping for
domestic trade and administrative purposes, sufficed. An esti-
mated 90 percent of Indonesia’s land area was ignored by the
Dutch.
Thus, independent Indonesia inherited an inadequate and
uneven infrastructure, one that served only about 10 percent
of the national territory and concentrated overwhelmingly upon
Java and a few other port hinterlands, mainly in Sumatra. Even
what infrastructure there was deteriorated badly during the
Second World War and the subsequent struggle for indepen-
dence. In the 1950s and early 1960s, problems such as regional
revolts, the lack of finance and skilled manpower, and the gov-
ernment’s tendency to give priority to directly productive
investment projects as well as to noneconomic ventures con-
tributed further to the neglect of basic infrastructure. Aside
from a few limited projects, no major effort to rehabilitate and
expand the economic infrastructure was made until the be-
ginning of the New Order under Suharto in 1967.
Several difficulties arise in trying to analyze the integration
of provinces into the nation-state on the basis of their structural
linkages. Structural networks do not distinguish between inter-
and intraprovincial communications. In addition, the provinces
vary considerably in their orientation to land and sea forms of
transport. Within Java most transportation takes place by land
(by rail and road), whereas in Maluku the multi-island compo-
sition of the province dictates sea transportation as the pre-
dominant mode. In parts of Kalimantan river transportation is
vital. Within and between many of the Outer Island provinces,
sea and air links provide the only means of physical interaction,
whereas in Sumatra all modes of transportation exist, although
with differing combinations of usage in each province.
TRANSPORTATION
Lack of detailed data on passenger flows between provinces
necessitates the use of surrogates. An examination of the rail
network and the numbers of passengers carried in each
province gives some indication of population mobility, itself a
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prerequisite to population interaction. Similarly, analysis of
road networks and numbers of vehicles in each province pro-
vides a general picture of comparative mobility (as well as of the
level of economic development). Examination of shipping and
shipping routes gives some indication of the degree of inter-
provincial movement, and consideration of airline traffic gives a
measure of the connections among major cities. Data given, as
elsewhere in the book, should be handled cautiously. It is nec-
essary to focus on the overall picture and trends rather than
assuming that the reported figures are precise. Data for this
chapter are tabulated in Appendix 2.
The railroad system in Indonesia is limited to Java and
Madura, and to three unconnected areas of Sumatra: Aceh
and North Sumatra, West Sumatra, and southern Sumatra (see
Figure 4.1). Thus, only in Java and to a limited extent in
northern and southern Sumatra do railroad connections play
any part in interprovincial transportation. In Sumatra the rail-
roads were built to connect agricultural estates or tin and coal
mines with ports on the coast, with the exception of that in
Aceh, which was constructed originally to enable Dutch military
operations to put down the Acehnese revolt in the late nine-
teenth century.
Most of the railroad track (71 percent) is in Java. The total
length of track has decreased from over 7,360 kilometers in
1939 to about 6,700 kilometers in 1982 (4,700 kilometers on
Java and Madura and 2,000 kilometers on Sumatra). 2 Passenger
traffic declined during the 1961 to 1977 period, with the
number of passengers falling from 144 million during 1961 to
only twenty-three million in 1977, despite an increase in pop-
ulation of over thirty million during that time period. This was
partly a response to improved road conditions and an increase
in bus and truck transportation, and partly a result of the in-
adequate maintenance and renewal of railroad lines, bridges,
and equipment. But since 1977 the number of passengers has
increased consistently, to forty-four million by 1982. 3 The short
length of the average journey in 1982 (139 kilometers for pas-
sengers in Java, 141 kilometers in North Sumatra, 260 kilo-
meters in South Sumatra, and thirty-four kilometers in West
Sumatra) suggests that most travel is intraprovincial rather
than interprovincial. This factor, together with the limited areas
served by the railroads, indicates that railroads have a compar-
atively small integrative role on a nationwide scale in Indonesia,
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Figure 4.1. Location of railroads in Indonesia, 1980.
with the limited exception of Java. However, much interaction
takes place on the trains, because people tend to converse
freely with strangers and share ideas, perceptions, and news.
In an analysis of road transportation as a measure of in-
tegration, two factors need to be considered. First, the arch-
ipelagic character of Indonesia dictates that sea (and, to a
lesser extent, air) and not road links will be more crucial among
the hundreds of small islands and in the provinces consisting
mostly of smaller islands. Second, the difficult terrain, dense
vegetation, and low level of development of much of the larger
islands of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya necessitate con-
siderable use of small sailing craft along the coast or river
systems for interprovincial passenger and freight movement.
However, between provinces in Java, increasingly in
Sumatra, and in limited areas of other provinces in the Outer
Islands, road transportation is predominant. The road network
is much denser in Java, and the quality of the paved roads there
is much superior to that found in most of the Outer Islands.
Indeed, Java, with only 6.9 percent of the total land area of In-
donesia, has 27 percent of all the roads in the country and 48
percent of its paved highways. 4 In terms of total road density
(in kilometers of all types of roads per 1,000 square kilometers)
Java has an average of 347 compared to an average in the Outer
Islands of sixty-eight (and a range from eight in Irian Jaya to
266 in North Sulawesi). Sulawesi and Sumatra have higher road
densities than Kalimantan, Maluku, and Irian Jaya (see Figure
4.2).
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The contrast between Java and the Outer Islands in road
density is far greater when only paved roads are considered.
Java has a far denser network of paved roads (249 kilometers
per 1,000 square kilometers compared to thirty-six in Sulawesi,
forty-one in Sumatra, and six in Kalimantan) and has a far
higher percentage of its roads paved (72 percent compared
to 37 percent in Sumatra, 24 percent in Kalimantan, and 23
percent in Sulawesi). There is a distinct decrease in the density
of paved roads with increasing distance eastward from Java
(with East Nusatenggara having 23.8 kilometers of paved roads
per 1,000 square kilometers, Maluku 9.1, and Irian Jaya 1.5),
although Central and East Kalimantan also rank among the
lowest, with 2.0 and 3.4, respectively. Contrasts between
provinces within the major islands are also enormous (see
Figure 4.3).
Within the past ten years a comprehensive program of road
improvement has been undertaken: a network of 18,000 kilo-
meters of high-priority road links throughout the archipelago. 5
Indeed, some of the results can already be seen in the signif-
icant increase in total road length, from 95,463 kilometers in
1972 to 168,028 kilometers in 1982, and in the more than dou-
bling of paved roads from 25,068 kilometers in 1972 to 69,209
kilometers in 1982 (a change from 26 percent paved in 1972 to
41 percent paved in 1982). 6
Vehicle density has likewise increased enormously over the
past decade and, as expected, ranges widely among the
provinces, in relation both to the length of roads and to the size
of provincial populations. In terms of the number of vehicles per
kilometer of road, the Javanese provinces stand out as by far
the best served (see Figure 4.4), with an average of more than
three times as many as any other island group and more than
seven times as many as Nusatenggara, Maluku, and Irian Jaya.
Apart from all the Javanese provinces, only North Sumatra ex-
ceeds the national average of 32 vehicles per kilometer of road.
Perhaps a more meaningful measure of vehicle density is the
number of registered vehicles per 1,000 population (see Figure
4.5). As might be expected, some of the more highly urbanized
and developed provinces, Jakarta, East Kalimantan, Bali, and
North Sumatra, have a disproportionate share of vehicles (155,
sixty-eight, fifty-three, and fifty-three vehicles per 1,000 pop-
ulation, respectively), and East and West Nusatenggara and
Maluku have the fewest (eight, thirteen, and thirteen, respec-
tively, compared with a national average of thirty-six). Java had
65 percent of the total 5,347,716 registered vehicles in the
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Figure 4.2. Length of roads of all types and conditions in kilometers
per 1,000 square kilometers, 1982. Calculated from data in Table
VII.1.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
Figure 4.3. Length of paved roads in kilometers per 1,000 square kilo-
meters, 1982. Calculated from data in Table VII.1.3 in Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik , Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
country in 1982, a proportion fairly consistent with Java’s share
of the overall population (62 percent), but highly out of balance
when land area is considered and when Java’s rail network is
taken into account. East Nusatenggara ranks lowest on both ve-
hicular indices.
Despite the relatively small number of vehicles per 1,000
population, mobility is growing, as evidenced by the impressive
increase in the number of vehicles since 1970. In that year the
total number of registered vehicles was only 805,000 for a pop-
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Figure 4.4. Number of registered vehicles of all types per kilometer of
road, 1982. Calculated from data in Table VII.2.3 in Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
ulation of around 115 million (an average of one vehicle per 143
people). By 1974 this number had increased by 67 percent to
1,342,000 and by 1982 had reached an amazing 5,347,716 ve-
hicles (for a population of around 155 million, an average of one
vehicle per twenty-nine people), a 664 percent increase over the
1970 figure. The increase took place particularly in the number
of motorcycles, which make up 70 percent of all the vehicles in
the country, compared with 15 percent for passenger cars, 12
percent for trucks, and 3 percent for buses. 7 Once again one
needs to note the considerable amount of interaction that takes
place on buses and on trucks used to transport people, espe-
cially on long-distance trips.
Because of Indonesia’s geographical configuration whereby
84 percent of the territory under its jurisdiction consists of
sea, shipping has historically been the prime means of linking
the thousands of islands and is second only to roads in im-
portance. Interisland shipping was well organized and regular
under the Dutch colonial administration, although it served only
a limited number of ports. It was provided not only for economic
reasons but for governmental purposes of integrating the far-
flung empire, with profitable lines subsidizing other non-eco-
nomic but administratively important routes. The Dutch-owned
fleet continued to serve interisland shipping needs after inde-
pendence until its withdrawal in 1957; after that the situation
deteriorated badly and only began to improve again at the be-
ginning of the 1970s.
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Figure 4.5. Number of registered vehicles of all types per 1,000 popu-
lation, 1982. Calculated from data in Table VII.2.3 in Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
Of the five branches of the Indonesian shipping fleet, the
archipelago fleet (armada Nusantara), the local shipping fleet
(armada lokal), and the people’s shipping fleet (armada rakyat)
are of predominant importance in interprovincial transpor-
tation. These fleets are largely complementary, with the
people’s and local shipping fleets serving local harbors and
coastal villages and feeding the major ports, which are served
by the interisland, archipelago fleet. Regional differences in
the relative importance of the different fleets occur: people’s
shipping is of greater importance in eastern Indonesia, while
just over half the local shipping fleet is domiciled in the west.
The most important for interisland transportation is the armada
Nusantara (interisland fleet).
The oldest, traditional form of communications among the
islands was by sailing vessels (perahu) that made use of the
seasonal monsoons in their annual voyage, sailing eastward
with the westerly wind in the wet October-to-March season and
westward with the northeasterly monsoon in the dry April-to-
September season. By the mid 1970s, an estimated 7,500 to
10,000 of these small wooden sailing vessels, some with small
auxiliary motors, served shipping needs, primarily in Sulawesi
and East Java. 8 Perahu shipping (armada rakyat) accounts for
approximately 10 percent of the total Indonesian interisland
trade and is important for certain cargoes, particularly timber,
where it has had a virtual monopoly. Perahu shipping has the
advantage of being more flexible than other forms of trans-
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portation; the sailing vessels are virtually independent of im-
ported materials and spare parts; they place few demands on
the infrastructure of ports and dockyard services, and they are
not handicapped by burdensome, bureaucratic controls. They
are thus self-sufficient, labor-intensive, and, in the past espe-
cially, mostly unregulated, able to respond quickly to changes in
trading needs. For these reasons, perahu shipping historically
has been strong in periods of economic decline (such as in the
late 1950s to 1960s) but has suffered increasing competition
from the local shipping fleet as the economy has improved and
as infrastructure and capital have been concentrated on serving
the needs of the local and interisland shipping fleets.
Perahu shipping thus plays a minor though significant role
in interisland trade and communications. Its importance varies
considerably from area to area, partly for historical reasons
and partly too because only certain routes are suitable for the
perahu because of wind patterns. But in ports such as Banjar-
masin, Semarang, and Cirebon, perahu shipping predominates;
and in linking many of the smaller, isolated villages and harbors,
perahu shipping has a vital role.
The armada lokal involves wooden-and steel-hulled motor
vessels used for freight, with capacities of between 100 and
500 cubic meters, which provide feeder services to the major
ports within a radius of approximately 200 miles. 9 This sector
has increased its share of shipping considerably since the es-
tablishment of the New Order in 1967, and by the mid-1970s
accounted for approximately 18 percent (1.9 million tons per
annum) of total interisland trade. Local shipping is frequently
in the hands of Chinese, who have better access to finance and
cargoes, especially of consumer goods, which are so important
in the outward trade from Java. Most is domiciled in Sumatra
(25 percent in Riau alone), compared with only 29 percent in
Java.
However, the interisland fleet of primary importance in
linking all the provinces and serving the major ports for both
passengers and freight is the armada Nusantara. Because of its
recognized integrative role as well as its economic role in pro-
moting development and regional trade, this fleet has been the
main focus of attention in a nation concerned with the problems
of national integration and development.
In colonial days, interisland transportation was provided by
the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (K.P.M., the Dutch in-
terisland shipping company), supplemented by the vessels of
the Kapal-Kapal Armada Pemerintah (government fleet) to facil-
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itate government administration and fill local transport needs.
The K.P.M. continued to operate after independence until 1957,
when it was withdrawn as a consequence of Indonesia’s at-
tempted nationalization of the fleet, which was part of its effort
to wrest West Irian from the Dutch. As a result, interisland
transportation declined drastically: by 1968 it was estimated
that the size of the Indonesian fleet was only 30 percent of
that of the K.P.M. fleet in 1957. By 1972, 48 percent of the in-
terisland fleet of 389 ships was over fifteen years of age, and
only 187 of the 275 ships licensed to operate on the Regular
Liner Service routes were operative. Service was irregular and
productivity low, with port time consuming 70–80 percent of
total operating time. 10 Since 1972, however, great improve-
ments have been made to rehabilitate seaworthy vessels; to
modernize, expand, and improve the efficiency of the interisland
fleet; and to improve shipyard and dock facilities. Cargo shipped
by interisland shipping, for example, increased from 2.3 million
tons in 1973, to 3.5 million tons in 1976, and to 4.4 million tons
in 1980.
In 1980 the interisland fleet totaled 374 vessels, with a com-
bined capacity of 379,000 deadweight tons. 11 This network was
supplemented by a number of vessels designed to carry ho-
mogeneous bulk cargoes and meet overflow seasonal shipping
needs. (By 1980 two-thirds of the total cargo fleet was used for
the transportation of petroleum and liquified natural gas alone.)
The relative importance of each province in interisland shipping
can be seen in the income generated by each port, aggregated
by province. The income from ports in Java (33.5 percent of
the total for Indonesia) just exceeds that from Sumatra (33.3
percent), compared with Kalimantan’s 21.7 percent, Sulawesi’s
6.3 percent, Irian Jaya and Maluku’s combined total of 4.1
percent, and Nusatenggara’s 1.2 percent. However, on a
provincial basis Jakarta predominates, with over 1,294 million
rupiahs in income generated by its port of Tanjung Priok (17.2
percent of the total for Indonesia), followed by East Kalimantan
with 1,104 million rupiahs from its five major ports (14.6
percent), and Riau with 835 million rupiahs from its major
port of Dumai (11.1 percent). 12 On a per-capita basis, however,
East Kalimantan’s ports generate almost twice as much as the
second ranking province of Riau (1,013.5 and 538.2 rupiahs
per capita, respectively), with Jakarta, Irian Jaya, and Aceh
also each generating more than three times the national av-
erage of 51.1 rupiahs per capita (see Figure 4.6). Provinces with
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the lowest port-generated income per capita include all the Ja-
vanese provinces apart from Jakarta, as well as Bali, the two
Nusatenggara provinces, and Bengkulu.
Attention has also been given to integrating especially iso-
lated parts of Indonesia (the daerah-daerah lemah) by providing
regular service with thirty-one special vessels (the armada per-
intis [pioneer fleet]). The motivation for this is both political
and economic: to integrate and to involve those areas in main-
stream Indonesian life; and to develop, by guaranteeing regular
transportation, any cash crops that can be produced, as well as
to raise living standards by bringing in imported goods. Areas
served include the Riau archipelago, West Sumatra, West and
East Nusatenggara, Sangihe and Talaud (in North Sulawesi),
Maluku, and Irian Jaya. Traffic on these lines grew by over 31
percent a year between 1976 and 1980. 13
Of the 319 registered ports, the seventeen largest (each
recording an income of at least 100 million rupiahs in
1981–1982) accounted for 70 percent of the total shipping
income (see Table 4.1). 14 The government has been active in
rehabilitating these ports and stimulating the shipping industry
through a number of regulations and construction projects.
These include requiring goods purchased or sold by official
agencies or enterprises to be transported on Indonesian liners
and reducing berthing fees for domestic liners. In a more con-
troversial move, the government is forcing shipowners to scrap
all vessels over twenty-five years old (regardless of their sea-
worthiness) and sell the scrap to the state-owned Krakatau
Steel (at prices well below those on the international market).
Shipowners are then required to purchase standard, locally
built ships from the state-owned shipbuilding company in Sura-
baya, which, critics claim, are being built with high-cost local
materials and an inexperienced work force, thus costing far
more than the preferred secondhand foreign-built vessels previ-
ously bought. 15
Air transportation has increased enormously over the past
two decades, a measure of both the increasing integration par-
ticularly of urban areas and the improving standard of living
in Indonesia. Just between 1968 and 1971 the number of pas-
sengers flying on domestic flights increased from 382,000 to
993,000, an increase of 260 percent. 16 By 1974 the numbers
had increased to a reported 2,229,000 passengers, 17 and by
1981 to 6,512,902, a 656 percent increase over just ten years.
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Figure 4.6. Income generated by the ports in each province in rupiahs
per capita, 1981–1982. Calculated from data in Republik Indonesia,
Departemen Perhubungan Laut, Direktorat Perkapalan dan Pelayaran
SubDit. Kebandaran dan Awak Kapal, Seksi P.U., File No. TH 1981/82.
18 The amount of freight carried by the airlines is still small but
increased at an annual rate of 23 percent between 1969 and
1982. 19
The number of domestic air passengers passing through
the sixty-six provincial airports gives some idea of the com-
parative importance of air traffic relative to population size in
each province and reflects economic prosperity as well as pop-
ulation mobility. As Figure 4.7 shows, Jakarta and East Kali-
mantan dominate in per-capita air travel, while provinces with
the least domestic air traffic in relation to their populations
are West, Central, and East Java, Aceh, Lampung, and the rel-
atively isolated and less developed provinces of East and West
Nusatenggara and Southeast Sulawesi.
Much progress has been made in increasing the number of
aircraft and the number of flights on already established routes,
as well as in constructing new airports and air strips, thus
improving communications among previously isolated areas.
Several commercial airlines serve domestic routes, and there
are several special charter airlines as well. In 1983, the primary
government-owned national airline, Garuda Indonesian
Airways, operated seventy-seven aircraft with a combined
seating capacity of 11,400, and Merpati Nusantara, incorpo-
rated into Garuda in 1978 but still run as a separate entity,
operated thirty-eight aircraft. 20 Other commercial domestic air-
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Table 4.1. Major ports of Indonesia ranked by income recorded,
1981–1982
Port Rupiahs
(millions)
1. Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) 1,294,006
2. Dumai (Riau) 835,426
3. Surabaya (East Java) 534,500
4. Lhokseumawe (Aceh) 339,252
5. Kuala Semboja (East Kalimantan) 286,826
6. Balikpapan (East Kalimantan) 272,765
7. Belawan (North Sumatra) 267,239
8. Bontang (East Kalimantan) 227,739
9. Palembang (South Sumatra) 181,168
10. Tanjung Santan (East Kalimantan) 161,254
11. Samarinda (East Kalimantan) 155,381
12. Manado/Bitung (North Sulawesi) 136,340
13. Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) 133,244
14. Semarang (Central Java) 128,132
15. Sorong (Irian Jaya) 118,354
16. Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi) 116,590
17. Cirebon (West Java) 101,784
Source: Republik Indonesia, Departemen Perhubungan Laut,
Direktorat Perkapalan dan Pelayaran SubDit, Kebandaran dan
Awak Kapal, Seksi P.U., File No. TH 1981/82
lines, such as Mandala and Bouraq, further strengthen air trans-
portation services in the country and help to link population
centers throughout the archipelago.
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Figure 4.7. Number of air passengers recorded on domestic flights
per 1,000 population, 1981. Calculated from data in Table 9 in Biro
Pusat Statistik, Statistik Angkutan Udara 1981.
COMMUNICATIONS
Mass communications are vital to integrating a nation in terms
of both area and people. This has been recognized by many
governments of developing countries, which have sought to im-
prove all forms of communications. Radio and television, tele-
phone and telegraph, mail service and the press all play a vital
role in national communications. Telecommunications facilities
have expanded tremendously since 1970 with the completion
of the domestic satellite network consisting of two communica-
tions satellites (Palapa) and forty earth stations.
Of all the forms of mass-media communications considered
in a 1972 sample survey of the best way to disseminate infor-
mation and reach people, radio was found to be most effective
(compared with the press, television, and films). 21 This is partly
because of the widespread availability and relative low cost of
radios and partly because a radio requires no skills of its au-
dience. Use of traditional media (such as shadow puppet plays
[wayang]) was also valued because of its ready acceptance by
the people (in those areas such as Java where it is a traditionally
accepted part of the culture).
The importance of exposure to national and nationwide
radio broadcasts and television programs has already been con-
sidered under the sociocultural dimension of integration. An
impressive doubling in the number of radio receivers was
recorded between 1964 and 1971 (from 1.5 million to three
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million), and by 1980 12.3 million households reported owning
a radio/cassette recorder. 22 Television accessibility throughout
the country has expanded even more rapidly. By 1980,
2,940,000 households reported owning a television set, up from
an estimated 10,000 in 1962. In 1973 only about 3.8 percent
of the land area of Indonesia received television signals: ap-
proximately 26 percent of Java, and parts of southern Sumatra,
eastern Kalimantan, and southern Sulawesi. 23 Indeed, in 1973
93 percent of all television sets were found in Java. Since then,
television has become available in every province, thanks to the
Palapa satellites. Despite the fact that television is only one-
way communication, television programs are seen as a partic-
ularly effective medium for strengthening national integration
and preserving and developing Indonesia’s national culture, as
well as for promoting rural development. 24
Telephone communications have also been aided by the de-
velopment of the satellite communications system. But even
though telephone density has risen from 1.8 per 1,000 popu-
lation in 1971 to 4.0 in 1981, telephone linkages remain rela-
tively poorly developed in Indonesia. This is a reflection partly
of the low level of development, but partly too it reflects the dif-
ficulties and high cost of providing telephone facilities in such
a physically fragmented country. The satellite system is supple-
mented by microwave facilities linking Jakarta to southern
Sumatra, Bali, and parts of Nusatenggara, and other high-fre-
quency radio and high-altitude systems link the remotest is-
lands. 25 Telephone communication is limited largely to urban
areas and thus correlates closely with the proportion of the
population of each province that is urban and with the level
of development. As expected, telephone density is far higher
in Jakarta (32.8 telephones per 1,000 population) than in any
other province, with East Kalimantan a poor second at 8.5. 26
Other provinces with relatively high telephone densities are
North Sumatra, Bali, and Irian Jaya, while exceptionally low
per-capita telephone ownership exists in Southeast Sulawesi,
East Nusatenggara, Lampung, West and Central Kalimantan,
and Central Sulawesi (see Figure 4.8). As with other forms of
communications, there has been a rapid expansion of telephone
communications in recent years: the number of telephones has
increased from 60,000 in 1968 to 263,000 in 1973 to 584,181 in
1981 and 741,322 in 1983.
Analysis of the number of minutes of telephone conversation
per capita in 1980 portrays a pattern generally similar to that of
telephone ownership, with Irian Jaya, East Kalimantan, Jakarta,
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Figure 4.8 Number of telephone licenses issued per 1,000 population,
1981. Calculated from data in Table VII.5.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
and Bali having the highest telephone usage on a per-capita
basis, and West Kalimantan, East Nusatenggara, Lampung, and
Jambi the lowest (see Figure 4.9). Some interesting changes
have occurred over the past decade, however, because of the
development of the multichannel microwave system and the
new domestic satellite communications system: whereas in
1973 Java recorded 94 percent of all telephone conversations
when measured by number of minutes spoken, by 1980 that
figure had fallen to 62.8 percent, approximately equal to Java’s
share of the total Indonesian population. The two provinces of
Irian Jaya and Maluku together had far more telephone com-
munication per capita per annum than any other group of
provinces (77.1 minutes per 100 people, compared with 44.1 for
Java, 43.4 for Nusatenggara [including Bali], 42.0 for Sumatra,
41.5 for Kalimantan, and 37.6 for Sulawesi). 27
Even more than with the use of telephones, eastern In-
donesia’s use of telegrams for domestic communication is far
higher than that of Java and Sumatra. The number of telegrams
sent to domestic destinations was greatest by far in Irian Jaya
and Maluku (270.6 and 231.9 per 1,000 population, compared
with a national average of 46.9). Other provinces with a high
use of telegrams were East Kalimantan, Central and North Su-
lawesi, Riau, and Jakarta; those with lowest use were Lampung,
North Sumatra, West, Central, and East Java, and West Kali-
mantan (see Figure 4.10). 28
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Figure 4.9. Number of minutes of telephone conversation within In-
donesia per 100 population, 1980. Calculated from data in Table 13 in
Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Kommunikasi 1980.
The provinces that stand out as having the fewest com-
munication links with other provinces, in terms of both tele-
phones and telegrams, on a per-capita basis, are West Kali-
mantan and Lampung. Telegraph communications from other
isolated provinces, such as Southeast and Central Sulawesi
and East Nusatenggara, are surprisingly high. For twenty-four
provinces telegrams addressed to domestic destinations consti-
tuted over 95 percent of all telegrams sent. In Jakarta this figure
dropped to 89 percent, a reflection of the capital’s international
status, and in Bali it fell to 92 percent, because of its tourism.
Interprovincial flows of mail form another index of inter-
regional communication and thus of functional integration.
However, inadequate data make detailed cross-provincial com-
parisons impossible.
The press, which plays such an important role in dissemi-
nating information and integrating peoples in more developed
societies, has a very limited role in Indonesia. It serves a small,
mainly urban clientele focused in Jakarta and a few other
provincial capitals, and provides incomplete coverage of na-
tional activities. Historically, the fortunes of the press have fluc-
tuated widely: they flowered in the mid-1950s, but underwent
a spectacular decline in the period of Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy. After the abortive coup in 1965 the press again ex-
panded, and in 1966 circulation rose to a peak of about two
million, but then declined to under 900,000 by the end of 1967
(for a population of over 110 million). 29 It has since increased
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substantially. As in many developing countries, each copy of a
newspaper is read by far more people than a comparable issue
in a developed country.
Yet newspapers reach only a small segment of the popu-
lation. On average only 18 percent of Indonesia’s population ten
years of age or over reported having read a newspaper or mag-
azine in the week preceding a survey in 1981. As expected, per-
centages vary widely, from a high of 48.9 percent in Jakarta, and
between 25 and 28 percent in North and West Sumatra, North
Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, to less than 12 percent in West and
East Nusatenggara, Bengkulu, Jambi, Bali, and East Java (see
Figure 4.11). 30
Government control and interference have also varied in
intensity over the years. In the late 1960s experts rated In-
donesian newspapers as among the freest in Southeast Asia, but
there has been considerable growth in the power and influence
of the military since then and increased censorship. Several in-
fluential army-controlled dailies based in Jakarta have expanded
their circulation and established affiliated branch editions in a
number of provincial towns. But some provincial newspapers
and news magazines that provide news locally have at times
been banned from being mailed to other parts of Indonesia,
thereby reducing their potential integrative effect. Press
freedom was sharply curtailed following the Jakarta riots in
January 1974 31 and has fluctuated since. A fair amount of veiled
criticism is currently permitted, although there are definite
limits. Indeed, a leading newspaper, Sinar Harapan, was closed
down in 1986 for being too outspoken. Censorship, which the-
oretically may help integration by curbing inflammatory criti-
cism, in practice may also lead to a repressive rather than an
integrated society and may restrict development.
MIGRATION
Analysis of migration data as recorded in the 1971 and 1980
censuses reveals much about the degree of interaction among
people from the various provinces of Indonesia, although it
should be noted that the census records only a small subset
of all the population movement that occurs within the country:
that which crosses provincial borders and is of at least six
months’ duration. It thus fails to take note of the consider-
able amount of intraprovincial movement as well as temporary
migration. Other complicating factors in comparing inter-
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Figure 4.10. Number of telegrams sent to domestic destinations per
1,000 population, 1981. Calculated from data in Table VIII.5.5 in Biro
Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1982.
Figure 4.11. Percentage of the population who read a newspaper or
magazine in the week preceding a survey, 1981. Based on data in
Table III.1.9 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku
Saku.
provincial migration are the tremendous variation in the geo-
graphical size of the provinces and the physical proximity of
other provinces. For example, Irian Jaya has an area of 422,000
square kilometers, whereas Jakarta has less than 1,000 square
kilometers. A person can therefore travel only a short distance
on Java by land, cross a provincial border, and be classified as
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a migrant, but in Irian Jaya “migration” under this definition re-
quires journeys of hundreds of kilometers and travel by sea or
air.
In terms of long-term interprovincial migration, the popu-
lation of Indonesia as a whole is relatively immobile. In 1980
only 7.8 percent of the total population (11.4 million people out
of 146.8 million) had resided in a province other than that in
which they were presently located, and only 7.0 percent were
living in a different province from the one where they were
born. 32 Over one-third of those who had lived elsewhere (4.5
million or 39 percent) were residing either in Jakarta or in
Lampung in southern Sumatra, a major destination for transmi-
grants from Java. In general there is considerably more inter-
provincial mixing in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Irian
Jaya than there is in Nusatenggara, Java (with the exception
of Jakarta), and Sulawesi. Very little intermixing takes place in
the eight provinces where less than 5 percent of the population
has ever lived in another province. This group includes both the
densely populated provinces of East, Central, and West Java and
Bali, and the more isolated and less developed provinces of East
and West Nusatenggara and West Kalimantan, as well as South
Sulawesi (see Figure 4.12).
Analysis of the generally small percentage of each
province’s population that has previously lived outside that
province shows that in fourteen provinces over half of the im-
migrants came from just one or two other provinces, generally
from their nearest neighbors (with the exceptions of the
provinces attracting transmigrants from Java and Bali, such
as North Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Lampung,
and West Kalimantan) (see Figure 4.13). Other provinces,
however, such as East Nusatenggara and South and North Su-
lawesi, have immigrants from a wide diversity of other
provinces, with no one province contributing more than 17
percent. In comparison with the migration data in the 1971
census, it is interesting to note that the source areas for in-
terprovincial migrants have broadened as transportation and
communications facilities have improved.
Although the percentages of people who have lived outside
their present province of residence remain small, they conceal
the substantial numbers involved, particularly in the case of
Java. For example, although only 2.3 percent of Central Java’s
and 2.1 percent of East Java’s population have lived previously
in another province, these percentages represent 579,000 and
623,000 people respectively, significantly higher numbers than
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Figure 4.12. Percentage of the population in each province who have
lived previously in another province, 1980. Calculated from data in
Table 7.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no.
2.
the 57,500 in-migrants in East Nusatenggara and the 69,500
in West Nusatenggara (which also constitute only 2.1 and 2.6
percent of their respective populations), or even the 150,000
in Central Kalimantan, which make up a much more significant
15.7 percent of its total population of 954,000. 33
Three major migration flows can be identified from the 1980
census materials: first, that to Jakarta, where just over 40
percent of that special district’s population formerly resided
in another province. Jakarta’s attractions are obvious: it is the
center of government and commerce and has greater em-
ployment and education opportunities than any other province.
Over 75 percent of the in-migrants in Jakarta in 1980 had
come from Java, with the highest proportions, as might be ex-
pected, from West and Central Java (33.5 and 32.3 percent, re-
spectively) (see Table 4.2). Significant numbers had come also
from North, West, and South Sumatra, West Kalimantan, and
South and North Sulawesi. Indeed, Jakarta was the prime desti-
nation for migrants from North, West, and South Sumatra, West
and Central Java, Yogyakarta, West Nusatenggara, and West
Kalimantan. The considerable amount of interchange between
Jakarta and West Java is also striking: over half the out-mi-
grants from Jakarta live in West Java, from where a considerable
number commute or engage in circular migration to Jakarta.
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Figure 4.13. Province of last previous residence of interprovincial mi-
grants, 1980. Calculated from data in Table 7.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no.2.
The second major migration flow is the movement from Java
to Lampung, South and North Sumatra, and to a lesser extent
Jambi and Riau, stimulated largely by the government’s trans-
migration (resettlement) program (see Table 4.3). In Lampung
39 percent of the population had migrated from other provinces
(two-thirds of them from Central and East Java), while South
and North Sumatra each had over 350,000 migrants from Java.
Also increasingly affected by the government’s transmigration
program in the 1970s have been the provinces of South, West,
and East Kalimantan, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, and,
most recently, Irian Jaya. In addition to government-sponsored
migration there has always been a considerably larger flow of
spontaneous migration in the same direction.
The government’s stated goals in its transmigration
program are to provide land for the landless from Java, Bali,
and Lombok (in West Nusatenggara); to improve the distrib-
ution of population; and at the same time to provide manpower
for labor-scarce areas outside Java, Bali, and Lombok, so that
the latter areas can develop as new centers of production. The
program is also seen as a vehicle to promote “national stability
and integration.” 34
The Interaction Dimension
122
Table 4.2. Migration to Jakarta
Place of previous residence
of Jakarta’s population in
1980
In-migrants
to Jakarta
Percentage of Jakarta’s
in-migrant population in
1 980a
Aceh 12,635 0.4
North Sumatra 149,513 5.8
West Sumatra 131,198 5.1
Riau 17,011 0.7
Jambi 6,576 0.2
South Sumatra 89,831 3.4
Bengkulu 3,420 0.1
Lampung 11,394 0.4
Jakarta [3,842,898]b —
West Java 859,979 33.5
Central Java 828,947 32.3
Yogyakarta 62,208 2.4
East Java 211,530 8.2
Bali 7,411 0.3
West Nusatenggara 8,039 0.3
East Nusatenggara 9,009 0.4
East Timor 1,313 0.1
West Kalimantan 47,349 1.8
Central Kalimantan 2,507 0.1
South Kalimantan 12,795 0.5
East Kalimantan 6,279 0.2
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North Sulawesi 27,818 1.1
Central Sulawesi 3,769 0.1
South Sulawesi 38,687 1.5
Southeast Sulawesi 2,868 0.1
Maluku 13,645 0.5
Irian Jaya 4,151 0.2
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S,
no. 2, Table 7.3
aExcluding those abroad or not stated.
bResidents of Jakarta who have not lived in any other province.
However, serious questions have been raised about how in-
tegrative the government’s transmigration program actually is.
In general, the indigenous people in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and
Sulawesi have not welcomed the settlement of Javanese and Ba-
linese transmigrants among them, especially where they have
threatened to become a majority in their local region. Transmi-
grants in Irian Jaya are strongly opposed by the local people. In
a discussion of some of the sociocultural difficulties that arise
in connection with transmigration, a study by the Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific noted that there
was considerable resentment among poor, indigenous farmers
in South Sulawesi, for example, because they were not eligible
for the financial and other assistance available to transmigrants
from Java and Bali. 35 Relations have been somewhat easier
where there have been no conflicting land claims or where local
people have benefited from employment or business opportu-
nities opened up by transmigrant settlements. But there has
been little genuine assimilation based on intermarriage, partly
because of the different cultures, languages, and ways of life,
but partly also because transmigrants recruited from among
the poorest in Java have not usually enjoyed sufficient social
standing among ethnic groups such as the Minangkabau, Bugis,
or Batak. 36 In addition, there is real fear among the inhabitants
of the Outer Islands of increasing Javanization.
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Table 4.3. Number of government- sponsored transmigrants,
1969–1983
Province Number of settlers
Aceh 35,516
North Sumatra 13,955
West Sumatra 29,870
Riau 114,728
Jambi 131,554
South Sumatra 358,819
Bengkulu 61,252
Lampung 140,265
West Kalimantan 66,107
Central Kalimantan 41,348
South Kalimantan 81,560
East Kalimantan 49,039
North Sulawesi 21,852
Central Sulawesi 91,599
South Sulawesi 48,426
Southeast Sulawesi 78,643
Maluku 16,678
Irian Jaya 32,927
1,414,138a
Source: Republic of Indonesia, Department of Transmigration
aIn addition to official, government-sponsored transmigrants,
there are at least twice as many spontaneous transmigrants,
although their destinations differ widely from those of
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government-sponsored transmigrants. For example, thirteen to
eighteen times as many spontaneous as official transmigrants
moved to Lampung and North Sumatra between 1975 and
1980. See H. W. Arndt, “Transmigration: Achievements,
Problems, Prospects,” p. 71. North Sumatra in 1980 recorded
617,115 people who had previously lived outside the province;
in Lampung, the numbers were 1,813,900. See Biro Pusat
Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2, Table 7.3.
Third, there is the movement to some of the provinces with
higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita or above-av-
erage rates of economic growth: East Kalimantan (where 25
percent of the population previously resided in another
province), Jambi (21 percent), Riau (17 percent), Bengkulu (17
percent), Central Kalimantan (16 percent), and Central Su-
lawesi (16 percent). 37 In terms of actual numbers, North and
South Sumatra had the largest flows by 1980, with over 600,000
in-migrants each. West Sumatra, Bali, East Nusatenggara,
North and South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, as well as
most of Java, registered more out-migration than in-migration
in the decades preceding both 1971 and 1980.
Despite generally low interprovincial migration rates, a
comparison of 1971 and 1980 census data indicates growing
mobility among the population. Almost twice as many people
had previously resided in another province in 1980 as in 1971
(11.4 million compared with 5.8 million). In addition, studies by
Hugo, Jellinik, and others have shown a substantial upswing in
all kinds of other mobility, especially commuting, seasonal mi-
gration, and circular movements, with generally shortened pe-
riodicity and longer distances involved than before. 38 Others
have discussed both the great increase in commuting in con-
nection with the improvements and expansion in transport in
the 1970s, and the proclivity of certain ethnic groups (particu-
larly the Minangkabau, West Javanese, Batak, Banjarese, Bugis,
and others) to engage in circular migrations (merantau). 39 In
recent years the pattern of such circular migration has changed
almost entirely to one of urban destinations and the taking up
of occupations quite unlike those in the area of origin. 40 Such
circulation between the city and the countryside not only re-
lieves the strain on the urban infrastructure and services, but
increases the dissemination of new ideas and, it can be argued,
fosters understanding and integration. But, on the other hand,
circulation reflects the spatial unevenness of development and
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helps to perpetuate the inequality between the elite among
the wage-earning classes and the circulating petty producer/
peasant classes. 41
Although the low overall migration figures indicate that
there is comparatively little population mixing, it is significant
that most interprovincial migrants have gone to urban areas,
where the potential for inter-ethnic mixing is greater than in
rural areas. However, the physical presence of immigrants from
another province does not, of course, necessarily mean inter-
mingling and interaction with those born in that province. Even
in urban areas, and particularly in large cities, there is a ten-
dency for each ethnic group to live in its own kampung
(neighborhood). In rural areas, ethnic groups frequently form
separate communities having relatively little contact with other
groups.
Return migration is significant for both integration and
development, because migrants who return to their areas of
origin generally take back with them experiences of inter-ethnic
contact as well as of economic differences and innovations that
can be a stimulus to local development. They are also a source
of information for future migrants. The data show that the
provinces where most return migrants have lived are the urban
or economically developing provinces of Jakarta, Riau, Jambi,
and East Kalimantan. The rates of return migration are highest
in North Sulawesi, West and East Nusatenggara (although in
the last two cases the actual numbers are small), and West
Sumatra (with its merantau migration pattern revealed in its 35
percent rate of return migration).
On the basis of per-capita migration data, therefore, two
provinces stand out as being particularly poorly integrated into
the national whole: East and West Nusatenggara, where out-
migration and in-migration together affect less than 3 percent
of the provincial population. In addition, Central and East Java
and Bali have relatively little in-migration. By contrast, Jakarta
emerges as a melting pot for the entire nation. Although in
terms of absolute numbers the majority of in-migrants have
come from Java (76.4 percent of lifetime migrants), every
province is a source area, with the percentages coming from
other provinces ranging from 0.05 and 0.1 in the cases of East
Timor and Central Kalimantan to 5.8 and 5.1 for North and West
Sumatra, respectively (see Table 4.2).
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TRADE
Another measure of national integration is the amount of trade
that takes place among the various regions within a nation.
An analysis of trade data reveals those provinces that par-
ticipate only minimally in the integrative trading experience,
either by having very low levels of trade with other provinces
in the country, or by maintaining stronger trading relationships
with places outside the national boundaries than with other
provinces within the country, or both.
It has been claimed that the Indonesian archipelago was
probably more integrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries than it was when colonial domination reoriented trade
more directly to overseas markets in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. 42 Increasingly, a separation of the different eco-
nomic regions of Indonesia took place, along with a growing,
dramatic split between Java and the Outer Islands in terms of
production factors, income levels, and demand. This situation
began to change only after 1930, in the period during and fol-
lowing the depression, when Java shifted from export to do-
mestic production as a result of the slump in the sugar market
and as the government began to encourage self-sufficiency in
rice production, an increase in domestic manufactures, and in-
terregional trade. Regional specialization increased and inter-
island trade grew. However, these trends were interrupted and
reversed by the Second World War and by the Japanese occu-
pation, which emphasized both subsistence and regional self-
sufficiency and disrupted both interregional transportation and
the established capital-intensive sector.
Even after independence was attained, government policy
and the deep-rooted problems inherited from the past combined
to reinforce economic fragmentation. A decline in prices re-
duced per-capita incomes and thus the market incentive for Ja-
vanese manufactured goods. Java shifted more of its resources
into food production to meet the needs of its own rapidly
growing population. 43 Trade tended to revert to the pattern of
each island exporting and importing directly from overseas and
trading within its own shores rather than with other islands,
while Java used increased amounts of the revenues generated
by Outer Island export earnings for its own imports of raw ma-
terial and capital goods for the Javanese market.
Regional markets grew slowly. This was a function of poor
agricultural growth and low per-capita incomes, together with
foreign exchange policies that restricted foreign consumer im-
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ports and froze export proceeds while domestic prices rose.
Interisland trade was thus subjected, at least from the view-
point of the Outer Islands, to progressively poorer economic
terms. Some local manufactures began to grow, particularly in
Sumatra. But serious deterioration in transportation facilities
in the late 1950s and early 1960s contributed to the further
weakening of interregional trade, as did growing economic
mismanagement. The distribution network remained disorga-
nized and decentralized.
Both domestic and foreign trade have increased consid-
erably under the new economic order in the post-1966 period.
Government intervention in domestic trade has increased to
“ensure the adequate supply of essential goods to Indonesian
consumers, to diversify the economy in accordance with devel-
opment plans, and to convert a colonial economy into a national
economy.” 44 This has met with mixed results: some measure
of quality control of exports and the protection of certain com-
modities, an insistence on control of private enterprise by “In-
donesian citizens,” but also some inflation and speculation, and
a massive, centralized bureaucracy.
In an analysis of the overall national trading pattern of In-
donesia it is important to consider the disproportionate partici-
pation of the different provinces in terms of both the production
of exports and the consumption of imports. The foreign trade
figures for 1982 show the great importance of Sumatra, and,
to a lesser extent, Kalimantan, in generating exports (primarily
petroleum, liquified natural gas, and timber). Sumatra accounts
for 59.1 percent of the total volume and 50.6 percent of the
total value of Indonesia’s exports; Kalimantan contributes 20.5
percent of the volume and 24.1 percent of the value. Java’s ex-
ports, by contrast, make up only 16 percent of the total volume
and 20.2 percent of the value of the whole country’s exports.
45 Per-capita data on export tonnage for international and do-
mestic destinations, presented in Figure 4.14, show a similar
pattern.
Moreover, when data on cargo loaded for overseas trade are
examined, Sumatra’s dominant role becomes much more ap-
parent: 80.9 percent of Indonesia’s cargo by weight originates
in Sumatra, primarily in Riau (50.7 percent of all Indonesia’s
cargo) and Aceh (24.3 percent). 46 Java’s cargoes loaded for
international destinations constitute only 4.0 percent of In-
donesia’s total, a smaller proportion than that originating in
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Figure 4.14. International and domestic exports: cargoes loaded in
tons per 100 population, 1982. Calculated from data in Table VII.4.2
in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
both Kalimantan, where 7.8 percent of Indonesia’s cargo des-
tined for foreign ports is loaded, and Irian Jaya, with its 4.4
percent share.
On a per-capita basis, disparities in terms of exports are
even more striking. Only seven of Indonesia’s twenty-seven
provinces export more than the national average of 38.9 tons
per 100 population. Riau stands out with its 1,340.6 tons, Aceh
is a distant second with 533.5 tons, and Irian Jaya third with
214.0 tons, all reflecting the mineral wealth of these areas. By
contrast, per-capita figures of below one ton per 100 population
occur in West Java, Bali, West and East Nusatenggara, and East
Timor, and below five tons in Central and East Java and South
and North Sulawesi (see Figure 4.15).
Imports, by contrast, flow predominantly to Java and
overwhelmingly to Jakarta: 68.8 percent of imports by value
enter Java, including 38.4 percent to Jakarta alone. 47 Sumatra
receives 20.6 percent and Kalimantan 7.3 percent; Irian Jaya
and Maluku together get 0.8 percent. These figures, however,
are not greatly out of line with each island’s share of the total
population (Java, 62 percent; Sumatra, 19 percent; Kalimantan,
5 percent; and Irian Jaya and Maluku, less than 2 percent). On
a per-capita basis, the contrasts, though wide, are not as ex-
treme as they are for exports. Kalimantan on average receives
the greatest value of imports on a per-capita basis ($182 per
capita); Java’s per-capita figure ($127) is only slightly higher
than that of Sumatra ($124). The poor, underdeveloped islands
of Nusatenggara receive least ($15), a figure that would be
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lower still if the relatively higher per-capita import level of Bali
were not included. Jakarta’s imports are more than eight times
the national average on a per-capita basis ($996 compared with
a national average of $114), but it is not clear from the data
what proportion of imports entering Jakarta is destined for re-
distribution to other provinces in Java or the Outer Islands. If
Jakarta’s imports are averaged with West Java’s, the per-capita
figure falls dramatically to $227 per person, substantially lower
than East Kalimantan’s astounding $908 and Riau’s high $387.
Provinces with exceptionally low per-capita import figures are
East Nusatenggara (3 cents), Bengkulu (20 cents), and West
Nusatenggara and Southeast Sulawesi ($2 each) (see Figure
4.16).
In a comparison of export and import data, therefore, it is
clear which islands benefit most from their incorporation into
the country of Indonesia. Java obviously benefits enormously:
its imports ($11,599 million or $127 per capita) far exceed its
exports ($4,511 million or $49 per capita). Similar situations
exist in Bali and Nusatenggara (which together have imports of
$118 million or $15 per capita, but exports of only $22 million
or $3 per capita), and, to a lesser extent, in Sulawesi (which
has imports of $313 million or $30 per capita and exports of
$244 million or $23 per capita). The reverse is true for Sumatra,
where exports ($11,303 million or $403 per capita) exceed im-
ports considerably ($3,474 million or $124 per capita); for Kali-
mantan (exports of $3,263 million or $485 per capita and im-
ports of $1,225 million or $182 per capita); and for Maluku and
Irian Jaya (exports of $868 million or $336 per capita, but im-
ports of only $130 million or $50 per capita). One has to wonder
about the integrative effect of this imbalance, particularly for
Irian Jaya and Maluku, which contribute so much more to the
national economy than they gain (although revenue generated
by drilling or mining accrues directly to the central government
and so lessens the perceived disparity between contributions
to and benefits from the national economy). However, the data
suggest that the situation at the beginning of the 1980s was
slightly more balanced than it was in 1971. In that year 75
percent of all Indonesia’s imports flowed to Java. Java had the
highest value of imports on a per-capita basis of any island
group, and Jakarta’s imports were more than sixteen times the
national average on a per-capita basis. 48 But Java obviously
still consumes a disproportionate percentage of the nation’s im-
ports, both in relation to its exports and in comparison with
most of the provinces in the eastern islands of Indonesia.
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Figure 4.15. International exports: cargoes loaded in tons per 100
population, 1982. Calculated from data in Table 1 in Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik, Statistik Bongkar Muat Barang di Pelabuhan Indonesia 1982.
Figure 4.16. Value of imports received from international trade in U.S.
dollars per capita, 1982. Calculated from data in Table 8 in Biro Pusat
Statistik, Impor Menurut Jenis Barang dan Negeri Asal, vol. 2.
The export situation, though seriously unbalanced, probably
does not threaten national integration as much as does the
uneven import situation, because raw materials (petroleum,
liquified natural gas, timber, and certain mineral and agricul-
tural commodities) are obviously restricted in their location and
exist largely as enclaval extractive industries that have little
effect on the major part of the population of the provinces
where they exist. The potentially explosive unbalanced import
situation seems to be far more serious, as people with similar
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needs receive disproportionate amounts, both absolutely and in
relation to what they produce for export. Differences in living
standards in different parts of the archipelago are very obvious.
Knowledge of where imported goods are more accessible and
where higher standards of living consequently occur (in urban
Java and particularly in Jakarta) contributes to the attrac-
tiveness of Jakarta and the consequent brain drain from the
Outer Island provinces, as well as to some discontent in parts of
the Outer Islands.
As might be expected, the contrasts among the provinces in
interprovincial trade are far smaller than those in international
trade, but show a similar pattern. The importance of Kalimantan
and Sumatra in producing exports for domestic trade stands
out both overall and on a per-capita basis (see Figure 4.17).
Unfortunately, the value of exports in interprovincial trade is
not available, but on the basis of tonnage per capita East Kali-
mantan and Riau produce far more than any of the other
provinces (with 328 and 183 tons per 100 population, respec-
tively). 49 By contrast, twelve of Indonesia’s twenty-seven
provinces produce less than ten tons per 100 population. As
with exports for overseas, Java and the Nusatenggara provinces
(Bali, West and East Nusatenggara, and East Timor) stand out
for their low production of exports. However, one should note
that many of Java’s exports for domestic trade consist of lighter
manufactured goods (as well as of cement, fertilizer, and other
heavy products), whereas most of the tonnage from the high-ex-
porting provinces consists of heavy commodities such as oil and
timber.
Imports from interprovincial trade (averaged over the two-
year period of 1981–1982) ranged from 14.4 tons per 100 pop-
ulation in Nusatenggara to 574 tons in Kalimantan, with
Lampung and West Nusatenggara recording the lowest values
for individual provinces (8.0 and 8.7 tons, respectively) and East
Kalimantan and Riau the highest (211.9 and 123.7 tons, respec-
tively) (see Figure 4.18). Unlike the situation with imports from
overseas, on a tonnage per-capita basis in interprovincial trade,
Java imports far less than all the other island groups with the
exception of Nusatenggara; but it still imports more than twice
as much as it exports (18.4 tons per 100 population compared
with 7.8 tons), a ratio exceeded only by Nusatenggara’s 14.4
and 4.3 figures.
There is more parity in interprovincial trade between ex-
ports and imports on a tonnage basis, although Kalimantan and
Sumatra continue to export more than they import, unlike all
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the other island groups, where the reverse is true. The greatest
contrasts occur in Jakarta, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Lampung,
Bali, and East Nusatenggara, which import at least three and a
half times more tonnage than they export.
An examination of interprovincial trading patterns indicates
limited commercial relationships and thus, one could argue,
limited integration. In 1981 only Jakarta and East Java both im-
ported and exported from every province in the country, while
several (notably Aceh, West Sumatra, Jambi, Bengkulu,
Lampung, Central Kalimantan, Bali, and Central Sulawesi) had
significant trade (of more than 500 tons per year) with less than
half of the other provinces. 50
An interesting change from the situation in 1971 is the in-
creased involvement in both international and interprovincial
trade of Maluku, Irian Jaya, and Southeast Sulawesi. From
ranking among the least integrated in this area, all three have
moved much closer to the national averages on most trade in-
dices and actually exceed them in terms of domestic imports
and on one of the export indices (interprovincial exports for
Southeast Sulawesi and Maluku, international exports for Irian
Jaya). Unlike these three provinces, West and East
Nusatenggara remain at or close to the bottom on all of the
trade indices, demonstrating their less-developed and less-inte-
grated status, with Central Kalimantan and Bengkulu recording
particularly low figures on the import indices, which are more
critical than export indices for national integration. It is encour-
aging to note the somewhat reduced dominance of Java in the
trading statistics, with a smaller percentage of imports flowing
into Java, and the fact that Sumatra and Kalimantan generally
import more on a per-capita basis than Java does, a reversal of
the situation in 1971.
Thus, overall Indonesia is moving toward greater inte-
gration in this interaction dimension, although the situation
among the provinces remains noticeably uneven.
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Figure 4.17. Interprovincial exports: cargoes loaded in tons per 100
population, 1982. Calculated from data in Table 1 in Biro Pusat Sta-
tistik, Statistik Bongkar Muat Barang di Pelabuhan Indonesia 1982.
Figure 4.18. Interprovincial imports: cargoes unloaded in tons per 100
population, 1981–1982 (average). Calculated from data in Table
VIII.4.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1982 (1981
figures); and Table 1 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Bongkar Muat
Barang di Pelabuhan Indonesia 1982 (1982 figures).
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5
The Economic Dimension
ECONOMIC integration, both structurally and spatially, is of
crucial importance to any country’s national cohesion and po-
litical stability. In numerous developing countries (and in some
developed ones as well) regional dissatisfaction stems from the
perception of economic inequalities. This was a major under-
lying cause of the civil war in Sudan, and it had a definite
role in the breakup of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Within Indonesia, too, several of the regional rebellions experi-
enced since independence have had economic grievances at
their root. Marked economic disparities are particularly disin-
tegrative when exceptionally rich (or sometimes, poor) regions
are peripherally located or economically independent of the rest
of the country.
One of the major problems of economic development
(whether in industry or agriculture) is that development almost
inevitably exacerbates economic disparities among both regions
and peoples because it takes place only in certain specific areas,
rather than being spread evenly throughout an entire country.
The tendency for the rich to get richer and the poor poorer
is well documented in the economic development literature.
But, as the Indonesian government has recognized since the
early 1970s, economic growth has to be balanced with equity to
attain national stability and integration.
For maximum economic integration, economic disparities
among different regions ideally should be minimal, especially
in such aspects as standard of living and level of development.
Also, existing economic disparities should be in the process of
diminishing as all areas of the country participate in and benefit
from development. In addition, there should be increasing eco-
nomic interdependence among the different regions of the
country.
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However, analysis of a large number of economic indicators
available at the provincial level in Indonesia in the early 1980s
reveals that, despite considerable economic development par-
ticularly since the early 1970s, Indonesia is still not very well
integrated economically.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Some level of economic disparity within a nation-state is un-
avoidable because of the inevitably uneven natural resource
base and because of differences in human response to varied
opportunities. Thus, differences in the environment, such as in
topography, climate, soil quality, and the availability of water,
and also in the location and accessibility of minerals and energy
sources, such as petroleum or coal, create basic inequalities
in the potential for development. Similarly, many differences
in the human environment—population distribution, historical
development, cultural values and openness to change, varying
levels of skills and entrepreneurship, and efficiency of resource
use and organization—contribute to unequal rates of economic
growth.
At early stages of development it is normal for differences
to be exacerbated and disparities increased among the diverse
regions within a state. 1 The colonial history of Indonesia well
exemplifies such polarized development. The Dutch took ad-
vantage of the potential of the Javanese environment, its fertile
soils, moderate climate, and accessible location, to concentrate
their exploitative and developmental efforts there. A typical
core-periphery situation developed between Java and the Outer
Islands and lasted at least until the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Java completely dominated the economic scene, producing
most of the exports of the country and experiencing marked
development of its infrastructure. By contrast, the Outer Is-
lands, apart from some mining operations and plantations and
certain privileged areas, were generally neglected and indiffer-
ently treated.
In the early twentieth century, however, an interesting in-
version of this core-periphery situation began to develop. This
has been attributed partly to the world economic situation,
where sugar prices dropped so dramatically. As a consequence,
Indonesia shifted from dependence upon sugar as a major
export crop (which had been grown almost entirely on Java)
to rubber and coffee (which came from the Outer Islands, par-
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ticularly Sumatra). Indeed, in the first quarter of the twen-
tieth century Java produced three-quarters of the value of In-
donesia’s agricultural exports, but soon thereafter became an
absorber rather than an earner of foreign exchange. 2 But this
inversion resulted also from changes brought about directly by
Dutch colonialism. The Dutch influence upon Java, which in-
cluded development of the infrastructure and transportation
and communications links, unequal urban growth, education,
and health measures, led to a population increase with which
productivity failed to keep pace. Thus, in spite of continued
improvements in crop production in Java, standards of living
have remained static or even declined during the twentieth
century. In the Outer Islands, by contrast, increasing produc-
tivity outstripped population growth, and the economic dy-
namism and growth impetus generally associated with the core
was transferred to selected areas of the Outer Islands, notably
the plantation areas of North and East Sumatra, and such
Dutch-favored areas as North Sulawesi and parts of Maluku
(particularly Ambon).
The 1930s witnessed an increase in the economic inte-
gration of Indonesia, with a viable pattern of regional spe-
cialization and trade emerging. Java concentrated upon food
(especially rice) production and domestic industrialization, pro-
viding manufactured goods for shipment to the Outer Islands in
exchange for primary products produced there. 3 But this trend
was abruptly halted and reversed by the Japanese occupation
and the subsequent struggle for independence.
Independent Indonesia, therefore, inherited a badly
damaged economy, partly because of war damage inflicted by
the Japanese and the returning Dutch and partly because of
Indonesia’s own scorched-earth policy during its struggle for
independence between 1945 and 1949. The dualistic colonial
structure of export-oriented, foreign-dominated enterprises in
the modern sector and peasant agriculture in the traditional
sector reasserted itself in the parliamentary democracy period
of 1950–1957. There was, however, a slow but steady rate of
economic growth and reasonable progress in restoring an
export economy, which occurred to a large extent independently
of any central government action. 4 The subsequent period of
Guided Economy, with its “sosialisme à la Indonesia,” which fol-
lowed the nationalization of all Dutch businesses in 1957–1958,
was marked by aimlessness, accelerating hyper-inflation, and
serious balance-of-payments deficits. These contributed to a
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growing gap between rich and poor, as well as to a decrease in
investment and the lack of development of a firm economic base
for the future.
Since independence, Indonesia’s economic development has
demonstrated the power of circular and cumulative causation:
5 a better-developed physical and institutional infrastructure,
a ready labor force, and a large local market, as well as im-
portant political factors (of political control and local political
pressures) all combined to perpetuate and accentuate the his-
toric domination of Java over the rest of Indonesia. 6 By far the
greatest share of all investment and development (except for
purely exploitative mining, timber extraction, and some plan-
tation agriculture) has been located there. Sukarno’s lack of at-
tention to the economic dimension of national integration and
the imbalance he inherited in the country’s economy, by which
the Outer Islands generated over 80 percent of Indonesia’s
gross domestic product but received less than 20 percent in
return, were primary causes of the regional unrest that led to a
number of rebellions in the 1950s and early 1960s.
It was not until 1967, after the abortive coup and the be-
ginning of the New Order government of Suharto with its em-
phasis on stability and fiscal balance, that any real attempts
were made at systematic economic planning and development.
But by then problems of uneven development inherited from the
colonial past and the early period of independence had been ex-
acerbated and become more entrenched. Stagnation in overall
production had been matched by lack of progress in struc-
tural transformation: in other words, there had been lack of
both growth and development. Surplus rural populations were
not being absorbed by a growing industrial sector as in many
countries; rather, they were either absorbed by the agricultural
sector in a process of involution, 7 or they entered the service
sector or trade. Indeed, the numbers employed in manufac-
turing declined absolutely in the 1931–1961 time period and de-
clined further in the growing urban areas of Indonesia between
1961 and 1971. 8 Problems were further compounded by the
great increase in population, 9 which wiped out any incremental
gains in productivity that had occurred. It has been estimated
that per-capita income in Java in 1969 was probably no higher
in real terms than it had been thirty years previously. 10
As a result, by the early 1970s Indonesia’s economic situ-
ation was highly unbalanced, both in terms of infrastructural
development, which was highly concentrated in Java, and in
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terms of revenue production, per-capita income, and standard
of living, which were highest in certain areas of the Outer Is-
lands, particularly in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan.
The contrast between Java and the Outer Islands can be
seen also in agriculture. Overall, only about 9 percent of In-
donesia’s land area is cultivated, but this figure ranges widely
from region to region. Despite having less than 7 percent of
the country’s total land area, Java reportedly accounts for 75
percent of Indonesia’s corn production, 80 percent of its
cassava, 90 percent of its soybeans, 50 percent of its rice, and
all of its sugar. Seventy percent of Java is cultivated year round,
a figure that contrasts dramatically with the 4 to 6 percent of
the total land area in the Outer Islands used for agriculture at
the beginning of the 1980s. A similar contrast exists in the pro-
vision of irrigation services: over 40 percent of Java’s sawah
land is irrigated by modern facilities, whereas most of the land
in the Outer Islands is in ladang (dry field) or swidden culti-
vation. 11
Since 1967 the Indonesian economy has undergone pro-
found change and experienced remarkable growth. This has
been partly because of the New Order government’s emphasis
on political stability and economic development, which has pro-
moted domestic economic growth and attracted billions of
dollars of foreign investment. 12 It is also partly the result of
loans (at both concessional and market rates) from international
financial institutions, especially the World Bank, 13 and billions
of dollars in aid and loans from the Inter-Governmental Group
on Indonesia. 14
The New Order government focused first (in its first Five-
Year Development Plan, Repelita I, 1969–1974) upon stabilizing,
rehabilitating, and developing the overall national economy,
with little attention paid to regional economic differences. 15
The average annual rate of growth of the national gross do-
mestic product (GDP) during those five years was 8.4 percent,
thanks to major policy improvements (especially the control of
inflation); encouragement of private and foreign investment and
aid; the beginning of the rehabilitation of the economy’s basic
infrastructure (especially in irrigation, power, transportation,
and communications); progress in the extractive industries of
oil, natural gas, and timber; increased agricultural production
(especially rice); and improved irrigation. 16 However, because
these policies were pursued without great concern for their
impact on different regions, many developments led to accen-
tuated regional disparities.
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It was only with the formulation of the second Five-Year
Development Plan, Repelita II (1974–1979), that the balanced
development of all regions became a primary objective: a most
important goal for the continued political as well as economic
integration of the nation. 17 In addition, Repelita II aimed at in-
creasing the standard of living of the Indonesian people. Specif-
ically, it sought to provide better food, clothing, and housing;
to improve and expand infrastructure; to expand and distrib-
ute social welfare benefits equitably; and to provide greater
employment opportunities. Real GDP rose at an average annual
rate of 6.8 percent (4.7 percent for real per-capita GDP). 18
But neglect of balanced regional economic development in the
past had led to increasing economic disparities among the re-
gions and made the task of achieving regionally balanced devel-
opment much more difficult.
The third Five-Year Development Plan, Repelita III
(1979–1984), continued to stress regional development by
placing the equitable distribution of development gains at the
head of its trilogy of development goals (equity, economic
growth, and national stability). In the agricultural sector it em-
phasized integrated rural development, and in the industrial
sector it focused on the establishment of industries that create
employment opportunities or that fulfill basic domestic needs.
19
The fourth Five-Year Development Plan, Repelita IV
(1984–1989), continues to place more emphasis on equity in the
same trilogy of development goals, although it wants to ensure
that all three elements are in constant harmony and mutually
reinforcing. 20 Like its predecessors, its overriding goal is to
“raise the standards of living, intellectual abilities, and general
welfare of the people.” However, plans are easier to formulate
than to implement, and regional inequalities inevitably persist
and in some respects seem to be widening.
In the subsequent discussion of regional inequalities, trends
in regional economic disparities, and analysis of economic inte-
gration, one needs to be aware of limitations in the reliability
of the statistical data. First, there is always the possibility that
data have been gathered inaccurately or distorted. In addition,
because the provinces vary so tremendously in size both areally
and demographically, data are generally given in per-capita
terms. This has the advantage of stressing the comparability of
data from the vastly diverse provinces, but removes the element
of size differentials from view. Finally, averaged figures for each
province camouflage important intraprovincial differences, be-
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cause many of the key economic activities form modern,
foreign-oriented enclaves, especially in the Outer Islands, with
relatively few spread or backwash effects on the provincial
economies. Data for this chapter are tabulated in Appendix 3.
REGIONAL INEQUALITIES
The magnitude of economic disparities among regions provides
some indication of the degree of economic integration of a
nation-state, because in a highly integrated economy, disparities
among regions are relatively small. Through the migration of
the factors of production, particularly capital and labor, large
differences are evened out in an integrated economic system; in
a less integrated economy, substantial differences in such fea-
tures as per-capita regional GDP, commodity prices, and cost
of living are to be expected. Living standards, as measured by
ownership of certain household items and access to electricity
and to fuel other than firewood for cooking, also reveal patterns
of unequal economic development. And finally, taxation data
give an indication of regional differences, providing important
information as to both the source of national and provincial
income and the location of taxation revenue expenditures.
Perhaps the most comprehensive index of regional in-
equality in Indonesia is the regional gross domestic product
(RGDP). 21 This ranged in 1980 from approximately 5,874 billion
rupiahs (Rp) in East Java to Rp 129 billion in Bengkulu.
However, because this is partly a function of differences in the
size of provincial populations, a more meaningful index is RGDP
per capita. Here, too, enormous variations exist, with East Kali-
mantan having a per-capita income (Rp 2,846,290 per annum)
more than twenty-seven times that of East Nusatenggara (Rp
104,250). 22 These figures may be misleading, however, because
they include royalties generated from oil, natural gas, and other
mineral production that accrue directly to the national gov-
ernment; and it can be argued that, as enclaval activities, they
have relatively little impact on the overall welfare of the
province in which they are located. But even when the pe-
troleum and mining sectors are excluded from those five
provinces where they have such a significant impact on the
provincial RGDP (East Kalimantan, Riau, Irian Jaya, Aceh, and
to a lesser extent South Sumatra), per-capita RGDP differences
vary by a factor of eight (from Rp 846,590 in East Kalimantan to
Rp 104,250 in East Nusatenggara) (see Figure 5.1). Table 5.1,
The Economic Dimension
142
which gives the relative importance of mining and agriculture in
the composition of the regional gross domestic product of each
province, demonstrates clearly those provinces with substantial
mineral deposits (including petroleum, natural gas, and hard
minerals). Riau produced more than twice as much in the value
of its petroleum products in 1979 as any other province, and
mining accounted for 84.4 percent of its RGDP. 23 In addition, it
exports logs, plywood, other timber products, bauxite, palm oil,
and rubber.
East Kalimantan also depends heavily (for 62.8 percent of
its RGDP) on its petroleum and especially in recent years on
its liquified natural gas (LNG) production (from the Bontang
LNG plant). But in addition it has major timber resources and
the largest capacity in Indonesia for producing plywood (which,
together with other wood products, is Indonesia’s third most
valuable export, after oil and natural gas). 24 Aceh’s production
of liquified natural gas (from its Arun field) has risen sharply
over the past fifteen years and helps to account for the high 61.1
percent of its RGDP produced by mining. Irian Jaya likewise de-
pends for over half of its RGDP on mining (including petroleum,
natural gas, copper, and gold and silver from copper concen-
trate).
South and North Sumatra derive a considerable amount of
revenue from their mining activities, although these make up
a much smaller percentage of their RGDPs. Both produce oil
and natural gas, and South Sumatra has substantial coal pro-
duction as well as tin (making Indonesia the second largest pro-
ducer of tin in the world). 25 However, both North and South
Sumatra have more developed and diversified economies, with
substantial rubber and palm oil plantations, plywood pro-
duction, and food, wood, chemicals, and metal-goods pro-
cessing. 26
By contrast, five provinces depended on agriculture for over
50 percent of their RGDP in 1979, and a further eight for over
40 percent. It is significant that the provinces most highly de-
pendent upon agriculture have the lowest per-capita RGDPs in
Indonesia (for example, East and West Nusatenggara, Central
Sulawesi, and Bengkulu). Also among the poorest provinces in
terms of per-capita RGDP are the densely populated provinces
of Central Java and Yogyakarta.
Price disparities among the provinces are inevitable because
of such factors as differences in location and consequently dif-
ferent transportation costs, in local conditions of supply and
demand, and in the concentration of private investment or gov-
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Table 5.1. Relative importance of mining and agriculture in
each province’s regional gross domestic product (RGDP), 1979
(amounts given in constant 1975 market prices)
Province Amount
produced
by mining
in 1,000
million
rupiahsa
Percentage
of the
RGDP
produced
by miningb
Amount
produced
by
agriculture
in 1,000
million
rupiahsa
Percentage
of the RGDP
produced
by
agricultureb
Aceh 310.7 61.1 115.9 22.8
North Sumatra 150.9 15.0 373.3 37.0
West Sumatra 0.6 0.2 92.9 37.0
Riau
(with petroleum) 1,409.4 84.4 61.0 3.7
(without
petroleum)
14.2 6.7 61.0 28.8
Jambi 5.8 4.5 64.9
South Sumatra
(with petroleum) 134.0 17.7 148.0 19.5
(without
petroleum)
35.0 5.8 148.0 24.6
Bengkulu 0.5 1.0 23.9 46.0
Lampung 0.5 0.2 140.9 45.0
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Jakarta — — 26.4 1.7
West Java 218.4 9.4 704.3 30.4
Central Java 5.2 0.3 598.3 39.4
Yogyakarta 0.5 0.3 63.7 36.7
East Java 6.6 0.3 868.2 36.3
West Kalimantan 0.5 0.2 98.6 42.9
Central Kalimantan 0.4 0.3 49.7 46.6
South Kalimantan 0.6 0.3 76.9 38.0
East Kalimantan
(with petroleum) 654.0 62.8 85.7 8.2
(without
petroleum)
6.1 1.7 85.7 24.0
North Sulawesi 2.2 1.1 82.9 40.6
Central Sulawesi 0.6 0.8 43.8 53.4
South Sulawesi 3.3 0.6 254.2 50.3
Southeast Sulawesi 8.8 15.1 23.8 41.0
Bali 1.5 0.6 99.3 42.2
West Nusatenggara 3.9 3.0 68.6 52.0
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East Nusatenggara 0.2 0.2 84.3 63.8
East Timor n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maluku 10.6 7.6 68.4 48.7
Irian Jaya
(with mining) 142.4 52.9 67.8 25.2
(without mining) 0.4 0.3 67.8 53.4
n.a.: not available
aBiro Pusat Statistik, Pendapatan Regional Propinsi-propinsi di
Indonesia 1976–80, Table II.A.9.
bIbid., Table II.B.9.
Figure 5.1 Regional gross domestic product per capita in thousands of
rupiahs per capita, at current market prices, without oil, 1980. Based
on data in Table X.9 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983,
Buku Saku.
ernment expenditure. In addition, governmental intervention
through taxation or trade restrictions has affected prices in
certain areas. Yet price disparities, based on the consumer
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price index for food, clothing, housing, and miscellaneous and
general merchandise in the capital cities of each province in
1981 (the only data available), are not great. The consumer
price index ranges from a low of 151.6 in Maluku to a high
of 193.9 in South Sumatra (see Figure 5.2). No clear patterns
emerge. Overall, prices are highest in South Sumatra and
Jambi, East Java, South Kalimantan, and North Sulawesi; and
are lowest in Maluku, East and West Kalimantan, Irian Jaya,
Jakarta, and South Sulawesi. It appears that higher prices for
some items are counterbalanced by lower prices for others.
However, when the retail price of rice in the provincial
capital cities is examined, the disparities are considerably
wider. The lowest prices are found in Jakarta, East Java, and
Yogyakarta, prices that are over 60 percent lower than those
found in Riau, East Nusatenggara, and Lampung.
Certainly, in comparison with conditions in the early 1970s,
price disparities seem to have been significantly reduced. In
1972 the price index for East Kalimantan was almost double
that for West Nusatenggara. 27 Then, higher prices generally
corresponded to increasing distance from Java, or to the higher
incomes in those provinces with oil, timber, and significant
industrial activity. The higher prices in low-income provinces
were of particular concern, especially when those provinces
occupied geographically peripheral positions in the country,
where costs could have been reduced by more direct trade
with closer neighboring countries (such as North Sulawesi with
the Philippines and Aceh with Malaysia). But the patterns pre-
vailing in the early 1970s seem to have changed substantially,
according to data available for the early 1980s.
Contrasts among the provinces are also exemplified in the
data on the incidence of poverty and deprivation. Despite an
average annual rate of economic growth of 7.3 percent during
the 1970s and a decline in the incidence of poverty from a high
of 57 percent in 1970, it is estimated that in 1980 approxi-
mately 39 percent of Indonesia’s population (some 56,650,000
people) still lived below the poverty line (an index constructed
from per-capita food expenditures). 28 These proportions vary
dramatically from province to province (see Figure 5.3). Irian
Jaya, Jambi, and West Kalimantan record the lowest incidence
of poverty (less than 10 percent of their respective populations),
but three of the Javanese provinces (Centred and East Java
and Yogyakarta) as well as East and West Nusatenggara have
over 50 percent of their populations living in poverty (with
Southeast Sulawesi close at 49 percent). Compared with Java
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Figure 5.2 Consumer price index in the capital city of each province,
Average of food, housing, clothing, miscellaneous, and general mer-
chandise, 1981. Calculated from data in Table VIII.4.4 in Biro Pusat
Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku.
and the eastern islands (Bali, the Nusatenggaras, Maluku, and
Irian Jaya), with 46.5 and 46.7 percent of their populations in
poverty, Kalimantan and Sumatra appear prosperous (with low
11.5 and 20.4 percent figures), while Sulawesi matches the na-
tional average (39.3 percent).
However, an index of deprivation (defined as the proportion
of people whose food needs are not satisfied) reveals a
somewhat different picture: Java, despite its high level of
poverty, appears as the island with the lowest incidence of
deprivation (0.7 percent), compared with Kalimantan (2.6
percent), Sulawesi (3.6 percent), Sumatra (3.7 percent), and the
eastern islands (with a disturbing 26.1 percent figure). 29 This
low deprivation figure for Java reflects the impact of a wide
series of government social welfare programs in the 1970s,
which have brought at least some improvement in living stan-
dards throughout rural Java. Contrasts among individual
provinces are much greater, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent
in West Java (and less than 1 percent in Central and East Java,
Jakarta, and North Sulawesi) to an amazing high of 44.4 percent
in East Nusatenggara (and relatively high figures of 20.9 and
20.6 percent in West Nusatenggara and Bali, respectively, and
13.5 percent in Maluku) (see Figure 5.4). 30
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Figure 5.3. Percentage of the population living below the poverty line
(an index constructed from per-capita food expenditures), 1980.
Based on data in Table 5 in the World Bank report, Indonesia: Se-
lected Aspects of Spatial Development (used with permission).
The very high localized incidence of both poverty and depri-
vation in East and West Nusatenggara, Bali, and Maluku under-
scores the lack of true economic integration, for this and the
high costs of transport impede the flow of food (as well as of
other commodities) there from food-surplus areas. 31
Standard of living can also be measured in other ways. But
differences in the size and condition of households and housing
frequently reveal more about the variety of cultural customs in
the country than they do about standard of living. Data on the
number of rooms per household or persons per room cannot
be meaningfully compared when some people live in multiple-
family longhouses (such as the Dyaks in Kalimantan) and others
in single-family dwellings (such as the typical Minahasan farmer
in North Sulawesi). Different cultural values as well as the level
of urbanization may also affect the value placed upon such con-
veniences as the availability of piped water, the type of toilet fa-
cility, and the mechanism for garbage disposal.
However, several indices are available that give reasonable
measures of provincial differences in living standards. These in-
clude ownership of certain consumer items, the consumption of
electricity, and the use of fuels other than wood or charcoal for
cooking. Three measures are examined here: the percentage of
households owning a sideboard; the percentage of households
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Figure 5.4. Percentage of the population living in deprivation (defined
as those whose food needs are not met), 1980. Based on data in Table
5 in the World Bank report, Indonesia: Selected Aspects of Spatial De-
velopment (used with permission).
using electricity for lighting; and the percentage of households
using kerosene, gas, or electricity for cooking. Some interesting
patterns emerge.
Ownership of a sideboard may be considered indicative of
a higher standard of living both because of the cost of pur-
chasing (or making) one and because its main function is the
storage of other consumer items. Overall, 46 percent of house-
holds in Indonesia reportedly own a sideboard. 32 The highest
percentage is recorded, as to be expected, in the most urban
province of Jakarta (69 percent), but surprisingly, South Kali-
mantan ranks second (67 percent), with East Kalimantan third
(62 percent). Other provinces with significantly above-average
figures include North Sumatra, West Java, South and North Su-
lawesi, and Central Kalimantan. By contrast, only 13 and 15
percent of households in Irian Jaya and East Nusatenggara are
recorded as owning a sideboard, with other provinces such as
West Nusatenggara and Southeast Sulawesi also having propor-
tions of less than 30 percent (see Figure 5.5).
Economic development levels are frequently measured by
consumption of electricity. It is instructive, therefore, to con-
sider regional differences in electricity consumption. On av-
erage, only 14 percent of Indonesia’s private households used
electricity for lighting in 1980. As expected, there is a close
correlation with urbanization, although this breaks down no-
ticeably in the cases of Riau, Lampung, Central Java, Yo-
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Figure 5.5. Percentage of households owning a sideboard, 1980.
Based on data in Table 66.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk
1980, Series S, no. 2.
gyakarta, and Irian Jaya, where consumption of electricity is
far below the urban percentage of their populations (see Figure
5.6). The greatest contrast is between Jakarta, with 47.8
percent of its households recording the use of electricity for
lighting, and East Nusatenggara, where only 4.3 percent of
households light their homes with electricity. Yet this is a signif-
icant increase from the situation in 1971, when the range was
from 23.4 percent in Jakarta to 0.4 percent in Central Sulawesi.
In 1980, the more developed provinces of Jakarta, East and
South Kalimantan, North and South Sumatra, Riau, Bali, and
North Sulawesi stand out in having above-average use of elec-
tricity for lighting. By contrast, East and West Nusatenggara,
Lampung, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, and Central Java are
noticeable for their lack of development in this respect.
Another index of differences in levels of development is the
type of fuel used for cooking. About 75 percent of all house-
holds use wood or charcoal, but this proportion varies consid-
erably among the provinces. Understandably, in the urbanized
province of Jakarta, wood is less available and kerosene, gas,
or electricity provides the major source of fuel for a recorded
96 percent of the population. But in other parts of Java, despite
the limited amount of firewood available and the increasing
distances families have to go to procure it (not to mention
such problems as resulting deforestation on steep slopes, soil
erosion, and the choking of irrigation canals), there is a sur-
prisingly high degree of dependence upon wood and charcoal
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Figure 5.6 Percentage of households using electricity for lighting,
1980. Calculated from data in Table 63.3 in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
for cooking. Less than 20 percent of the population in Central
Java and Yogyakarta and less than 25 percent in East Java
use kerosene, gas, or electricity. However, percentages are far
lower in most of the Outer Island provinces, especially those in
the less urbanized areas such as Nusatenggara, Central Kali-
mantan, and Central and Southeast Sulawesi (see Figure 5.7).
Information about taxation and government expenditures
provides further indices of unequal regional resources and de-
velopment. In 1982–1983, tax revenues made up about 27
percent of the national budget (compared with 59 percent from
oil and gas production, 12 percent from foreign loans and other
aid, and 2 percent from non-tax revenues); but it is from the
national budget that most of the revenue used in the provinces
comes. Central government funds are broken down into routine
and development accounts.
Provincial governments obtain revenue for their programs
from a variety of sources. Central government grants, which
account for a high and rising proportion of provincial govern-
ments’ income (over 70 percent), include the Subsidi Daerah
Otonomi (the SDO, autonomous region subsidy) and other
grants for routine expenditures, and grants for development
made through the various Inpres programs (Instruksi Presi den
or presidential authorization). Second, the provinces are al-
lowed by the central government to raise revenue from royalties
on such activities as gasoline sales, forestry, and mining. Third,
provincial governments obtain revenue from provincial taxes,
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Figure 5.7. Percentage of households using kerosene, gas, or elec-
tricity for cooking, 1980. Calculated from data in Table 63.3 in Biro
Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
such as those on the ownership and transfer of motor vehicles
and on large houses. Many other local taxes and service charges
are also levied, but this income is primarily used at the kabu-
paten (district) and kotamadya (city district) level.
In considering spatial inequalities in the generation and ex-
penditure of revenue, three indices are particularly pertinent.
The first is the amount of per-capita tax revenue generated
in the provinces. 33 This varies considerably, with East Kali-
mantan and Jakarta raising far more than any of the other
provinces (Rp 29,800 and Rp 20,600 per capita, respectively).
The other provinces in Kalimantan as well as Central Sulawesi,
Irian Jaya, Aceh, and Riau all generate above-average provincial
tax revenues. Almost all are mineral-rich provinces. The prov-
inces that raise least include both the less urbanized, less de-
veloped provinces of the Nusatenggaras, Southeast Sulawesi,
and Lampung, and the poor, overpopulated provinces of East,
Central, and West Java and Yogyakarta (see Figure 5.8). As to
be expected, there is a strong correlation between per-capita
provincially generated tax revenue and per-capita RGDP.
However, perhaps more important than local revenue gen-
eration, from the perspective of regional satisfaction and na-
tional integration, are regional government expenditures. Ob-
viously these need to be related to some degree to provincial
tax income to avert dissatisfaction in the richer, more economi-
cally advanced, and thus potentially independent provinces; but
the considerable contrasts in per-capita regional expenditures,
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especially between Jakarta and West Java (Rp 24,100 and Rp
6,800, respectively) or between East and West Kalimantan (Rp
35,300 and Rp 12,000, respectively), can only be regarded as
disintegrative, particularly as improved interprovincial commu-
nications bring more widespread awareness of such regional
differences. Expenditures do not seem to be related to any
minimum level of service or other gauge of equality. Indeed,
central government grants that could help to even out the wide
differences in the amounts generated by non-grant revenues
instead tend to reinforce them. Provinces with relatively high
local resources in general receive higher routine and devel-
opment grants from the central government than do provinces
with limited local resources. On a per-capita basis East Kali-
mantan and Irian Jaya spend most (Rp 35,300 and Rp 33,300,
respectively), with Central Kalimantan, Jakarta, and Central Su-
lawesi ranking next with per-capita expenditures of over Rp
20,000. By contrast, Lampung and the three major provinces of
Java have the lowest per-capita governmental expenditures (of
less than Rp 7,200) (see Figure 5.9).
A third interesting indicator of spatial inequities resulting
from taxation is central government support for development
programs (see Figure 5.10). This has always varied consid-
erably from province to province. 34 It seems that, once again,
central government grants and transfers to the provinces in
most cases compound existing inequalities. Regional grants fre-
quently seem to favor provinces with high per-capita incomes.
East and Central Kalimantan, for example, receive more than
nine times as much on a per-capita basis (Rp 20,800 and Rp
16,900, respectively) as West and East Nusatenggara (Rp 1,790
and Rp 1,850, respectively), but the contrasts with the
provinces in Java are greater still (East, West, and Central Java
received only Rp 335, Rp 362, and Rp 386 per capita, respec-
tively). Surprisingly, Jakarta received only a small per-capita al-
location (Rp 818), although this is more than compensated for
by locally generated tax revenues.
Not only did the per-capita rupiah amounts spent by the
central government on development in the provinces in
1980–1981 vary enormously (from Rp 8,250 in Central Java
to Rp 52,800 in East Kalimantan), but the proportions of re-
gional expenditures provided by the central and provincial gov-
ernments varied considerably as well. In West Nusatenggara
and Bengkulu the provincial government contribution to devel-
opment was just 1.2 percent, compared with an average of 10.4
percent, and a high of 32.2 percent in East Kalimantan. It is
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Figure 5.8 Provincial tax contributions to the central government in
thousands of rupiahs per capita, 1980–1981. Calculated from data in
Table 1 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah,
Daerah Tingkat I (Propinsi), 1975/76–1980/81.
Figure 5.9 Provincial government expenditures (operating and devel-
opment) in thousands of rupiahs per capita, 1980–1981. Calculated
from data in Table VIII.1.5 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia
1983 , Buku Saku.
surprising to note the relatively low provincial government con-
tributions of some of the richer provinces such as Riau (6.8
percent), Jambi (7.3 percent), and South Sumatra (9.2 percent).
Total provincial expenditures on routine spending vary less on a
per-capita basis (from Rp 7,030 in South Sumatra to the rather
exceptional Rp 27,200 in Irian Jaya), but the proportion con-
tributed by the central government varies more, from a low of
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Figure 5.10. Central government support for provincial development
programs in thousands of rupiahs per capita, 1980–1981. Calculated
from data in Table 1 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Keuangan Pemer-
intah Daerah, Daerah Tingkat I (Propinsi), 1975/76–1980/81.
40 percent in East Kalimantan to a high of 98 percent in Irian
Jaya (with an average of 80 percent). Thus, most provinces rely
heavily, for 70–90 percent of their routine budgets, on central
government subsidies.
Except for Jakarta and East Kalimantan, central government
grants form the major source of funds for provincial expendi-
tures. But it is interesting to notice the significant correlation
between per-capita non-grant income and per-capita Inpres
grants: the better-off provinces receive more, thus widening the
gap between rich and poor.
However, it needs to be added that regional disparities
might be greater still were it not for the redistributing mech-
anism of public finance. Most of the royalties obtained from oil
and natural gas and from other minerals accrue to the central
government and are derived mostly from the Outer Islands. A
large proportion of this revenue is spent in Java, thus tending
towards some measure of equalization of interregional income
disparity at least on a per-capita basis. 35
TRENDS IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES
Perhaps even more important than analysis of the static con-
ditions of regional economic inequality is an analysis of the
trends either reducing or exacerbating these differences. It has
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been argued that polarization is to be expected at early stages
of development as limited resources are concentrated in areas
of greatest potential for national economic growth. 36 Indeed,
virtually all ideologies and development theories agree in pre-
dicting that in the process of a country’s transition to a modern
economy, the overall distribution of income will become more
unequal and disparities will widen. 37 This is certainly what has
happened in Indonesia, both during the colonial period and
after. The evidence available suggests that income inequality
and regional disparities have continued to widen, despite the re-
gional development and social justice emphases of the last three
five-year development plans. 38
Indices that demonstrate these trends of growing regional
inequality include comparative changes in regional income, dif-
ferent regional economic growth rates, and changes in regional
allocations of new domestic and foreign investment. The growth
of manufacturing industry in the country has also led to in-
creased regional disparities.
As measured in absolute terms by per-capita RGDP, regional
inequalities have increased. Whereas in 1972 the gap between
the province with the lowest income (West Nusatenggara with
Rp 18,000 per capita) and that with the highest (East Kali-
mantan with Rp 221,000) was Rp 203,000, by 1980 the income
differential had increased to Rp 742,340, with average per-
capita RGDP of Rp 104,250 in East Nusatenggara and Rp
846,590 in East Kalimantan, although one could argue that the
relative gap had diminished. 39
Large differences have been recorded in the annual rates
of growth of the RGDP for the periods of both 1968–1972 and
1976–1980. Between 1968 and 1972 these ranged from a neg-
ative growth rate of 1.4 percent in North Sulawesi to a positive
annual growth rate of 24.9 percent in East Kalimantan. 40 The
1976–1980 growth rates varied from 6.1 percent in Yogyakarta
to 31.4 percent in Aceh, a spread very similar to that recorded
for the years 1968–1972. In the past the richer provinces have
grown faster and the poorer regions more slowly, thereby in-
creasing disparities, 41 but the 1980 figures exhibit no signif-
icant correlation between RGDP per capita and growth rates.
A spectacularly high growth rate took place only in Aceh (31.4
percent), 42 although Bengkulu also grew fast (17.2 percent)
and three other provinces (North Sulawesi and Central and
South Kalimantan) grew at an average annual rate of 14 percent
through the 1976–1980 time period (see Figure 5.11). The
growth rate in North Sulawesi is particularly significant (as-
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Figure 5.11. Average annual percentage growth rate of regional gross
domestic product at constant 1975 market prices, 1976–1980. Based
on data in Table 1.6 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Pendapatan Regional
Propinsi-propinsi di Indonesia 1976–80.
suming the data are accurate) because it was the only province
in the 1968–1972 period to record a negative growth rate, but
both South Kalimantan and Bengkulu also experienced great
improvement over their earlier sluggish 1.8 percent and 2.3
percent growth rates.
West Nusatenggara continued to experience a low average
rate of economic growth. Java also, with the exception only of
Jakarta, grew at below-average rates, as did Lampung and, sur-
prisingly, Riau and Jambi (all at less than 8.6 percent). It is
encouraging, though, to note the new projects funded by the
United Nations Development Program and World Bank for both
West and East Nusatenggara, aimed at stimulating development
and alleviating poverty in these two poorest provinces of the
country. 43
Indonesia’s provinces can be divided basically into four
major groups, as Table 5.2 illustrates. The first consists of those
with relatively high per-capita RGDP (over Rp 210,000) and
high RGDP growth rates (of 10 percent or more) in the
1976–1980 period. This group includes Jakarta and East Kali-
mantan, as would be expected, but also the petroleum (and
natural gas) and mining provinces of Aceh, South Sumatra, and
Irian Jaya. Central Kalimantan and North Sulawesi are also in
this category. The second group also has high per-capita RGDP
but lower rates of growth; this group includes the petroleum-
producing provinces of North Sumatra, Riau, and Jambi, as
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well as West Kalimantan and Maluku. Third are those poorer
provinces that have a per-capita RGDP of less than Rp 210,000
but relatively high growth rates of 10 percent or more; into
this category fall three of the four provinces of Sulawesi and,
surprisingly, East Nusatenggara, with its very low RGDP per
capita but relatively high 11.7 percent growth rate. Bengkulu,
Bali, and South Kalimantan are also in this category. The fourth
group comprises the provinces that are both poor and slow
growing: the four provinces of Java (outside of Jakarta),
Lampung (which shares many of Java’s characteristics), West
Sumatra, and almost lowest on both indices, West
Nusatenggara.
The richer provinces all have high export/RGDP ratios. It is
no coincidence that Sumatra and Kalimantan, with their signif-
icant production of rubber, timber, coffee, oil, and gas and their
higher dependence on exports, have maintained their leading
position in RGDP per capita, compared with islands that have
fewer resources and produce little for export on a per-capita
basis, such as Java, Bali, Nusatenggara, and to a lesser extent
Sulawesi. Yet the fact that most provinces depend very heavily
on only one or two export commodities makes them vulnerable
to price fluctuations and resulting instability.
There have been significant structural changes in the sec-
toral composition of the RGDP over the past decade. Every
region has experienced a decline in the share of agriculture
and an increase in the shares of manufacturing, construction,
and commerce. But Sulawesi and the eastern islands still obtain
almost half their RGDP (48.0 and 48.7 percent, respectively)
from agriculture and a very small proportion from manufac-
turing (2.6 and 5.8 percent, respectively). They also lag far
behind in commercial development. Java, by contrast, derives
16 percent of its RGDP from manufacturing and a high 30
percent from commerce. Sumatra and Kalimantan depend most
on mining (22 and 27 percent, respectively). But it is interesting
to note that there is no significant correlation between eco-
nomic growth rates and the proportion of the population em-
ployed in agriculture, although there is a significant (though
fairly low) negative correlation between per-capita RGDP and
employment in agriculture.
The sector of the economy that has seen the most growth
since 1966 is natural resource production. For example, pe-
troleum and natural gas exports have multiplied almost fiftyfold
in dollar terms since the mid-1960s and by over twenty times in
real purchasing power. Moreover, natural resource-based com-
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Table 5.2. Per-capita regional gross domestic product (RGDP)
and RGDP growth rates by province
Per-capita RGDP, 1980 (in Rp 000), without oil
HIGH
(over Rp 210)
LOW
(under Rp 210)
HIGH
(over
10%)
1 Aceh (225, 31) South
Sumatra (316, 11)
Jakarta (590, 10)
Central Kalimantan
(346, 14) East
Kalimantan (847, 10)
North Sulawesi (258,
14) Irian Jaya (213,
12)
3Bengkulu (170, 17) Bali
(198, 13) East
Nusatenggara (104,
12) South Kalimantan
(195, 14) Central
Sulawesi (174, 10)
South Sulawesi (194,
10) Southeast Sulawesi
(170, 10)
RGDP
growth
rates
1976–1980
LOW
(under
10%)
2North Sumatra (299, 9)
Riau (255, 7) Jambi
(230, 8) West
Kalimantan (214, 9)
Maluku (279, 9)
4West Sumatra (180, 9)
Lampung (191, 8) West
Java (208, 9) Central
Java (151, 8)
Yogyakarta (148, 6)
East Java (202, 8) West
Nusatenggara (111, 7)
modities increased nationally from two-fifths of the total value
of exports in the mid-1960s to over four-fifths in the mid-1970s.
But this increased production of natural resources has been
located almost entirely in the Outer Islands: petroleum and
natural gas production in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya;
timber mainly in Kalimantan and some in Sumatra; and hard
minerals in Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, and the islands off eastern
Sumatra. 44 The resulting expansion of modern employment and
incomes, goods, and services has led to substantially higher
material standards of living for considerable numbers of In-
donesians, but the expanded employment opportunities in the
modern sector have not been large enough to make a major
impact on the overall balance of supply and demand for labor
in the traditional sector. Real wages in the traditional sector re-
mained static during the 1970s and early 1980s (an agricultural
laborer earns the equivalent of $1 per day), while traditional
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producers of cash crops for export received lower real incomes
as a result of the resources boom. As a result there has been no
overall net gain for traditional producers. 45
Increasing disparities among provinces have occurred,
partly because of differential rates of growth in sectors where
there is a high degree of regional specialization. The greatest
contrast is between rapidly growing Jakarta (with its concen-
tration of industry, services, and administration) and the
resource-rich provinces on the one side, and on the other the
slowly growing or stagnant provinces (such as West
Nusatenggara), which are dependent largely upon agriculture
and have little in the way of known mineral resources, manufac-
turing, or other economic activities.
The regional allocation of new domestic and foreign in-
vestment has also changed. Between 1967 and 1976 it tended
to confirm the pattern of unequal growth already discussed:
71 percent of all investment project approvals were concen-
trated in Java, with Jakarta and West Java receiving over 50
percent of all investment projects in Indonesia (excluding oil).
Expressed more dramatically, more investment projects were
located in Jakarta alone (32 percent) than in the entire area
of Indonesia outside of Java (29 percent). 46 And if project ap-
provals for agriculture and extractive industries (most of which
are enclaval investments) are excluded, the share of investment
approvals for Jakarta rises to 60 percent for foreign-financed
and 35 percent for domestic projects. 47 However, the situation
has changed somewhat since 1976, as the government has at-
tempted to spread development more evenly: there has been a
recent decline in the share of approvals for Java as more em-
phasis has been placed on increased development in the Outer
Islands. Cumulative investment-project approvals for Java be-
tween 1968 and 1982 declined to 66 percent of the total for
the country. During the same time period Jakarta’s share of
investment projects fell to 25 percent and that of the areas
outside Java increased to 34 percent. 48
On a per-capita basis Java certainly absorbed less in foreign
investment capital than Maluku and Irian Jaya, Sumatra, and
Kalimantan, although its domestic investment capital approxi-
mated Sumatra’s amount (see Figure 5.12). With both foreign
and domestic investment, Kalimantan and the Maluku and Irian
Jaya provinces received above-average amounts on a per-capita
basis, while Nusatenggara and Sulawesi received substantially
less. As to be expected, contrasts among individual provinces
are considerably larger. For foreign investment projects the per-
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Figure 5.12. Approved domestic investment projects, excluding the
oil, insurance, and banking sectors, in thousands of rupiahs per
capita, 1968–1982. Calculated from data in Table IV. 16b in Biro Pusat
Statistik, Indikator Ekonomi 1982.
Figure 5.13. Approved foreign investment projects in U.S. dollars per
capita, 1967–1982. Calculated from data in Table 16d in Biro Pusat
Statistik, Indikator Ekonomi 1982.
capita figures range from highs of $323 and $234 in Aceh and
Irian Jaya, respectively, to 73 cents and 98 cents, respectively,
in West Nusatenggara and Yogyakarta (see Figure 5.13). 49 Con-
trasts are almost as great for domestic investment, with East
Kalimantan receiving Rp 615 and Jakarta Rp 395 per capita
in comparison with East Nusatenggara’s Rp 4 and West
Nusatenggara’s Rp 19 per capita. 50
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Industry in Indonesia has been slow to develop. Indeed, it
was not until 1967 with the beginning of economic planning
under the New Order that broad-based industrial growth really
began. But since then, manufacturing production has increased
enormously, making Indonesia the seventh largest producer of
manufactured goods among developing countries (in terms of
share of world manufacturing value added). Industrial growth
averaged an impressive 12.3 percent annual rate during the
1970s, slowing down to 10.6 percent annually by the end of
the decade as the easy stage of import substitution gradually
came to an end. Growth rates have been much lower since 1981
because of the international recession and cuts in government
expenditures in response to the fall in oil revenues, although
the fourth Five-Year Development Plan assumes a 9.5 percent
annual rate of growth in manufacturing for 1984–1989. 51 Man-
ufacturing in 1984 grew by 24.4 percent, thanks to high growth
rates in the liquified natural gas and oil refining subsectors,
which grew at 53 and 30 percent, respectively. These two sub-
sectors now account for more than half of manufacturing value
added. The non-oil-and-gas component grew at only 4.7 percent.
52 Manufacturing thus has the highest planned growth rate in
Repelita IV. It is expected to be the leading growth sector and to
play a role in the creation of employment opportunities and the
expansion of non-oil exports.
Indonesia has greatly diversified the structure of its manu-
facturing sector. Import substitution industries, including tex-
tiles, electrical, and automobile assembly, dominated early de-
velopment, to be joined later by electronics, cement, tires,
chemicals, paper, and aluminum. There has been major growth
in iron and steel, electrical machinery, transport equipment,
rubber, wood, and fabricated metal products, but much slower
growth in the traditional industries related to the agricultural
sector: food processing, beverages, tobacco, and textiles. A
gradual shift from consumer goods has taken place in favor
of intermediate and capital goods. However, it is significant
that the production of consumer goods in the traditional indus-
tries is carried out mainly by private enterprises, whereas the
newer, more capital-intensive industries such as cement, fer-
tilizer, automobiles, petrochemicals, and basic metal products
are primarily state-owned industrial enterprises, held either in-
dependently or in joint ventures with foreign firms. 53
In terms of employment, in the early days cottage firms
were overwhelmingly important, even though added value per
worker was estimated as forty times higher in medium and
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large firms. 54 In the mid-1970s 3.6 million people or 7 percent
of the work force were employed in manufacturing activities,
with large-and medium-sized firms (defined as those employing
twenty or more workers) accounting for one-fourth of these
jobs. By the beginning of the fourth Five-Year Development Plan
in 1984, the comparable figures were closer to five to six mil-
lion or between 8 and 9 percent of the labor force. Employment
in large-and medium-scale manufacturing rose by an annual av-
erage rate of only 7 percent during the 1970s, from 487,000 in
1970 to 1,067,000 in 1982. 55 Yet this increase of 0.5 million jobs
during the decade corresponds to less than one-fourth of the av-
erage annual increase in Indonesia’s labor force, and thus has
failed to contribute significantly to the solution of Indonesia’s
employment problems. Small-scale and household or cottage
industry, meanwhile, accounted for 80 percent of total manu-
facturing employment in 1979. Growth in manufacturing em-
ployment as a whole rose at an annual rate of only 5 percent
during the 1970s. But even if an annual 10-percent increase in
employment in industry could be attained, this would absorb
only a small proportion of the over 2.5 million added to the work
force each year.
Inevitably, spatial contrasts in industrialization are consid-
erable, particularly those between Java and the Outer Islands.
Indeed, at the beginning of the 1970s, 78 percent of all industry
and 86 percent of total manufacturing employment were con-
centrated in Java. 56 Java has substantially more workers (rel-
ative to population size) in all three categories of firms—large
and medium, small, and cottage industries—than any of the
Outer Islands. The greatest contrast, however, is in the large
and medium category, where in 1974–1975 Java had seventy-
three manufacturing establishments per one million population,
compared, for example, with only twenty-eight per million pop-
ulation in Kalimantan. Indeed, the Outer Island provinces had
hardly any modern industry until very recently. 57 In most
provinces just one or two agriculturally based industries dom-
inated the industrial sector, such as rubber remilling and
sawmilling in six of the eight provinces in Sumatra and in Kali-
mantan, and vegetable oil production in Sulawesi. Only Java had
greater diversity, with its traditional textile and tobacco indus-
tries in the large-and medium-scale category, and bamboo and
rattan weaving and coconut sugar production in the cottage in-
dustry category. However, new, diverse, large industries have
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expanded rapidly within the past ten years, including steel, fer-
tilizer, cement, crumb rubber, plywood, and paper manufacture
(mostly in the state-owned sector).
Industries outside Java face more difficulties both in ob-
taining inputs and in marketing, because of less reliable trans-
portation services, high transportation operating costs, inad-
equate port facilities and other infrastructure, and other
problems with inefficiency, bureaucracy, and corruption.
But the regional disparities in per-capita income that might
be expected because of this spatial imbalance in industrial lo-
cation, as well as by the systematic income transfers from oil
and other natural resources of the Outer Islands to Java, do not
materialize, because of the large numbers of the poor in over-
populated Java.
Despite the stated government goals of altering this regional
concentration both by encouraging new industries to locate in
rural areas and by providing incentives to invest in the Outer
Islands, relatively little change in regional distribution of in-
vestment has occurred so far. Jakarta and West Java remain
particularly favored provinces. The advantages of locating new
factories in already-established areas (and especially in or near
the capital city) are common throughout developing countries:
access to senior government officials to deal with complex bu-
reaucratic problems, availability of better transportation and
communications facilities and a major port, proximity to the
main financial institutions and other industries, and the per-
sonal preference of entrepreneurs for living in larger cities.
Industrial development, at least through the 1970s, has re-
sulted in the broadening rather than the deepening of industrial
structure. Industries have expanded and grown more or less in-
dependently rather than in a mutually reinforcing or integrating
way. Interindustrial linkages in the past, both backward and
forward, generally have not been strong. 58 However, recent de-
velopment policies have focused on encouraging these linkages.
Although data are available only for interprovincial compar-
isons, it can be argued that intraprovincial economic disparities
may be just as critical to political stability and thus to national
integration. It is frequently the highly visible contrasts between
rich and poor, most obviously manifest in urban areas, that
provoke most tension. Evidence from household expenditure
data indicates that during the 1970s inequalities increased in
urban Java, especially in Jakarta. 59 There is evidence to suggest
that the contrast between rich and poor has been increasing in
rural areas also, as Green Revolution technology has benefited
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the wealthier farmers more than the poor, who cannot afford
the investments or the risks involved. A study on farm size, land
use, and the profitability of food crops in Indonesia in the early
1980s found that the richest households earned fourteen times
as much as the poorest from the cultivation of food crops; after
allowing for the transfer of rents and crop shares, they earned
twenty-four times as much. 60
In Java increasing fragmentation and decline in average
farm size present major problems, as does the increase in
landless households. 61 But in contrast to many other developing
countries where tenant farming is more common, 75 percent
of all farms are owner-operated. Changes in the structure and
social organization of Javanese agriculture as it moves to
greater use of high-yielding varieties of rice, however, are fun-
damentally labor-displacing and lead to increased social and
economic disparities. A greater central government presence
within the rural sector has helped to enhance the position of the
more privileged classes and likewise led to a widening gap be-
tween rich and poor within the rural society. These findings are
consistent with the findings of other researchers who contend
that economic growth leads inevitably to a more unequal dis-
tribution of wealth among social groups, and even to a signif-
icant absolute decline in the economic and social position of the
lowest income groups in developing countries. 62
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS DEPICTED BY
SECTORAL AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTERDEPENDENCE
Economic integration depends not only upon the factors already
discussed, such as approximate equality in living standards
throughout the country and a trend toward reduction of re-
gional disparities, but also on the interdependence of the
various parts of the national economy, both sectorally and re-
gionally.
Regional specialization can be an indication of both devel-
opment and national integration so long as it is accompanied
by interdependence among all the provinces, with each sup-
plying the others with the specialized products of its region
and obtaining from the others its many and diverse needs. For
provincial self-sufficiency is, by definition, the antithesis of eco-
nomic integration. In Indonesia, however, instead of mutual in-
terdependence there has grown up an autarkic core-periphery
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relationship, with Java supplying the manufactured goods for
much of the nation (supported by central government restric-
tions on the Outer Islands’ ability to obtain similar economic
goods more easily and inexpensively from neighboring coun-
tries) and drawing on the primary products of the Outer Island
provinces. This has resulted in weak lateral links, as the earlier
analysis of trade links among the provinces of Indonesia has
demonstrated (see chapter 4).
Regional specialization is only integrative when it is rein-
forced by such integrating forces as the complementarity of
regional economies and good interregional trade facilities. It
threatens national economic integration when one region’s spe-
cialization is not integrated into the whole through the mech-
anism of trade, when one province is economically independent
of other parts of the country, or when it has more bilateral trade
or other linkages with other nations than it does with other
parts of its own national unit. Unfortunately, data are not availa-
ble to compare the relative strength of extra-as opposed to in-
tranational linkages, although it is possible that North Sumatra,
for example, has stronger economic links with Singapore and
Malaysia than it does with most other parts of Indonesia. The
danger to national integration is obvious: such a region may
consider it more economically advantageous to seek indepen-
dence or to unite with its closer neighboring country than to
remain within its historical national framework, particularly
if that neighboring state is more economically advanced than
other areas within the original nation-state.
The degree of regional specialization gives some indication
of the degree of concentration of economic activity and of the
degree of participation of the various provinces in the overall
national economy and their stages of economic development.
As already discussed, data on the location of industry and em-
ployment reveal a pattern of concentration of agriculture,
mining, and extractive industry in the Outer Islands and of sec-
ondary and tertiary industry in Java. But from the perspective of
employment, few economic activities are overwhelmingly con-
centrated. The most highly concentrated economic activities are
mining and quarrying; the most widely distributed are agri-
culture and community service.
However, the pattern of agricultural activity varies consid-
erably, with certain provinces relying to a much greater extent
than others on agriculture. Bengkulu, West Kalimantan, East
Nusatenggara, and Lampung all have over 75 percent of their
provincial populations employed in agriculture (see Figure
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5.14). On average throughout the country, 56 percent of the
recorded employed population in 1980 was involved in agri-
culture, a figure that ranged from 48 percent in West Java and
East Kalimantan (excluding the 1.9 percent figure in Jakarta)
to 80.4 percent in Bengkulu. 63 Java had the lowest population
percentages employed in agriculture, with East Kalimantan,
Bali, West Nusatenggara, and North Sulawesi the only other
provinces with below-average employment in agriculture. Al-
though agriculture’s share of the GDP was projected to drop (to
26.4 percent in fiscal 1988–1989), agriculture was expected to
grow by 3 percent annually and to continue to be the mainstay
of Indonesia’s economy, employing (together with fishing and
forestry) about 55 percent of the labor force. 64
Examination of the participation of each province in the
nine major labor divisions (agriculture; mining and quarrying;
manufacturing; electricity, gas, and water; construction; trade;
transport and communications; financing and insurance; and
community services) shows the very low participation of certain
provinces in everything except agriculture and extractive in-
dustries, the two economic activities most influenced by the
environment. This is the situation particularly of some of the
provinces in the Outer Islands, such as Bengkulu, Lampung,
West and Central Kalimantan, Central and Southeast Sulawesi,
East Nusatenggara, and Maluku, indicating the low level of
their economic integration. By contrast, all the provinces of
Java, together with those of South, West, and North Sumatra,
Riau, Jambi, South and East Kalimantan, North and South Su-
lawesi, and Bali have much greater involvement in all the na-
tional economic sectors. 65
Serious questions arise over the integration of the In-
donesian economy from a structural point of view, although
the situation has improved considerably in the past few years
with the development of more forward and backward linkages
between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 66 In the
past, agriculture has been undercapitalized, with government
policies reflecting an urban bias in turning the terms of trade
against agriculture, while the urban-based industrialization
strategies have generated few linkages with the rural sector.
Even now, one has to question the advisability of developing air-
craft assembly and manufacturing, and the production of steel,
oil tankers, patrol boats, and telecommunications equipment,
which are both very costly and capital intensive, when the
country badly needs more labor-absorbing industry. During the
1970s the share of manufacturing output of consumer goods,
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Figure 5.14 Percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture,
forestry, fishing, and hunting, 1980. Calculated from data in Table
44.9 in Biro Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
whose production techniques are generally more labor in-
tensive and simpler, roughly halved, while that of intermediate
and capital goods rose approximately threefold. 67
Unemployment and underemployment are major problems,
claiming in 1983, according to Asian Business, a total of sev-
enteen million people, with the figures swelled by a further
two million each year. 68 But the greatest problem, according
to Arndt, is that of low productivity, for the great majority
of the poor work long hours for minimal returns. Indeed, he
suggests that emphasis should be placed on a productivity-
oriented development strategy rather than an employment-ori-
ented one, for modern technology is essential to attain the
quality of products demanded in the export markets. 69 As he
puts it, the crucial test of development performance is not em-
ployment, but the rate of growth of income and the degree of
equity in its distribution.
Greater economic integration is hindered by a number of
factors. One of the most influential is the high cost and difficulty
of transportation within an archipelago consisting of over 6,000
inhabited islands flung over a west-east distance of over 5,000
kilometers. High port charges and high distribution costs be-
cause of underdeveloped transportation facilities linking docks
with their hinterlands compound the problem. Traditionally,
provincial customs duties were charged to provide vital revenue
for each province, but these served also to hinder the flow of in-
terprovincial trade and were ultimately abolished. In addition,
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bureaucratic red tape, corruption, and poor provincial admin-
istration and management have further limited economic inte-
gration.
Yet compared to the old Federation of the West Indies or the
present Caribbean Community, Caricom, Indonesia’s prospects
for greater economic integration are bright. 70 There is more
regional specialization, standardization of telecommunications
and transportation, and monetary integration within the In-
donesian archipelago than there is among the members of
Caricom, which is the most similar geographically of all other
regional trading groups. Indonesia also has the advantages of
strong, centralized political and administrative authority and a
common national language.
The pattern that emerges in Indonesia in the early 1980s,
therefore, is one of significant economic disparities among the
provinces. These disparities are increasing in their magnitude,
partly as a result of the normal power of circular and cumulative
causation, whereby initial locational advantages especially of in-
frastructure are exploited first and become compounded, partly
because of the growing centralization of power that has en-
couraged centralization of economic activity, and partly because
of policies concerned with reestablishing economic stability and
promoting rapid economic growth after the Sukarno era.
However, there is current government commitment to spread
development and its benefits more evenly throughout the
country and to increase economic interdependence among the
regions, although this is limited partly by the high costs of trans-
portation and partly by numerous administrative and bureau-
cratic barriers.
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Spatial Patterns
IN THE three previous chapters the various dimensions of inte-
gration have been discussed and analyzed separately. Each di-
mension has been shown to consist of a number of variables
with varying degrees of interrelationships, as a comparison of
the various maps already presented clearly demonstrates. In
this chapter, these interrelationships will now be considered
more rigorously, through statistical analyses, to obtain a more
complete, composite picture of national integration in In-
donesia. Two types of analysis have been used: correlation
analysis, to consider the relationships between each pair of vari-
ables; and factor analysis, to extract the common elements from
a number of variables in each dimension of integration. The re-
lationships among the factors thus extracted are also examined.
Finally, factor scores for the provinces are analyzed and the
spatial patterns of overall integration delineated.
The indices selected for inclusion in the statistical analysis
were the most significant and relevant ones for which complete
and detailed data were available for the early 1980s. Obviously
they are subject to certain limitations. They are aggregate data,
a fact that masks important intra-provincial differences. They
are also not completely accurate, but subject to the differential
honesty and professionalism of the census takers and other
data collectors, sorters, and editors, and to a certain amount of
political manipulation (although in general Indonesian census
data are regarded as remarkably accurate). Nor are the indices
chosen always ideal; for example, data on interprovincial move-
ments of people would have been preferable to structural in-
dices on road networks and vehicle numbers. But, given these
constraints and caveats, one can still argue that the indices
selected do indeed have considerable validity, relevance, and
reliability. The data point out serious disparities among the
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provinces: certainly the government could have suppressed or
altered particularly embarrassing data to give a more rosy
picture of Indonesia’s conditions had it so desired.
For the purposes of this analysis, moreover, all data were
standardized to accommodate the large differences in size of
both area and population among the different provinces. 1 For
most of the sociocultural, interaction, and economic variables,
the standardization was in terms of population (percent, per
10,000, and so forth as appropriate) for each province, but for
a few variables (such as road density) the standardization was
in terms of unit area. Such standardization, however, necessary
as it is for valid statistical comparison, also camouflages very
basic differences, particularly between Java and the Outer Is-
lands, that are strikingly obvious to the observer; for the con-
centration of infrastructure, the size and sophistication of urban
centers, and other signs of economic development in Java are
diluted when averaged over the enormous population of Java
(91.3 million in 1980). Logarithmic transformation of the data
was carried out on those variables that had one disproportion-
ately high value, to avoid distortion of the mean and standard
deviation for that variable and increase the chances for linear
relationships between each pair of variables. 2
The correlation matrices for each dimension (using the
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients) were scruti-
nized to ascertain which indices were statistically significant.
Indices with correlates of over 0.95 were judged to be mea-
suring the same factor; the correlation matrix was therefore
simplified to include only one of the indices thus clustering
together. At the other end of the scale, indices that showed
correlations of less than 0.50 with any other variable were
likewise excluded on the grounds of their confusing further
analysis with unnecessary noise.
In the factor analysis, the varimax orthogonal type of ro-
tation was selected as being most valuable in this study because
by this method of rotation the best fit vectors (factors) extracted
are independent of one another.
Because of the large number of variables (over eighty were
considered) and the small number of provinces (twenty-five
were included in the statistical analysis), it was impossible to
achieve statistically valid results if the variables were all in-
cluded in one factor analysis at the same time. 3 The three major
dimensions of integration were therefore analyzed separately,
and the common factors from each dimension were examined
subsequently for their correlations. Factor scores were then ex-
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amined to ascertain the spatial patterns (of the degree of inte-
gration obtaining in each province on each factor) so that the
overall patterns of integration of the different provinces into the
nation-state of Indonesia could be determined.
Initial analysis of the three dimensions demonstrated that
the inclusion of Jakarta distorted the results. Although each
province is unique in its combination of sociocultural, inter-
action, and economic characteristics, Jakarta’s “uniqueness” is
overwhelming. This can be seen in most of the maps in the
earlier chapters of the book. It is typified by Jakarta’s special
character as an almost all-urban province in a country whose
average degree of urbanization is only 22.4 percent and as the
province where economic and political power is concentrated.
Jakarta almost consistently exhibited disproportionate indices.
This confused the analysis by unduly affecting the size of the
mean and standard deviation for each variable and thus dis-
torted the overall pattern for the other provinces. As a result,
Jakarta was excluded from the statistical analysis. East Timor
was also omitted, because of its recent incorporation into In-
donesia and the consequent lack of comparable data.
Only a proportion of the variation within the correlation ma-
trices is accounted for by the factors extracted. This ranges
from 76.3 percent for the interaction dimension, through 79.9
percent for the economic, to 84.8 percent for the sociocultural
dimension. This is to be expected, partly because not all the
variables that are relevant to the question of integration are
available and partly because the variables selected are also
measures of forces other than integration. For each dimension
several computer runs were undertaken to obtain the matrix
with the most significant variables, where each variable had a
communality of above 0.49 and loaded specifically on one factor.
This led at times to the exclusion of certain variables theoreti-
cally considered relevant to the concept of national integration,
such as the migration data.
Out of the wealth of information available in the sociocultural
dimension of national integration, twelve key indices were se-
lected for inclusion in the statistical analysis. These variables
and their Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are
shown in Table 6.1. Some interesting relationships emerge. The
language variable measuring the percentage of the population
able to speak the Indonesian language correlates highly (0.74),
as might be expected, with literacy rates, but surprisingly little
with any of the education variables (0.20 with the percentage of
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the population ten years of age and over who have completed
primary school, 0.40 with the percentage who have completed
senior high school, and 0.22 with primary school participation
rates). Likewise, the low correlation between literacy rates and
the education variables are unexpected (0.11 with primary
school completion rates, 0.42 with secondary school completion
rates); only with elementary school participation rates does lit-
eracy correlate at a significant level of 0.68. 4 It was this last ed-
ucation variable, therefore, that was chosen for inclusion in the
statistical analysis, both on the basis of its higher correlation
with literacy rates and on theoretical grounds that it best mea-
sures basic educational opportunities among the provinces. 5 It
is interesting to note, however, that the correlations between
language and completion of primary school, and between lit-
eracy and completion of primary school, were much higher in
1971 (0.56 and 0.83, respectively) than in 1980. 6
Of the two religion variables considered, Islam correlates
significantly (in a negative direction) only with Christianity,
whereas Christianity (including both Protestantism and
Catholicism) correlates both with the provision of hospital beds
and (negatively) with radio ownership. Among the various in-
dices measuring participation in a cross-provincial, nationwide
organization (cooperatives, scouts, and membership in a social
organization in the three months before a survey was taken
in 1981), only cooperative membership correlates significantly
with any other variable, negatively with the presence of for-
eigners claiming Asian citizenship. This latter variable, the per-
centage of non-Indonesian-citizen Asians, correlates positively
with viewers of Indonesian-made movies, while both these vari-
ables correlate positively with television ownership and the
percentage urban. Both the Indonesian-movie viewing and tele-
vision ownership indices also correlate strongly, as might be ex-
pected, with a number of other nonsociocultural indices, partic-
ularly those measuring economic development and communica-
tions links.
These twelve variables were subjected to a principal compo-
nents factor analysis with a varimax rotation, which condensed
and ordered them into four orthogonal and thus statistically in-
dependent factors. The first factor depicts the urban-and media-
related characteristics of television ownership, the viewing of
Indonesian-made movies, radio ownership, and access to hos-
pital facilities. The second factor depicts religion and the as-
sociated variables of health-care facilities (as measured by the
availability of hospital beds) and, to a lesser extent, radio own-
Spatial Patterns
174
Table 6.1. Correlation matrix of selected sociocultural variables
Meanings of the variables selected and their sources:
LANG (Language). Percentage of the population in 1980 able to
speak the Indonesian language. Source: Biro Pusat Statistik
(B.P.S.), Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, Tables 8.3.
ISLAM (Adherents of Islam). Percentage of the population in
1980 classified as Muslim in the 1980 census. Source:
B.P.S., Statistik Indonesia 1982, Table IV.4.1.
CHRSTN (Christian). Percentage of the population in 1980 clas-
sified as Christian (both Protestants and Catholics) in the
1980 census. Source: B.P.S., Statistik Indonesia 1982, Table
IV.4.1.
EDUCNP (Education participation). Percentage of seven to
twelve year olds in school in 1980. Source: B.P.S., Sensus
Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2.
LITRCY (Literacy). Percentage of the population ten years of age
and over classified as literate in the 1980 census. Source:
B.P.S., Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2, Table 18.3.
COOPMB (Cooperative membership). Number of members of
agricultural cooperatives per 100 population (average of
1979 and 1980 figures). Source: B.P.S., Statistik Indonesia
1983, Buku Saku, Table VIII.3.2.
ASIANS (Non-Indonesian Asian citizens). Number of foreigners
claiming Asian citizenship, 1981. Source: B.P.S., Statistik
Indonesia 1982, Table III.1.11.
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INDFLM (Indonesian-film watchers). Number of people watching
an Indonesian-made movie in 1981 per 100 population.
Source: B.P.S., Statistik Bioskop Indonesia 1981 dan 1982,
Table 4.
RADIOW (Radio ownership). Percentage of households owning a
radio, 1980. Source: B.P.S., Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series
S, no. 2, Table 66.3.
HOSPBD (Availability of hospital beds). Number of hospital beds
per 10,000 population in 1980. Source: B.P.S., Statistik In-
donesia 1982, Table IV.2.1.
TVOWNR (Television ownership). Percentage of households
owning a television set, 1980. Source: B.P.S., Sensus Pen-
duduk 1980, Series S, no. 2, Table 66.3.
URBAN (Urban population). Percentage of the population clas-
sified as urban in the 1980 census. Source: B.P.S., Sensus
Penduduk 1980, Series S, Tables 1.
ership. It is interesting to note here the positive association
of radio ownership with Islam in contradistinction to the as-
sociation of Christianity with health care (a reflection of past
Christian missionary activity). The third factor relates literacy
to education and knowledge of the Indonesian language. The
fourth factor combines membership in a cooperative (a positive
integrating measure) with the presence of non-Indonesian Asian
citizens (evaluated as a negative force). Cooperative mem-
bership is also loosely linked to elementary school participation
rates (see Table 6.2). Eigenvalues and the percentage of the
variance in each factor are given in Table 6.3, and communal-
ities in Table 6.4.
The factor scores for these four factors reveal some im-
portant spatial differences among the provinces, as Table 6.5
demonstrates.
The first factor, dealing with urban-and media-related vari-
ables, highlights the exceptional province of East Kalimantan
with its disproportionate scores, 7 but it also depicts clearly
the more urban provinces of North and South Sumatra, Riau,
South Kalimantan, and Yogyakarta, all in the western part of the
country (see Figure 6.1). Their more urbanized populations, as
might be expected, are more exposed to radio, television, and
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Indonesian-made films. The provinces with the lowest scores on
this factor are among the least urban and least developed: East
Nusatenggara, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, and Lampung.
The second factor illustrates the contrasts associated with
religion and its related attributes (radio ownership with Islam
and the provision of hospital beds with Christianity). The highly
Christian-influenced provinces of Irian Jaya and East
Nusatenggara stand out with their extreme scores, and fairly
high scores are recorded for North Sulawesi, Maluku, and
North Sumatra. In clear contrast are the highly Muslim
provinces in the rest of Sumatra, all of Java, and southern Su-
lawesi, as well as South Kalimantan and West Nusatenggara
(see Figure 6.2).
The third factor deals with the important integrative char-
acteristics of literacy, knowledge of the Indonesian language,
and education. It clearly depicts the most highly developed
provinces in this aspect: North Sulawesi, Maluku, and North
Sumatra (where former Christian missionary activity con-
tributed much). However, not all predominantly Christian
provinces or provinces with a notable Christian presence ben-
efited equally, as the very high negative scores for Irian Jaya
and West Kalimantan demonstrate. Similarly, the relatively high
scores of Central Sulawesi and particularly West Sumatra
cannot be attributed to a Christian presence (Central Sulawesi’s
population is only 21 percent Christian, and that of West
Sumatra is just 1.6 percent Christian). Yet the difference is very
striking in the two least-developed provinces of West and East
Nusatenggara, where West Nusatenggara’s last place and high
negative score (and 0.4 percent Christian population) contrasts
with East Nusatenggara’s more modest negative score (and its
91 percent Christian population) (see Figure 6.3).
The fourth factor links the integrative variable of mem-
bership in cooperatives with the disintegrative variable of the
presence of non-Indonesian-citizen Asians. It shows the more
integrated provinces on this characteristic, Yogyakarta, North
Sulawesi, West Nusatenggara, Bali, and East Java, standing in
sharp contrast to three provinces that have disproportionate
numbers of non-Indonesian-citizen Asians (and low cooperative
membership), West Sumatra, Riau, and Jambi (see Figure 6.4).
The sociocultural dimension thus consists of four very dif-
ferent strands, each with its own spatial patterns. Only East
Nusatenggara has negative scores on all four factors, 8 while
West Kalimantan, Central and Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku, and
Irian Jaya have negative scores on three of the four factors.
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Table 6.2. Rotated factor loadings in the sociocultural
dimension
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
LANG 0.22 -0.31 0.76 0.40
ISLAM 0.10 0.86 0.10 -0.01
CHRSTN -0.12 -0.95 -0.04 0.16
EDUCNP 0.03 0.27 0.75 -0.53
LITRCY 0.09 0.13 0.96 0.09
COOPMB -0.14 0.05 -0.15 -0.86
ASIANS 0.53 0.01 -0.05 0.69
INDFLM 0.72 0.09 0.12 0.39
RADIOW 0.56 0.49 0.41 0.16
HOSPBD 0.65 -0.64 0.25 -0.15
TVOWNR 0.87 0.21 0.31 0.24
URBAN 0.93 0.01 -0.07 0.07
Note: Underlined numbers indicate the variables that have the
most significant loadings on each factor; dashed lines indicate
those variables contributing somewhat less.
Statistical analysis of the interaction dimension of national
integration is particularly difficult because of the different land-
sea orientation of different parts of archipelagic Indonesia.
Some provinces consist predominantly of land areas on one
of the major islands of Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan, where
overland or river transportation is most important; other
provinces are made up of a number of smaller islands, where
coastal shipping is of greater significance. A further problem
is that the same index may have widely differing implications
in different areas: for example, the railroad in Java links the
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Table 6.3. Eigenvalues and percentages of the
variance in the sociocultural dimension
Factor Eigenvalue Percentage of
the variance
Cumulative
percentage
1 4.40 36.7 36.7
2 2.67 22.2 58.9
3 1.91 15.9 74.8
4 1.20 10.0 84.8
different provinces, whereas in Sumatra the three sections of
railroad are unconnected and thus serve predominantly local,
not interprovincial, transportation needs. A further difficulty
arises over standardizing for both the area and the population
of each province.
However, out of all the variables pertaining to the inter-
action dimension, nine key variables (which correlated with at
least one other significant variable and for which there were
relatively accurate and detailed data) were selected for the sta-
tistical analysis. It is interesting to note that theoretically im-
portant indices of interaction, such as newspaper circulation
and population mobility (including migration data), had to be
excluded because of their lack of significant correlation with
any other interaction variables. The variables selected and their
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown in
Table 6.6. When subjected to a factor analysis with a varimax
rotation, these were condensed and ordered into a dichotomous
factor structure (see Table 6.7).
Interpretation of the factors is difficult. The first factor con-
sists of loadings from variables associated with greater urban-
ization and higher per-capita economic development: telephone
and vehicle ownership, passengers using air transportation,
and the two trade variables measuring interisland and interna-
tional imports. The second factor has two poles, one relating
sea transportation and telegram use, the other reflecting high
road density (which is associated with high population density).
These two factors account for 76.3 percent of the variation in
the matrix. Eigenvalues and percentages of the variance in each
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Table 6.4. Communalities in the
sociocultural dimension
Variable Communality
LANG 0.88
ISLAM 0.76
CHRSTN 0.94
EDUCNP 0.92
LITRCY 0.95
COOPMB 0.78
ASIANS 0.76
INDFLM 0.70
RADIOW 0.75
HOSPBD 0.92
TVOWNR 0.95
URBAN 0.88
factor are given in Table 6.8, and communalities in Table 6.9.
Factor scores for the interaction dimension are given in Table
6.10.
Factor scores of the first factor, dealing with the urban
and economic orientation of the transportation and communica-
tions network, depict the dominant position of East Kalimantan
(with a factor score of 3.40). Bali, North Sumatra, and Riau
are the only other provinces that have significant, relatively
high scores on this factor; while at the other extreme, several
provinces stand out for their lack of integration as measured by
this factor: East Nusatenggara (especially), West Nusatenggara,
Southeast Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and Bengkulu, all less-
developed and more-isolated Outer Island provinces (see Figure
6.5).
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Table 6.5. Factor scores of the sociocultural factors
Province Factor 1
Urban/Media
Factor
2
Religion
Factor 3
Literacy/
Language
Factor 4
Coop
membership/
Asians
Aceh -0.48 0.76 0.43 -0.16
North Sumatra 0.96 -0.96 1.27 -0.16
West Sumatra -0.17 0.48 0.88 -0.77
Riau 0.92 0.81 0.13 1.54
Jambi -0.65 0.94 0.29 1.37
South Sumatra 0.90 0.47 0.38 0.76
Bengkulu -0.79 0.85 0.18 -0.22
Lampung -1.14 0.74 0.45 0.79
West Java -0.15 0.79 -0.02 -0.10
Central Java -0.01 0.71 -0.60 -0.75
Yogyakarta 0.77 0.40 0.25 -1.82
East Java 0.14 0.68 -0.87 -1.06
Bali 0.14 -0.36 -0.63 -1.22
West Nusatenggara -0.51 0.52 -2.18 -1.31
East Nusatenggara -1.60 -2.06 -0.62 0.60
National Integration in Indonesia
181
West Kalimantan 0.48 -0.27 -1.57 2.32
Central Kalimantan -0.65 0.34 0.51 0.63
South Kalimantan 0.89 0.67 0.22 -0.53
East Kalimantan 3.23 -0.17 0.00 0.88
North Sulawesi 0.52 -1.74 1.80 -1.37
Central Sulawesi -1.19 -0.14 1.08 0.34
South Sulawesi 0.13 0.87 -1.13 -0.44
Southeast Sulawesi -1.11 0.34 -0.27 0.08
Maluku -0.74 -1.12 1.71 0.49
Irian Jaya 0.13 -2.78 -1.68 0.11
Figure 6.1. Factor scores of sociocultural factor 1 (urban/media).
On the second factor, however, the Javanese provinces,
along with the most extreme case, Bali, cluster together at one
pole, demonstrating their high population density and corre-
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Figure 6.2. Factor scores of sociocultural factor 2 (religion).
Figure 6.3. Factor scores of sociocultural factor 3 (literacy/language).
lated high road density and their difference from the rest of In-
donesia. At the other pole, Irian Jaya, East Kalimantan, Riau,
Maluku, and Central Kalimantan illustrate the importance of
sea travel and telegram communications (see Figure 6.6).
In the statistical analysis of the economic dimension, diffi-
culties arise in trying to separate indices measuring economic
integration from those illustrating economic development. In-
dices such as the ownership of a sideboard or consumption of
electricity are measures as much of economic development as
they are of participation in and integration into the national eco-
nomic life. Yet it can be argued that economic development is
a necessary though not sufficient condition for economic inte-
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Figure 6.4. Factor scores of sociocultural factor 4 (cooperative mem-
bership/Asian citizens)
gration and that the extent to which the different provinces are
involved in economic development is an indication of their inte-
gration into the nation-state.
Of all the variables relating to the economic dimension,
eleven were selected for their particular relevance, the com-
pleteness and consistency of their data, and their correlation
with other variables. These variables and their Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6.11. When
subjected to factor analysis with a varimax rotation, these vari-
ables were condensed and partitioned into three distinct factors
(see Table 6.12). Eigenvalues and percentages of the variance in
each factor are given in Table 6.13, and communalities in Table
6.14. Factor scores are shown in Table 6.15.
The first and most important factor, which accounts for
47.4 percent of the variance, summarizes those variables con-
tributing to national development (provincial income and do-
mestic investment levels, provincial participation in the national
economy through taxation, and the amount spent upon devel-
opment by both central and provincial governments). Factor
scores depict a pattern of striking contrasts between several of
the economically dynamic provinces in the Outer Islands, domi-
nated overwhelmingly by East Kalimantan but also including
Central Kalimantan and Irian Jaya; and the provinces of inner
Indonesia, with their negative per-capita contributions to the
national economy, particularly the provinces of Java but also
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Table 6.6. Correlation matrix of selected interaction variables
Meanings of the variables selected and their sources:
ROADNS (Road density). Length of roads (of all types and condi-
tions) per 1,000 square kilometers, 1982. Source: Biro
Pusat Statistik (B.P.S.), Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku
Saku, Table VII.1.3.
VEHCLP (Vehicles per 1,000 population). Number of registered
vehicles of all types per 1,000 population, 1982. Source:
B.P.S., Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku, Table VII.2.3.
LGSEAT (Sea-traffic-generated income, log-transformed).
Income generated by sea traffic in the ports of each
province in rupiahs per capita (calculated from recorded
data for 285 ports, agglomerated by province), 1981–1982.
Source: Republik Indonesia, Departemen Perhubungan
Laut, Direktorat Perkapalan dan Pelayaran SubDit. Keban-
daran dan Awak Kapal, Seksi P.U., File No. TH 1981/82.
AIRTRF (Air traffic). Number of domestic air travelers, recorded
for sixty-six airports and agglomerated by province, per
1,000 population, 1981. Source: B.P.S., Statistik Angkutan
Udara 1981, Table 9.
TELPHN (Telephone ownership). Number of telephone licenses
issued per 1,000 population, 1981. Source: B.P.S., Statistik
Indone sia 1983, Buku Saku, Table VII.5.3.
TELGRM (Telegrams). Number of telegrams sent to domestic
destinations per 1,000 population, 1981. Source: B.P.S.,
Statistik Indonesia 1982, Table VIII.5.5.
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IMPDOM (Imports from domestic sources). Number of tons of
cargo unloaded in interprovincial trade per 100 population
(average of 1981 and 1982 figures). Source: B.P.S., Statistik
Bongkar Muat Barang di Pelabuhan Indonesia 1982, Table
1.
LGIMPI (Imports from overseas, log-transformed). Value of inter-
national imports in U.S. dollars per capita, 1982. Source:
B.P.S., Impor Menurut Jenis Barang dan Negeri Asal, vol. 2,
Table 8.
LGPOPD (Population density, log-transformed). Population
density per square kilometer, 1980. Source: B.P.S., Statistik
Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku, Table II.1.3.
Table 6.7. Rotated factor loadings in the
interaction dimension
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2
ROADNS 0.20 -0.84
VEHCLP 0.89 -0.23
LGSEAT 0.53 0.77
AIRTRF 0.82 0.34
TELPHN 0.94 0.11
TELGRM 0.24 0.72
IMPDOM 0.75 0.47
LGIMPI 0.70 0.04
LGPOPD -0.06 -0.93
Note: Underlined numbers indicate the variables
that have the most significant loadings on each
factor.
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Table 6.8. Eigenvalues and percentages of the variance in the
interaction dimension
Factor Eigenvalues Percentage of
the variance
Cumulative
percentage
1 4.53 50.3 50.3
2 2.34 26.0 76.3
Table 6.9. Communalities
in the interaction
dimension
Variable Communality
ROADNS 0.74
VEHCLP 0.84
LGSEAT 0.87
AIRTRF 0.79
TELPHN 0.90
TELGRM 0.58
IMPDOM 0.79
LGIMPI 0.49
LGPOPD 0.87
Bali and the two Nusatenggara provinces (see Figure 6.7).
These contrasts underscore the claim made earlier about the ex-
ploitation of the Outer Islands for the benefit of Java.
The second factor, by contrast, highlights the more mod-
ernizing forces of altered economic life-styles associated with
changes from agricultural to other forms of employment, which
involve greater personal interdependence. This factor is char-
acterized by a relatively low percentage of the population em-
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Table 6.10. Factor scores of the interaction factors
Province Factor 1
Urban-related
Factor 2 Sea
transportation/Road
density
Aceh 0.19 0.44
North Sumatra 0.90 -0.62
West Sumatra -0.07 -0.19
Riau 0.88 1.41
Jambi -0.25 0.08
South Sumatra 0.38 -0.01
Bengkulu -0.82 -0.07
Lampung -0.64 -0.35
West Java -0.36 -1.26
Central Java -0.17 -1.26
Yogyakarta 0.47 -1.60
East Java 0.12 -1.01
Bali 1.63 -2.25
West Nusatenggara -1.00 -0.42
East Nusatenggara -1.64 -0.13
West Kalimantan -0.64 0.49
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Central Kalimantan -0.82 1.04
South Kalimantan 0.13 0.22
East Kalimantan 3.40 1.43
North Sulawesi 0.23 0.05
Central Sulawesi -0.63 0.76
South Sulawesi 0.05 -0.38
Southeast Sulawesi -0.94 0.60
Maluku -0.56 1.28
Irian Jaya 0.14 1.75
Figure 6.5. Factor scores of interaction factor 1 (urban-related)
ployed in agriculture; a comparatively high use of kerosene,
gas, or electricity as a fuel for cooking (in place of the tradi-
tional firewood); a relatively high use of electricity for lighting;
and a high rate of ownership of one of the symbols of devel-
opment, a sideboard. 9 This household-modernizing economic
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Figure 6.6. Factor scores of interaction factor 2 (sea transportation/
road density).
factor illustrates the differences between much of the eastern
part of the country (the lowest factor scores recorded are for
East Nusatenggara, Irian Jaya, and Southeast and Central Su-
lawesi) and the other parts of the country. East Kalimantan
and West Java score highest on this factor, followed by South
Sumatra‚ Riau, and North Sumatra (see Figure 6.8).
The third factor focuses on the dynamic element of eco-
nomic growth as measured by the average growth rate in RGDP
between 1976 and 1980 and the associated variable of approved
foreign investment projects in the 1967–1982 period on a per-
capita basis. Not surprisingly, given its first-place position on
both these individual variables (see chapter 5), Aceh’s factor
score totally dominates the factor score structure (4.14, com-
pared with its nearest rival, North Sumatra, with a score of
0.86). At the other extreme, Yogyakarta and West Nusatenggara
record both low economic growth and little foreign investment
(see Figure 6.9). However, the provinces at both extremes on
this factor have changed since 1971, as a comparable study
using early 1970s data demonstrates. 10 Then, East Kalimantan,
Maluku, and Riau stood out along with Aceh as economically
dynamic provinces, contrasting especially with North Sulawesi,
which was the only province to experience a negative economic
growth rate during the 1968–1972 time period on which the
earlier study was based. West Kalimantan and Bengkulu also
recorded fairly high negative scores at that time.
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Table 6.11. Correlation matrix of selected economic variables
Meanings of the variables selected and their sources:
REGGDP (Regional gross domestic product). RGDP in money
terms (excluding oil) in thousands of rupiahs per capita,
1980. Source: Biro Pusat Statistik (B.P.S.), Statistik In-
donesia 1983, Buku Saku, Table X.9.
SIDEBD (Sideboard ownership). Percentage of households
owning a sideboard, 1980. Source: B.P.S., Sensus Penduduk
1980, Series S, no. 2, Table 66.3.
FUELCM (Fuel consumption). Percentage of private households
using kerosene, gas, or electricity for cooking, 1980.
Source: B.P.S., Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2,
Table 63.3.
ELECCM (Electricity consumption). Percentage of private house-
holds using electricity for lighting, 1980. Source: B.P.S.,
Sensus Penduduk 1980, Series S, no. 2, Table 63.3.
REGEXP (Regional expenditure). Provincial government expendi-
tures (operating and development) in thousands of rupiahs
per capita, 1980–1981. Source: B.P.S., Statistik Indonesia
1983, Buku Saku, Table VIII.1.5.
TAXGVT (Provincial tax contributions to the government). Lo-
cally raised tax revenue in thousands of rupiahs per capita,
1980–1981. Source: B.P.S., Statistik Keuangan Pemerintah
Daerah, Daerah Tingkat I (Propinsi), 1975/76–1980/81,
Table 1.
CGVDVT (Central government support for development). Na-
tional government support for development programs in
thousands of rupiahs per capita, 1980–1981. Source: same
as above (TAXGVT).
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GROWTH (Growth rate of RGDP). Average annual growth rate of
RGDP 1976–1980 at constant 1975 market prices. Source:
B.P.S., Pendapatan Regional Propinsi-propinsi di Indonesia,
1976–80, Table 1.6.
AGREMP (Agricultural employment). Percentage of the popu-
lation employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and
hunting, 1980. Source: B.P.S., Sensus Penduduk 1980,
Series S, no. 2, Table 44.9.
LGDINV (Domestic investment, log-transformed). Approved do-
mestic investment projects excluding the oil, insurance, and
banking sectors, 1968–1982 in thousands of rupiahs per
capita. Source: B.P.S., Indikator Ekonomi 1982, Table
IV.16b.
INTINV (International investment). Approved foreign investment
projects, 1967–1982, in U.S. dollars per capita. Source:
B.P.S., Indikator Ekonomi 1982, Table IV.16d.
Significantly, only East Kalimantan has positive scores on all
three of these economic factors. Indeed, East Kalimantan is the
only province even to record positive scores on the first two
most significant factors, demonstrating again its predominant
position as Indonesia’s richest and most developed and devel-
oping province on a per-capita basis. 11
At the other extreme, however, there are several provinces
with significant negative scores on all three factors: West and
East Nusatenggara and Lampung. This indicates their lack of
economic development and integration into the national whole.
In addition, there are several provinces that have significant
negative scores on two of the factors: 12 West Sumatra, West,
Central, and East Java, Yogyakarta, West Kalimantan, Central,
South, and Southeast Sulawesi, and Maluku. Of this latter
group, the Javanese provinces, together with West Sumatra and
South Sulawesi, have positive scores on the second, modern-
izing factor but negative scores on both the economic devel-
opment and growth investment factors, while the others have
positive scores on the first, economic development, but negative
scores on the other two factors.
However, as discussed earlier, it is almost impossible to
measure economic integration without also measuring eco-
nomic development. Although economic integration depends
upon some degree of development, economic development does
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Table 6.12. Rotated factor loadings in the economic dimension
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
REGGDP 0.82 0.50 0.14
SIDEBD 0.13 0.79 0.14
FUELCM 0.22 0.88 0.00
ELECCM 0.48 0.74 0.03
REGEXP 0.90 -0.16 0.18
TAXGVT 0.88 0.30 0.14
CGVDVT 0.93 0.04 0.02
GROWTH -0.05 -0.10 0.94
AGREMP 0.10 -0.74 0.23
LGDINV 0.75 0.34 0.05
INTINV 0.38 0.09 0.80
Note: Underlined numbers indicate the variables that have the
most significant loadings on each factor.
Table 6.13. Eigenvalues and percentages of the
variance in the economic dimension
Factor Eigenvalues Percentage of
the variance
Cumulative
percentage
1 5.22 47.4 47.4
2 2.24 20.4 67.8
3 1.33 12.1 79.9
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Table 6.14.
Communalities in the
economic dimension
Variable Communality
REGGDP 0.93
SIDEBD 0.66
FUELCM 0.82
ELECCM 0.78
REGEXP 0.87
TAXGVT 0.88
CGVDVT 0.87
GROWTH 0.89
AGREMP 0.61
LGDINV 0.69
INTINV 0.80
not necessarily lead to greater economic integration. It is dif-
ficult, therefore, to be sure that Aceh’s seemingly greater
degree of economic integration as measured by the indices se-
lected here truly reflects increased integration and not what
is more likely, substantial investment and development. Simi-
larly, it would seem that Lampung’s negative scores on all three
factors reflect its general poverty and lack of development as
much as its lack of national integration.
The problem of promoting both economic development and
economic integration remains a major one for the government
and peoples of Indonesia. National economic growth cannot
continue to be pursued at the cost of ever-widening disparities
in economic well-being among the provinces. Nor, on the other
hand, can uncontrolled regional development be promoted
without concern for its impact on the nation as a whole. Both
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Table 6.15. Factor scores of the economic factors
Province Factor 1
Economic
development
Factor 2
Modernization
Factor 3
Growth/Investment
Aceh -0.89 -0.17 4.14
North Sumatra -0.38 0.91 0.86
West Sumatra -0.38 0.18 -0.40
Riau -0.05 0.93 -0.55
Jambi 0.39 -0.09 -0.71
South Sumatra -0.05 1.07 -0.18
Bengkulu 0.05 -0.67 0.67
Lampung -0.50 -0.62 -0.39
West Java -0.83 1.60 -0.20
Central Java -0.80 -0.01 -0.67
Yogyakarta -0.55 0.00 -1.02
East Java -0.75 0.66 -0.53
Bali -0.71 0.73 -0.04
West
Nusatenggara
-0.68 -0.47 -0.95
East Nusatenggara -0.67 -1.87 -0.12
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West Kalimantan 0.19 -0.55 -0.42
Central Kalimantan 1.78 -0.95 0.39
South Kalimantan -0.34 0.75 0.42
East Kalimantan 3.58 1.93 0.18
North Sulawesi -0.41 0.84 0.35
Central Sulawesi 0.51 -1.27 -0.48
South Sulawesi -0.54 0.56 -0.22
Southeast Sulawesi 0.20 -1.34 -0.44
Maluku 0.56 -0.48 -0.42
Irian Jaya 1.28 -1.67 0.73
Figure 6.7. Factor scores of economic factor 1 (economic devel-
opment).
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Figure 6.8. Factor scores of economic factor 2 (modernization).
Figure 6.9. Factor scores of economic factor 3 (growth/investment).
are prescriptions for disintegration. Only in a balance between
the two, in which regional development takes place within a na-
tional framework of economic growth where other bonds of na-
tional interdependence are constantly being strengthened, can
true economic development and integration take place.
Because the three dimensions of integration had to be an-
alyzed separately to achieve statistically valid results, the in-
terrelationships among the dimensions have thus far not been
examined. However, these are shown in the correlation matrix
of the nine factors extracted in the factor analyses (see Table
6.16). Two sets of significant interrelationships emerge.
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The first set, with the highest correlations, consists of the
urban-related factors: the first sociocultural factor (which had
loadings from variables measuring television and radio own-
ership, exposure to Indonesian-made movies, and access to hos-
pital beds, as well as the percentage urban), the first interaction
factor (which had loadings from variables associated with
greater urban and per-capita economic development, including
telephone and vehicle ownership and participation in air trans-
portation and trade), and the second economic factor (which
was labeled the modernizing factor because of its more urban-
related characteristics of relatively low employment percen-
tages in agriculture, relatively high household ownership of a
sideboard, and comparatively high consumption of electricity
for lighting and use of fuels other than firewood for cooking).
The second set, with somewhat lower correlations among
the factors and less inherent meaning, links together the fourth
sociocultural factor (with its positive loadings on the presence
of non-Indonesian-citizen Asians and its negative loadings on
the more integrative variable of cooperative membership) with
the second interaction factor (which had positive loadings from
sea travel and telegrams and negative loadings from population
density and road density). This second interaction factor also
correlates significantly with the first economic factor, that con-
cerned with national development (with its positive loadings
from provincial income, domestic investment, provincial par-
ticipation in the national economy through taxation, and the
amount spent on development by both central and provincial
governments).
The correlation matrix demonstrates also the very high
degree of independence of the remaining three factors: the
second sociocultural factor (concerned primarily with religious
differences in the country), the third sociocultural factor (in-
cluding literacy, language, and education), and the third eco-
nomic factor (dealing with economic growth and foreign in-
vestment); all of these had correlations of under 0.35 with
any other factor. It thus appears that these are genuinely in-
dependent factors, measuring separate aspects of the whole
concept of national integration.
The factor analysis and the ranking of the provinces on the
basis of their factor scores demonstrate two distinct aspects of
national integration within Indonesia.
On the one hand, factors such as the fourth sociocultural
factor (cooperative membership and Asian citizens), the second
interaction factor (high population and road density and low
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Table 6.16. Correlation coefficients of the nine factors extracted
in the analysis of the sociocultural, interac tion, and economic
dimensions of national integration
Factor SocCult
1
SocCult
2
SocCult
3
SocCult
4
Intact
1
Intact 2 Econfac
1
Econfac
2
Econfac
3
SocCult
1
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87** 0.08 0.42 0.76** 0.02
SocCult
2
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.28 -0.21 0.33 -0.09
SocCult
3
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.18
SocCult
4
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0.61** 0.44 -0.15 -0.01
Intact 1 0.87** -0.01 0.11 -0.07 1.00 0.00 0.42 0.72** 0.14
Intact 2 0.08 -0.28 0.13 0.61** 0.00 1.00 0.68** -0.28 0.21
Econfac
1
0.42 -0.21 0.07 0.44 0.42 0.68** 1.00 0.00 0.00
Econfac
2
0.76** 0.33 0.21 -0.15 0.72** -0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00
Econfac
3
0.02 -0.09 0.18 -0.01 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00
**Significant at the 0.001 level.
use of sea transportation and telegrams), and the second eco-
nomic factor (household modernizing) highlight the dichotomy
between Java (and Bali) and the Outer Islands. This is the very
dichotomy that has been consistently recognized in the liter-
ature about Indonesia: the “sharp contrast between Java and
Bali on the one hand and the outlying islands on the other‚”
which has given rise to the acceptance of Java as the “core”
of Indonesia and the other islands as the “periphery.” 13 Thus,
the far greater population density in Java and Bali, their more
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developed infrastructure (in terms of road density and vehicle
concentration), their greater participation in certain nationally
oriented organizations such as village social associations and
cooperatives, and their greater exposure to modernizing influ-
ences (as indicated in their higher levels of consumption of
electricity and kerosene and their lower employment levels in
primary agricultural activities) contrast with conditions existing
in the Outer Islands.
Yet on the other hand, a closer examination of the factors
and their spatial patterns reveals that in at least two different
ways this “core-periphery dichotomy” conclusion is inadequate.
First, the factors that demarcate Java as a distinct “core” are
not as crucial as those factors synthesizing other features. In
both the sociocultural and interaction dimensions, the major
factor extracted from the factor analysis fails to distinguish Java
from the Outer Islands on a per-capita basis (see Figures 6.1
and 6.5); in the economic dimension it is the second (household
modernizing) factor that fails to make that distinction (see
Figure 6.8). Rather, the contrast is between certain of the Outer
Island provinces and other provinces also in the Outer Islands.
In other words, the contrasts among the Outer Island provinces
are greater and more significant than those between Java and
the Outer Islands, at least on a per-capita basis.
Second, the factor analysis shows that from a per-capita per-
spective Java is not a true core, because in each dimension the
Javanese provinces lack several of the key characteristics ex-
pected of a national core.
In the sociocultural dimension, a higher proportion of the
population speaks the national language in most of the outlying
areas in the Outer Islands (such as North and Central Sulawesi,
Maluku, all of Sumatra, and East Kalimantan) than in Java (see
Figure 6.3). Indeed, in Java less than 62 percent of the pop-
ulation can speak Indonesian (with the exception of Jakarta).
Yet widespread knowledge of a common, nationwide language is
one of the most important integrating forces in any nation-state
and consequently should characterize the core of any coun-
try. Literacy and educational levels are similarly below the na-
tional average in most of Java. In terms of access to medical
facilities and other amenities on a per-capita basis, the Ja-
vanese have fewer hospital beds and mother-and-baby clinics
and less exposure to Indonesian-made movies than the popu-
lation in many of the Outer Island provinces (especially East
Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and the provinces of Sumatra).
Indeed, the provinces of Java outside Jakarta are not even the
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most urbanized on a per-capita basis. North and South Sumatra,
Riau, and East Kalimantan all have a higher percentage of their
provincial populations classified as urban than any of the four
provinces in Java included in the statistical analysis.
On the interaction level, although Java has by far the most
highly developed land transportation network (road, rail, and
vehicular density), the comparative underdevelopment on a per-
capita basis of its sea transportation system and other non-land-
based interaction indices, as demonstrated by the non-land-ori-
ented interaction factor, is striking in this sea-oriented island
nation (see Figure 6.6). Similarly in terms of population inter-
action and mixing, on the basis of the 1980 migration data Java
emerges as a very homogeneous area: less than 4 percent of
its population (outside Jakarta) has lived in another province, a
characteristic hardly to be expected in a national core.
The same is true with the economic dimension. The national
development economic factor distinguishes Java (along with
provinces in the Outer Islands such as West and East
Nusatenggara and Aceh) as an economically underdeveloped
area on a per-capita basis, an area lacking the dynamic char-
acteristics normally associated with a core region (see Figure
6.7). Despite the fact that Java has received a disproportionate
percentage of both domestic and foreign investment, and is
the center of manufacturing industry in Indonesia, provincial
income levels and provincial contributions to the national
economy are lower per capita than in most of the Outer Island
provinces. This inverted core-periphery situation has been dis-
cussed earlier (see chapter 5). 14 On a per-capita basis
therefore, Java is a net economic drain on the national economy,
not an economically dynamic, pulsating center from which
spread effects extend to an underdeveloped periphery.
Thus, it is obvious that Java (outside Jakarta) and Bali do not
form the economically dynamic and heterogeneous heartland,
containing truly national core characteristics. Only in its po-
litical relationships, in its political domination of the periphery,
can Java be considered a core. In other ways the Javanese
provinces and Bali form a part of the periphery, albeit a very dis-
tinctive part.
Only Jakarta, the national capital city, stands out with true
core characteristics. Only Jakarta has a highly urban character,
a high economic growth rate, high income, and marked cos-
mopolitan features (with the greatest heterogeneity of popu-
lation of any province in Indonesia). Indeed, Jakarta has been
labeled “the most, even the only truly Indone sian city, because
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of its function as one of the few crucibles in which the nation’s
ethnic groups interact in their daily lives.” 15 Jakarta alone is
the center of investment; the headquarters of finance, adminis-
tration, and government; and the focus of most communications
and transportation links in the country.
When only Jakarta is recognized as the national core of
Indonesia, the pattern of national integration appears signifi-
cantly different from the dichotomous Java-Outer Islands model
traditionally accepted in the literature about Indonesia. Com-
parison of factor scores and the rankings of the six major factors
(see Table 6.17), together with other elements discussed earlier
in the book, suggests a fourfold classification of the levels of
integration of the provinces in Indonesia based on per-capita
characteristics (see Figure 6.10).
Of the nine factors that resulted from the factor analysis of
the three major dimensions of integration, six are conceptually
more important than the remaining three. In the sociocultural
dimension the first and third factors are most significant: the
first, accounting for 37 percent of the variance, links the urban-
and media-related characteristics; and the third, accounting
for 16 percent of the variance, combines the important vari-
ables of literacy, education, and knowledge of the Indonesian
language. The second factor, depicting religious differences,
demonstrates the contrasts between the predominant religion
of Islam and the minority Christianity; but, as discussed earlier,
adherence to Islam cannot necessarily be construed as being
more integrative, because Christians have contributed to na-
tional development and integration disproportionately to their
numbers. The fourth sociocultural factor is likewise ambiguous
in meaning, for it combines the integrative cooperative mem-
bership variable with the disintegrative presence of non-Indone-
sian-citizen Asians.
Both interaction factors are inherently valuable because
they measure different, positive aspects of interaction. With the
economic dimension, however, the first two factors (measuring
national economic development and participation in the na-
tional economy, and household modernizing forces of changing
economic life-styles) are more significant than the third. This
last factor, accounting for only 12 percent of the variance, is
concerned with economic growth during a rather limited time
period (1976–1980) and with approved foreign investment pro-
jects from 1967 to 1982, and reflects the existence of eco-
nomic wealth and potential rather than economic integration.
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The groupings of the provinces, therefore, are based on their
factor scores on the six most important factors, two in each
major dimension.
First, the five provinces of West, Central, and East Java,
Yogyakarta, and Bali form a fairly distinct group with similar
scores on most of the factors, although it is interesting to notice
that they form a less uniform group than they did ten years ago.
They rank below average on the literacy-education-language so-
ciocultural factor, on the second interaction factor (which has
high loadings on sea transportation and telegram use and neg-
ative loadings on high road and population density), and on
the most important economic factor (that measuring economic
development and contribution to the national economy on a per-
capita basis). And they rank at or a little above average on
the other three major factors. As already suggested, Java and
Bali seem only partially integrated into the whole Indonesian
nation-state. In some ways they constitute a nation-state of their
own, with their own distinct cultures symbolized in their rich art
forms and language traditions, which are not those of the nation
as a whole. They are attached politically (though frequently in a
colonial-type relationship) to the other parts of the Indonesian
archipelago and are certainly economically dependent on them
for revenue generation; yet in other ways Java and Bali seem
independent, culturally aloof, and unwilling partners when it
comes to regional equality.
Second, five spatially separate provinces in the Outer Is-
lands stand out as being the most economically developed and
highly integrated. These provinces, East Kalimantan, North and
South Sumatra, Riau, and North Sulawesi, rank among the top
seven on at least three of the major factors and have generally
above-average scores on the others. They are provinces with
comparatively high levels of urbanization, each with a major
urban core. East Kalimantan stands out in its first position with
its overwhelmingly high scores and first-place rankings on four
of the six major factors (and second place on a further one).
Its only relatively low ranking (fifteenth) is on the literacy-
education-language sociocultural factor.
Historically these five provinces consist of two different
types. The provinces of North and South Sumatra and North
Sulawesi, with their nuclear centers of Medan, Palembang, and
Manado, are old historic cores. 16 North Sumatra is the home
of the Bataks and the locus of important late-nineteenth-and
twentieth-century agricultural estates, and it has a favorable
position with regard to trade with the Malay Peninsula across
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Table 6.17. Ranks of the provinces based on the factor scores of
the six most pertinent factors
Sociocultural Interaction Economic
Province Factor
1
Factor
3
Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
1
Factor
2
Aceh 16 8 8 9 25 15
North Sumatra 2 3 3 20 13 5
West Sumatra 15 5 13 16 13 11
Riau 3 14 4 3 10 4
Jambi 18 10 15 11 6 14
South Sumatra 4 9 6 13 10 3
Bengkulu 21 13 21 14 9 20
Lampung 23 7 19 17 16 19
West Java 14 16 16 22 24 2
Central Java 13 18 14 22 23 13
Yogyakarta 6 11 5 24 18 12
East Java 9 21 11 21 22 9
Bali 9 20 2 25 21 8
West
Nusatenggara
17 25 24 19 20 16
East
Nusatenggara
25 19 25 15 19 25
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West
Kalimantan
8 23 19 8 8 18
Central
Kalimantan
18 6 21 5 2 21
South
Kalimantan
5 12 10 10 12 7
East
Kalimantan
1 15 1 2 1 1
North Sulawesi 7 1 7 12 15 6
Central
Sulawesi
24 4 18 6 5 22
South Sulawesi 11 22 12 18 17 10
Southeast
Sulawesi
22 17 23 7 7 23
Maluku 20 2 17 4 4 17
Irian Jaya 11 24 9 1 3 24
the Straits of Malacca. South Sumatra traces its historic roots to
the Sri Vijaya empire of the seventh to the thirteenth centuries
and is the focus of a network of trading routes and connections
extending through much of the archipelago. North Sulawesi de-
veloped later as a core area and owes its comparatively high
degree of development to its favored position under the Dutch.
This is reflected in its sociocultural tradition, with its European
emphases on literacy, education, Christianity, medical facilities,
and so forth, and on its economic development as a center
for the production of copra and certain of the spices (cloves,
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Figure 6.10. Provinces grouped according to their common character-
istics, 1980.
nutmeg, mace, cinnamon, and vanilla). Its decline from a po-
sition of preeminence among the Outer Islands has to be un-
derstood in the light of the Javanese control of the economy
after independence, the Permesta rebellion, and the central
government’s restrictions on trade (with the nearby Philippines)
and regional development.
The second type of province, including East Kalimantan and
Riau, reflects particularly, though not exclusively, the ex-
ploitation of their economic resource base in the more recent
past, especially timber, petroleum, and natural gas. North and
South Sumatra are also rich in natural resources.
Third, a group of ten provinces exhibits an average or less-
than-average degree of overall integration. This group can be
subdivided into three categories: first, those that are somewhat
more integrated and developed, that rank within the top ten
provinces on at least two of the factors and include one or two
other relatively high or average rankings: South Kalimantan,
Aceh, and Jambi; second, those that are somewhat below av-
erage in most of their rankings: South Sulawesi and West
Sumatra; and third, those with great contrasts in their rankings
on the different factors: Central Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, Maluku,
and West and Central Kalimantan.
Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and Central Kalimantan all rank
remarkably high (within the top six provinces) on the literacy-
education-language sociocultural factor, the second interaction
factor (sea transportation-telegram use), and the first economic
factor (economic development and participation in the national
Spatial Patterns
206
economy), but have very low rankings (within the bottom eight)
on the remaining three major factors. Irian Jaya and West Kali-
mantan, by contrast, share very low rankings on the important
literacy-education-language sociocultural factor, but rank
higher on the first (urban-and media-related) sociocultural
factor; they share similarly high rankings on the second interac-
tion factor and first economic factor with the three other
provinces in this subgroup. Irian Jaya stands out as having the
greatest contrasts in its rankings: first and third on two (the
second interaction and first economic factors), but next to last
on two others (the second sociocultural and second economic
factors). In other words, it is a province with considerable eco-
nomic resources (particularly petroleum and copper) and has
comparatively high interaction by sea and telegrams on a per-
capita basis, but it shares little in the cultural heritage (as rep-
resented by the literacy-education-language factor) and in the
economically modernizing forces of the country. Economic de-
velopment here tends to be enclaval in nature, with greater
impact on the towns and in the vicinities of resource extraction,
and on its numerous in-migrants than on the indigenous inhabi-
tants.
South Sulawesi’s low level of integration as measured by
the factor scores is somewhat surprising, given the role of its
provincial capital, Ujung Pandang (formerly Makassar), as a
thriving port and metropolis, a major center for communica-
tions, and the economic and administrative center for much of
eastern Indonesia. South Sulawesi’s population is more hetero-
geneous than most, and in addition the Bugis trading network
is an important factor in integrating South Sulawesi into the
rest of Indonesia; 17 yet these traits are not reflected in any of
the indices. The explanation for the anomalous position of South
Sulawesi may have to be sought both in its past development
and in the size of its provincial population. Although historically
an important center before its sacking by the Dutch in 1669,
South Sulawesi developed slowly, partly because of a lack of
emphasis on education and training of the local population. 18
An important rice- and copra-producing region, South Sulawesi
was dominated for over 300 years by either Javanese or Minaha-
sans (from North Sulawesi), until the 1958–1961 Permesta re-
bellion when it threw off North Sulawesi’s control. The Dutch
regarded South Sulawesi much as they did Aceh, as an area of
perennial unrest, even after they pacified it in 1905–1910. 19 The
impression of Ujung Pandang as a thriving, bustling city and
the influence of the Bugis are diluted by the large size of the
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provincial population (6,062,000 in 1980, or over half the entire
population of the island of Sulawesi). 20 The province of South
Sulawesi includes some remote and isolated areas, and the con-
trast between the city (kota) and the hinterland (hutan, lit-
erally forest or jungle) is striking. But the designation of Ujung
Pandang as a major growth center and regional capital for all
of eastern Indonesia suggests that South Sulawesi will become
more integrated and developed in the years ahead.
It is interesting to notice how much more developed and in-
tegrated Aceh seems now than ten years ago. In a comparable
study based on early 1970s data, Aceh seemed rather poorly
integrated, with low rankings and negative scores on both the
interaction and economic dimensions. 21 Now, although it still
has negative scores on both major economic factors, it has
positive scores on both interaction factors and, in addition,
totally dominates the third economic factor, with its highest per-
capita economic growth rate and foreign investment rate. It
appears that real progress has been made both in developing
Aceh’s economic resources and in integrating this province,
with its peripheral position, its fanatical Muslim character, and
its history of continuous rebellion against any outside power,
whether Dutch or Javanese, into the national whole.
Fourth, five provinces stand out as least integrated and
least economically developed, having generally low rankings
on almost all the major factors and ranking among the lowest
six on at least three of them. This group includes Bengkulu
and Lampung in Sumatra, Southeast Sulawesi, and West and
East Nusatenggara. It is the last two provinces, however, that
emerge as by far the least integrated and developed in the
country: they have negative scores on all six major factors;
indeed, East Nusatenggara ranks last on one major factor in
each dimension. The two Nusatenggara provinces have the
lowest regional gross domestic product per capita in the
country by far and the fewest natural resources. In addition,
East Nusatenggara is the least urbanized of all the provinces
(with only 7.5 percent of its population being classified as
urban). Together these two provinces stand out as the most
underdeveloped and most neglected of all the provinces of In-
donesia.
In addition to the four groups of provinces discussed thus far
are two provinces excluded from the statistical analysis: East
Timor because of lack of comparable data and Jakarta because
of its overwhelming primacy.
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East Timor was forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1976 and,
almost inevitably, is still poorly integrated into the national
whole. Problems of neglect and lack of development by the
former Portuguese colonial power are being attacked by In-
donesian government investment in developing the infra-
structure and economic base of the province, 22 but East Timor
is poor in natural resources and will continue to be a drain
on the national economy. As to be expected, residents of East
Timor have by far the lowest knowledge of the Indonesian lan-
guage (33 percent) and the lowest literacy rate (21 percent)
of any Indonesian province. East Timor therefore joins West
and East Nusatenggara as the least integrated and most un-
derdeveloped of Indonesia’s provinces. In addition, continued
Timorese resistance to Indonesian control and the fact that
a military presence is still required to control the province
indicate lack of genuine integration, despite the efforts of the
Indonesian government to incorporate East Timor more fully
into the country through development and firmer structural
linkages.
In contrast to all the other provinces is the Special District
of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Istimewa). It is not technically a
province, although it functions as a separate administrative unit
comparable to a province. As already discussed, Jakarta stands
out as unique, with its dominant core characteristics.
As might be expected, no simple spatial pattern of national
integration in Indonesia emerges from the analysis. The most
highly integrated and developed provinces on a per-capita basis
are spatially separated both from one another, and from the na-
tional capital of Jakarta. They include provinces in the northern
and western parts of the archipelago, and on three of the four
larger islands, Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. The
provinces that stand out most obviously as a distinct, more
homogeneous group, those of Java and Bali, form a compact
geographical bloc. The least integrated and least developed
provinces of West and East Nusatenggara, Bengkulu, Lampung,
and Southeast Sulawesi flank Java and Bali on the west and
east. Immediate proximity to the capital city, the true core of the
country, seems to have little impact on the level of integration.
Provinces closest to Jakarta—Lampung, Bengkulu, and Central
and South Kalimantan, as well as West and Central Java—are
not the most integrated and highly developed. Rather, they form
a broken circle of less integrated provinces separating those
provinces that are most integrated and developed on a per-
capita basis (North and South Sumatra, Riau, East Kalimantan,
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and North Sulawesi) from the national core of Jakarta. Distance
from the core, however, may contribute to the feelings of re-
moteness and estrangement experienced in Aceh, Irian Jaya,
East Nusatenggara, and East Timor.
Indonesia’s pattern of integration, therefore, is uneven. It
does not show the more regular decline in cohesion with in-
creasing distance from the core that is characteristic of most
developing countries. Rather, the level of integration in In-
donesia declines at first with distance from the core in the
provinces nearest to it, but then peaks in the more developed
and prosperous provinces beyond the less integrated group,
before declining again toward the remote boundaries of the
country. The complexity of this pattern is not surprising, given
the size and archipelagic character of Indonesia, with its geo-
graphic, demographic, and economic diversity.
This refined understanding of the spatial pattern of national
integration in Indonesia has major implications for the country,
both for its continued progress in integration as a nation-state
and for its direction in economic development.
The weak integrative links of some of the provinces detract
from the overall strength of the country and pose a potential
threat to the continued unity of the nation-state. This is partic-
ularly so when such provinces have peripheral locations and/
or greater economic strength than the nation as a whole. Aceh,
Irian Jaya, and West Kalimantan are among those that seem
most vulnerable in this respect. Similarly, provinces that are
poorly developed from an economic perspective weaken the
entire country’s economy. West and East Nusatenggara and
East Timor are obvious examples here.
For some provinces (such as Irian Jaya, East Java, and South
Sulawesi) the predominant need is for stronger sociocultural
bonds through increased literacy, use of the Indonesian lan-
guage, and basic education. For others (including West Sumatra
and Central Kalimantan) the most important need is to increase
spatial linkages or interaction, not only with the capital city but
with other provinces as well. Many provinces need increased
economic development. Several provinces need increased at-
tention in two of the three major dimensions: West Kalimantan,
Jambi, Bengkulu, and Southeast Sulawesi in both the sociocul-
tural and interaction areas of integration; Lampung and Central
Sulawesi in both the interaction and economic spheres; and
Bali in both the sociocultural and economic dimensions. West
and East Nusatenggara stand out as urgently requiring devel-
opment in all three major dimensions.
Spatial Patterns
210
Indonesia’s leaders have long been aware of the challenges
of the country’s size, complexity, and uneven development and
have sought in a variety of ways to weld the country into a
more cohesive unit. The next chapter analyzes and attempts to
evaluate the various policies that have been followed to meet
this goal.
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Government Response to the
Need for National
Integration
THE problems of Indonesia’s great diversity and uneven devel-
opment were recognized by Indonesia’s leaders long before the
country proclaimed its independence in 1945. From the earliest
stirrings of nationalism in preindependence days to the present,
Indonesia’s leaders have sought continually to counteract the
potentially divisive threat of the differences existing within the
far-flung islands of the archipelago by seeking to bind together
the various regions and peoples into a better-functioning and
more mutually interdependent whole. Methods and emphases
have changed over the years, but the goal has consistently been
to promote greater national integration.
In preindependence Indonesia, it was not until the early
twentieth century that Indonesians began to develop a national
awareness and feeling of national unity. Although nationalism
was limited at first to a small group of educated upper-class In-
donesians, it gradually spread throughout much of the archi-
pelago, helped by various nationalist organizations such as Budi
Utomo, the Muhammadiyah, and Perhimpunan Indonesia. The
role of the united youth congresses in 1926 and 1928 in pro-
pounding the concept of one people and one country and in
gaining acceptance for the idea of one national language, a na-
tional flag, and a national anthem has already been discussed
(see chapter 2).
Under Sukarno, during the Orde Lama days, government
policies toward national integration varied. At first, during the
revolutionary struggle against the Dutch (1945–1949), there
was an emphasis on symbolism and political solutions for the
problems caused by the lack of cohesion. In 1950 the political
system was changed from a weak federal system to a stronger,
more centralized unitary state. Then, between 1950 and 1957,
during the period of parliamentary democracy, policies focused
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more on promoting economic stabilization, internal consolida-
tion, and rational development. Efforts were made to preserve
a balance among the different ideas of the various peoples
and political parties. However, after 1957 and the imposition
of the authoritarian Guided Democracy political system, the
government pursued national integration particularly through
emotive political and sociocultural policies. Sukarno sought to
raise nationalist, patriotic emotions through perpetuating the
revolution against Indonesia’s perceived enemies of continued
imperialism and capitalism. 1 He believed that the cause of na-
tional integration was best served by keeping up the revolu-
tionary spirit and momentum, by infusing the whole people with
a common national symbolism, by moving civil servants around
within the country, by promoting “Indonesian” ways of doing
things, and by developing national pride and worldwide recog-
nition through conspicuous foreign policy moves.
But through promoting national cohesion and unity at the
emotional level, and in the political and sociocultural dimen-
sions only, Sukarno ignored the reality of people’s other deeply
felt needs and thus in some ways exacerbated divisions within
the country. Some of the dissatisfaction found expression in the
twenty-one regional revolts that Indonesia experienced during
its first twenty years as an independent nation. 2 Needs not
met included those of economic development, improved stan-
dards of living, increased infrastructure within, and interaction
and trade among, the provinces, and the extension of social
benefits to a larger proportion of the population. Valuable re-
sources urgently needed for development were used instead on
noneconomic and prestige projects, on elaborate and expensive
presidential world tours, and on adventuristic foreign policy
ploys, such as the Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia.
The New Order government of President Suharto that came
to power after the abortive communist coup of 1965 thus in-
herited a country with a low level of national integration. Since
then, national integration, national stability, and economic de-
velopment have been its major goals. The government has at-
tempted to pay close attention to all the different essential di-
mensions of national integration and to achieve a better balance
among them. Many of the government’s efforts to promote na-
tional integration have already been mentioned in the chapters
dealing with the separate dimensions of integration. The
purpose of this chapter is to examine these in more detail and
to evaluate them.
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POLICIES RELATING TO THE SOCIOCULTURAL
DIMENSION
In the sociocultural dimension, the Suharto government has
sought to strengthen national identity and national unity by de-
veloping a truly national and nationwide culture that both tran-
scends and incorporates regional differences and overcomes
the disintegrative threats of modernization. 3
Major emphasis has been given to the promotion of the In-
donesian language, bahasa Indonesia. 4 It is the sole official lan-
guage of government, the medium of instruction beginning no
later than the third grade, and the dominant language of radio
and television. The government has also actively promoted lit-
eracy in Indonesian as a means of integrating the population.
The national education system, which was introduced in
1945, has been carefully crafted to further national cohesion.
All schools use centrally produced curricula and textbooks,
written in Indonesian, that intentionally promote national pride
and patriotism. To foster national unity, the curriculum at all
levels includes courses on the Panca Sila, Indonesia’s basic na-
tional philosophy. Indeed, critics have charged that at times
instruction on these matters tends toward indoctrination and
that the whole educational pattern in fact teaches intellectual
conformity, requiring mostly memorization, despite a theo-
retical commitment to the development of a scientific attitude,
a critical ability, and a willingness to solve problems. Similarly,
at the higher education level, despite official encouragement for
students to engage in creative thinking and national dialogue,
the government has taken a sharply repressive attitude toward
politically oriented student activism and has attempted to re-
strict student activities to scholarly societies. 5
The governments of Indonesia have consistently sought to
expand education at all levels throughout the archipelago and
to reduce the regionally unequal educational opportunities in-
herited from Dutch colonial days (when educational facilities
were highly concentrated in Java). Universal education is re-
garded as an end in itself as well as a means to improve living
standards and the productivity of people and to unify the nation.
Impressive steps have been taken to provide greater opportu-
nities for education, particularly at the primary level, where at-
tendance is now compulsory. Tens of thousands of new schools
and classrooms have been built and hundreds of thousands
of new teachers trained, with the result that the government
now claims that almost every child of elementary school age
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is enrolled in school. 6 Although the government’s estimates
are almost certainly overoptimistic, 7 it is clear that both the
numbers and the percentages of school-age children in ele-
mentary school have increased substantially. This is also true at
the secondary level. 8 However, disparities among the regions
are still considerable, with much higher proportions of primary-
school graduates able to find a place at lower secondary schools
in Jakarta than in the Outer Islands (and especially in West
Nusatenggara). Wide variations in test scores indicate also that
a higher quality of education is available in Jakarta than in
eastern Indonesia (where the average test scores in 1980 were
44 percent lower on a test administered nationally to ninth
graders). 9
The geography of higher education is a simple extension of
these disparities. Despite the establishment of government uni-
versities in the capital city of every province, most of the public
universities and almost all private universities are in Java, and
the quality of teaching is higher there too.
But recently, major efforts have been made to increase both
the availability and quality of higher education. The percentage
of nineteen to twenty-four year olds going on for higher edu-
cation reportedly doubled between 1979–1980 and 1984–1985,
from 2.5 percent to 5.1 percent. 10 In 1984 the government es-
tablished an open university (Universitas Ter buka), with an
initial enrollment of 66,000 students, in a further attempt to
spread higher education into the more inaccessible parts of the
archipelago, as well as to make it available to more of the over
400,000 applicants for university (of whom only 70,000 were ac-
cepted at the forty-three public universities in 1984). 11 The na-
tionwide radio and television networks are also being used as
part of this outreach.
In another attempt to bring equity of access to quality
teachers to all regions of the country, especially the less-de-
veloped areas, twelve universities in the eastern part of the
country have been linked to the agricultural university in Bogor
via satellite in the new Indonesian Distance Education Satellite
System (Indess). 12 In an earlier overhaul of the universities,
policies were adopted to raise standards, improve efficiency,
and standardize the subject credit system so that students could
transfer credits from one institution to another. 13 The tradi-
tional system of university senates electing their own rectors
and deans was replaced by direct presidential appointments.
Part of the purpose behind many of these reforms has been to
integrate as well as to upgrade the national education system.
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Official government policy toward the religious diversity
within the country has been consciously integrative. Although
88 percent of the population is at least nominally Muslim, the
government has tried assiduously to be inclusive rather than ex-
clusive in its public policies. It has done this by stressing Panca
Sila as the state philosophy, thereby giving equal recognition to
all the major religions and attempting to incorporate and unite
peoples of very different persuasions and cultures under the
first sila, which affirms belief in one Supreme Being. Panca Sila
has been emphasized also as a way of undercutting the strength
of Islamic organizations.
Since the overthrow and total discrediting of the Communist
party in 1965, the greatest perceived threat to the unity of the
country has been from the more fanatical Muslim groups, es-
pecially in the light of the recent resurgence of Islam in the
Middle East. The government has sought, therefore, to reduce
the power and influence of Muslims within the country, and to
depoliticize Islam by separating the political aspect of Islam
from the religious and social, discouraging the former while
claiming to encourage the latter. 14 It has strenuously resisted
Muslim pressure for an Islamic state. Government checks on
Muslim missionary activity (dakwah) have been imposed in an
effort to assuage feelings of anxiety among many religiously
concerned Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists, who
feel threatened by the very visible and much-felt dominance of
the Islamic majority. 15 The traditional link between the long
school holidays and the annual Islamic fasting month of Ra-
madan has been cut despite vigorous Muslim opposition. And
the government (dominated as it is by Javanese Muslims who
practice a syncretic, Javanese spiritualism, based on earlier
Hindu-Buddhist beliefs, known as kebatinan) has redefined Ja-
vanese mysticism as keper cayaan terhadap Tuhan yang Maha
Esa (belief in One Supreme Being), thus qualifying it for in-
clusion under the first sila of the Panca Sila. To practice ke-
batinan is thus officially to uphold the Panca Sila. 16 Since 1974
the government has encouraged a series of dialogues at local
and national levels among leaders of all five official religions to
reduce conflict among them. A Religious Consultative Body of
the five official religions has been established to promote social
harmony (kerukunan) and tolerance both within and among the
different religions in this pluralistic society.
Yet the government has also made concessions to the
Muslim community. It has restricted the missionary activity
of other religious groups (particularly Christian) by requiring
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that religious propagation be directed only at persons not al-
ready professing faith in one of the five official religions. It
has subsidized the building of mosques and religious schools
and the establishment and operation of Muslim educational as
well as social organizations. 17 It has even pursued a deliberate
Islamization policy in the provinces of Irian Jaya and East Timor,
where the indigenous population is overwhelmingly Christian,
by constructing mosques in the centers of all-Christian villages.
In response to Muslim criticism, the government has also
banned all gambling as mentally and morally destructive to so-
ciety and contrary to the religious tenets included in the Panca
Sila. 18
Politically, Islam has been on the defensive in Indonesia ever
since independence. In the wording of the constitution and its
preamble, Muslim pressure was rejected when the phrase “with
the obligation of Muslims to practice the shariah (Islamic law)”
was omitted in the Jakarta Charter. More recently, during the
New Order regime, Muslims lost in their bid to revise the mar-
riage laws to require all Muslims, including nominal ones, to
be married in Islamic ceremonies. In the simplification of the
political party system after the 1971 elections, the New Order
government forced several Muslim political parties to merge
and become the Development Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Pem
bangunan, PPP), deliberately rejecting any reference to Islam
in the PPP’s name. 19 In 1983 the government even went so far
as to force this Muslim political party, as well as all other re-
ligious, social, and political organizations, to accept the Panca
Sila as their sole ideological basis. This has been a particularly
difficult issue for Islamic groups, whose faith enjoins them to
implement their religion in their public as well as their private
lives. But in compliance with government demands, Islam is
now no longer openly the ideological foundation of the PPP; as
a result, it has lost some of its attraction as a vehicle for chan-
neling Indonesia’s Muslim aspirations. 20
This move has been seen by some as unnecessarily
provocative and divisive, causing a growing cleavage between
institutionalized Islam, led largely by well-to-do Muslims in the
towns and countryside, and the increasing numbers of more
radical Muslims, who regard the Panca Sila policy as blatantly
anti-Islamic and the regime as fundamentally hostile to Islam.
The government has also been criticized for perpetuating the
status quo by stressing unity and harmony over social change
and mobilization, and for concentrating too much power in
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the state bureaucracy, thus threatening the autonomy of social
organizations and some personal freedoms. 21 Indeed, as
Awanohara has expressed it:
The great stress on Pancasila underlines the government’s ex-
treme concern for security and stability in a country where na-
tional unity is still fragile. However, the irony is that the Pan-
casila-as-the-single-principle policy, which is meant to consolidate
national unity by eliminating all conflicts based on ideological dif-
ferences, because of the way it has been so forcibly pushed, runs
the risk of provoking a backlash that could threaten the very unity
it has set out to achieve. 22
Friction has also arisen over the government’s banning of
the kerudung (veil) and jilbab (women’s headdress) in state-run
schools.
Despite government pressure and determination that Islam
should be developed and practiced only in the context of In-
donesia’s national culture (and despite the spread of Chris-
tianity in some areas, the government’s encouragement of Ja-
vanese spiritualism, and the general wave of secularization ac-
companying economic development), Islam as a religion has
been gaining strength. It has permeated the secular schools,
government offices, and even the military. Nearly every major
building has a prayer hall or prayer room, and mosques have
sprung up everywhere. At universities mosques have become
centers of Islamic activity, organizing both daily prayers and
social work. Over 80,000 pilgrims a year make the hajj, and
more are paying the zakat tax for the benefit of the poor. 23 The
Islamic revival is reportedly creating groups of religious funda-
mentalists and political radicals, although these are a small mi-
nority; for there has always been considerable diversity within
Islam. Not only is there a difference between traditional,
nominal abangan and devout santri, but there is a significant
gap between fundamentalists and moderates, between those
who believe it is impossible to separate religion from politics
or any other aspect of life, and those who support the depoliti-
cization of Islam, believing that a pragmatic differentiation be-
tween religion and politics is necessary for Indonesia to cope
with the demands of modern times. 24
The Panca Sila, as the basic, integrative national philosophy,
has been promoted increasingly in a variety of different gov-
ernment strategies and policies. The government has estab-
lished an institute to interpret and teach Panca Sila. In 1978 it
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began a series of courses for all Indonesian citizens, beginning
with civil servants, known as the P-4 courses (a contraction
of the Indonesian term Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan
Panca Sila, meaning a Guide to the Comprehension and Practice
of Panca Sila). Under this program, approved by the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR), up to two million civil servants
(including all below the rank of cabinet minister) have been
required to attend two-week upgrading courses, organized
throughout the archipelago, whose purpose has been solely to
examine and understand Panca Sila within the framework of
the New Order. As an official in the program expressed it, “the
purpose of the program is to unite the nation behind a sound
ideology that all will enthusiastically embrace.” 25 The courses
have since been extended to the universities and high schools,
to religious leaders, and to other groups.
In the P-4 courses, Panca Sila has been explained as a tradi-
tional philosophy of life, the articulation of the historical expe-
rience of the Indonesian people, and something already existing
within the people rather than imposed upon them from outside
(in a deliberate attempt to dissociate the P-4 courses from the
indoktrinasi that took place under Sukarno during the Guided
Democracy period). It has emphasized the unity and cohesion
of society rather than new directions or changes in the social
order (and as such has been criticized for being an extraordi-
narily static ideology, long on rhetoric and sentiment but short
on specific prescriptions). 26
Inevitably, the costs associated with the implementation of
the P-4 courses have been considerable, both directly in pro-
viding the facilities and instructors for the large numbers re-
quired to attend and indirectly in the vast amount of time
lost from carrying out regular government, teaching, or other
business. Yet the fact that these costs are considered worth-
while demonstrates the seriousness with which the New Order
government sees P-4 as providing an important justification for
its policies and its ongoing emphasis on national unity. 27
Besides language, education, religion, and philosophy of
state, the Indonesian government has pursued integrative
policies in other sociocultural fields as well. Yet its policy toward
the Chinese minority (which numbers about 3.8 million out of
a total of 165 million, about 2.3 percent of Indonesia’s popu-
lation) has been somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand the
government has brought pressure to bear on the Chinese to
become Indonesian citizens, change their names, and be assim-
ilated. It has liberalized the nationalization law and reduced
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the waiting time for citizenship. In 1979, to “help develop In-
donesian culture and nurture unity among the people,” 28 the
government banned the import, sale, and distribution of any
literature printed in Chinese characters, although it has been
suggested that the read goal of the decree was for all Chinese
Indonesians to lose their command of the Chinese language. 29
The government has also tried to protect Chinese enterprises,
businesses, and people when anti-Chinese riots have broken
out, as they have periodically.
However, on the other hand, the Chinese continue to face
both official and unofficial discrimination. In 1979 the ethnic
Chinese were required to be registered again and later were
issued identity cards marked by a special code to distinguish
them from pribumi (indigenous Indonesians). 30 A presidential
decree (Keppres 14A/1980) provided for preferential treatment
for economically weak pribumi firms and local businesses in
the selection of contractors for certain government projects, 31
and a number of additional stipulations were aimed at providing
the “economically weak groups” with more facilities to enable
them to compete with the “economically strong group” (i.e., the
Chinese). Even though Suharto argued that this policy of up-
grading the economically weak groups was not a form of racial
discrimination but was intended to achieve “equity in distrib-
ution,” 32 it is dubious how many Chinese saw it as such. As
Arndt has put it:
The problem in Indonesia has been how to strengthen the weaker
economic groups of pribumis vis-à-vis the Chinese with their su-
perior business skills and resources, and how meanwhile to retain
the indispensable contribution of the Chinese to the nation’s com-
mercial life while preventing communal tensions from erupting
into open friction. 33
With ambivalent government support, the Chinese continue
to be hated and resented, particularly by young, under- or un-
employed pribumi. The Javanese have long held the view that
the Chinese are culturally and economically arrogant. Most
Indonesians feel especially bitter toward the Chinese busi-
nessmen who finance and manage the business concerns of
the pribumi government and military officials and amass unac-
ceptably great wealth to the detriment of the ordinary citizens
of the country. The close ties between the presidential family
and the wealthy Chinese tycoon, Liem Sioe Liong, are deeply re-
sented.
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In other policies relating to the sociocultural dimension of
integration, the government has encouraged a variety of or-
ganizations and programs to spread nationwide, transcending
regional and provincial boundaries. These include scouts, agri-
cultural cooperatives, and village social associations. Major ef-
forts have been made to expand both the availability and quality
of health care by increasing immunizations, building new com-
munity health centers and subcenters, increasing the number of
health professionals including both doctors and paramedics, ex-
panding the family planning program, and so on. In the arts, the
government has encouraged local artistic expression through
the establishment of increasing numbers of art centers and tra-
ditional arts groups and the documentation of regional intel-
lectual and ceremonial traditions. The goal has been to create a
new and vibrant Indonesian culture, incorporating diverse local,
traditional elements while nurturing regional cultures and up-
holding regional traditions. Policies have also been established
to guide the national culture to cope with the “influence of
negative foreign culture” while absorbing those positive alien
values that are needed for development. 34 The government has
even set up an Institute for the Advancement of National Unity
(Badan Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa).
Thus despite the difficulties, problems, and continued short-
comings, much has been accomplished in the sociocultural di-
mension of national integration in welding the very diverse and
geographically scattered peoples of the archipelago into one
nation, and in giving them the sense of a shared historical her-
itage and national pride, a feeling of participation in one na-
tional culture, and a common Indonesian identity.
POLICIES RELATING TO THE INTERACTION
DIMENSION
Great efforts have been made, particularly since 1967, to im-
prove the transportation network and communications systems
in an attempt to integrate the country more effectively. The
results have been spectacular. As discussed in chapter 4, in-
dependent Indonesia inherited an uneven and inadequate in-
frastructure from the Dutch, one geared more to the needs of
a colonial regime than to those of a new nation-state. Even
the limited infrastructure that existed was badly neglected in
the early years of independence, because of the Sukarno gov-
ernment’s primary concern with symbolism and political inte-
National Integration in Indonesia
221
gration rather than with economic development. It was not until
1967 that attention seriously began to be paid to the need to im-
prove the transportation and communications systems.
In the light of this history, the New Order government has
made impressive strides in improving and integrating the
country’s transportation system. Thousands of kilometers of In-
donesia’s roads have been rehabilitated and upgraded, and the
road network has been substantially expanded. A number of
World Bank loans and loans from the United States, Australia,
and the Asian Development Bank have helped in the con-
struction of the trans-Sumatra highway, the trans-Sulawesi
highway, road projects in Kalimantan, and the beginning of a
new trans-Irian highway parallel to the Irian Jaya-Papua New
Guinea border. Several new toll roads have been built and major
highways in Java improved and repaired. Many bridges have
been replaced and there has been a steady upgrading of rural
and rural-to-urban roads. City roads with heavy traffic are con-
tinually being upgraded and new bypasses constructed, and
ferry crossings have been made more frequent and efficient.
The intention has been to improve transportation while reduc-
ing costs and to promote economic activity, as well as to im-
prove the integration of areas thus linked together.
Some of the success of the improved road-building program
can be seen in the large increase in the number of vehicles
in the country. The number of buses increased from 20,000 to
160,000 in the 1969–1983 period (an average annual growth
rate of 16 percent), while passenger vehicles increased at an 11
percent average annual rate, from 212,000 to 870,000, during
the same period. 35 Particularly important, too, has been the
great increase in the number of minibuses, pickups, and small
trucks plying short-distance local routes, integrating villages,
towns, and cities. Indeed, a virtual revolution seems to have
occurred, at least in Java. For whereas fifteen years ago there
was still some substance in the stereotype of villagers who had
never visited their neighboring town, now in many villages most
people under forty have spent at least some time working in the
city and have brought back with them a much more dynamic
outlook to the village when they returned. 36 The psychological
distance between village and city has been shortened dramati-
cally. The improved and better-integrated transportation system
(and particularly the quick, cheap, and frequent bus service be-
tween cities) has led to greater labor mobility, with the result
that workers now move much more freely and spontaneously
from low-to high-wage employment; so much is this true that
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there were signs in rural Java of an emerging labor shortage
in early 1982 (despite a population of over ninety million in
an area approximately the size of New York State) as villagers
moved to obtain higher-paying construction and other work in
cities both in Java and in the Outer Islands. And this increase
in labor mobility is not restricted to Java, but is apparent
throughout the entire archipelago, extending even as far as
Irian Java. 37
Railroad transportation also has been improved and mod-
ernized. One of the goals of the fourth Five-Year Development
Plan (Repelita IV) is to make rail travel inexpensive, fast, and
safe by improving management, rehabilitating and recon-
structing railroad tracks and bridges, and adding and rehabili-
tating passenger coaches, freight cars, and locomotives. Plans
to upgrade and extend the rail network beyond the existing
6,700 kilometers of rail track began to be carried out in 1981.
38
Lake and river transportation has also been given attention
as an integral part of the surface transport network. Attempts
have been made to expand facilities and make them more effi-
cient.
Improved transportation has also been achieved at sea.
Major efforts have been made to modernize, expand, and im-
prove the efficiency and capabilities of the interisland and local
fleets, as well as to improve ferry crossings and shipyard, dock,
and port facilities. 39 The capacities of both the national in-
terisland merchant fleet and the local fleet increased by an
average of 7 percent a year between 1969 and 1982, while ton-
nage increased by 20 percent annually on ocean vessels and 6
percent on local over the same time period. 40 Passenger traffic
likewise has risen enormously. Recent government efforts have
focused on increasing efficiency and productivity at the ports by
reducing overregulation and corruption, by simplifying admin-
istrative procedures, by rationalizing harbor handling and an-
chorage fees, and by reforming the corruption-ridden customs
system. 41 An Inpres (Instruksi Presiden) Decree of April 1985
abolished the protection previously received by domestic ocean
shipping companies by opening up a large number of ports to
foreign vessels. 42
Yet despite all the attention devoted by the government
to interisland shipping, its performance still falls well below
that of the early 1950s, when the Dutch-owned Koninklijke
Paketvaart Maatschappij maintained very efficiently a compre-
hensive network of services that was closely integrated through
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transshipment with the deep-sea lines. 43 Indeed, Dick argues
that the improvements in interisland shipping have come about
in spite of, rather than because of, government policies. He
claims that it has been competition leading to better organi-
zation in the use of space and in traffic flow rather than physical
upgrading that has led to improved shipping, and that gov-
ernment regulations have tended not to promote but to retard
this process (as, for example, the compulsory scrapping of ships
more than twenty-five years old and the restrictions on im-
porting new and secondhand ships). 44 The regulatory system
has tended also to discourage the more efficient firms from ex-
panding, while helping the least efficient to stay in business.
However, as Dick acknowledges, this is not entirely the fault
of the government, as the Shipowners’ Association has consis-
tently lobbied for the “rights” of the weak (generally pribumi
companies) while giving no support to the further expansion of
the strong (often non-pribumi companies). 45
The fourth Five-Year Development Plan proposes improve-
ments for four gateway ports (Jakarta, Surabaya, Ujung
Pandang, and Belawan) to replace transshipment via Singapore,
fourteen collector ports, and twenty-five distributor ports. Port
facilities are to be rehabilitated through the construction of new
berths and storage facilities, the procurement of equipment
for cargo handling and storage, dredging of the harbors, and
dockyard rehabilitation. 46 The plan aims at increasing the total
capacity of vessels in the interisland and local shipping fleets,
the traditional sailing fleets, and the vessels serving remote
communities and outlying islands.
The government continues to support and subsidize pioneer
transport services to serve areas that are not attractive to com-
mercial carriers. The pioneer fleet, which was designed to assist
farmers on isolated islands in marketing their produce and in
buying essential goods, serves about 175 small ports. 47
There has also been an impressive expansion of air traffic,
particularly over the past eighteen years. Beginning with a
broken-down fleet of thirty-five aircraft in 1968, the major gov-
ernment airline, Garuda, has more than doubled and substan-
tially upgraded the number and size of its aircraft, 48 and other
internal airlines have expanded as well. New airports have
been constructed and older airports and airstrips improved.
Passenger and freight volume on domestic routes has increased
at annual average rates of 20 and 23 percent, respectively, be-
Government Response to the Need for National Integration
224
tween 1969 and 1982. 49 Pioneer routes to outlying regions that
offer very few passengers are subsidized by the government in
the interests of national integration.
An enormous investment in the interisland communications
network has been made by a government very conscious of the
vital role of mass communications in integrating a nation of
such great diversity and widespread geographical distribution.
Perhaps most important has been the domestic satellite com-
munications system, Palapa, first launched in 1976 and now
in its second generation of satellites (the Palapa B satellites).
This has revolutionized Indonesia’s telex, radio, television, and
facsimile-and data-transmission services. Among other advan-
tages, the system permits direct telephone dialing to any major
city in Indonesia and has made telephone communication with
isolated areas possible also. A multichannel microwave system
supplements the domestic satellite communications system with
its forty earth stations. Long-distance domestic telephone calls
increased at an annual rate of 6 percent between 1969 and
1983, while local telephone calls increased at an astonishing 33
percent annual rate. 50 During Repelita III‚ 232,000 automatic
telephone lines were added to the system, and the number of
telephone lines available to business and residential users is ex-
pected to double during Repelita IV as the state-owned tele-
phone utility, Perumtel, installs some 750,000 additional lines.
Modern digital switching exchanges, over 16,000 additional
telex lines, and 100 small earth-satellite communication sta-
tions are also planned for the 1984–1989 five-year development
period. 51 Domestic telexes increased at a 35 percent annual
rate between 1969 and 1983.
It has been especially through the expansion of television,
however, that the government has sought to promote national
unity; an understanding and appreciation of Indonesia’s diverse
cultures; and pride in its national cultural, economic, and ath-
letic achievements. It has worked to develop a truly national
culture, to integrate the entire archipelago, and to inspire and
encourage national development. The geographical area
covered by television broadcasting more than quintupled be-
tween 1975 and 1984, reaching an estimated audience of
ninety-six million people in 1984 (up from forty million in 1975).
52 In addition, the number of television sets increased from
410,000 in 1975 to 5,343,000 in 1984, while the number of
transmission stations grew from twenty-three to 200 during the
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same time period. Thirty-eight thousand public television sets
have been placed in villages in an attempt to achieve greater
evenness in information distribution. 53
Radio broadcasting by Radio Republik Indonesia has
likewise been extended both geographically, with the increase
in the number of radio transmitters, and in the number of
broadcast hours per day. One recent development has been the
great increase in the use of ham radios (by an estimated one
million amateur radio operators). In some provinces (such as
Bali), the number of transmitters is thought easily to exceed
the number of telephone lines. 54 The potential of radio broad-
casting for increasing national integration and its effect on the
national identity could be enormous.
The value of the satellite communications system in inte-
grating the country was demonstrated convincingly during the
1982 elections, when television coverage from all over the arch-
ipelago was able to “drive home to many Indonesians that they
had just participated in a great national undertaking.” It also
enabled the votes to be counted more quickly than in past elec-
tions. 55
Postal services have been expanded to cover all of In-
donesia’s regions, including remote villages and new transmi-
gration settlements. Eight hundred new post offices are planned
to be established during Repelita IV, enabling 58,028 of the
country’s 65,000 villages to benefit from regular postal service.
Thus, great progress has been and is being made to inte-
grate the country in terms of improved transportation and com-
munications systems.
POLICIES RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC
DIMENSION
It is probably in the economic field, however, that the greatest
threats to national integration occur. For it is the gap between
the rich and the poor, the problems of unemployment and un-
deremployment particularly in the cities, the contrast between
cities and rural areas, and the unequal standards of living and
inequality of opportunity among provinces that provoke the
greatest dissatisfaction and unrest. Even the ethnic problem be-
tween the Chinese and pribumi Indonesians is largely an eco-
nomic one.
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Economic disparities among the provinces exist partly be-
cause of the uneven spatial distribution of the resource base,
but partly too because of very uneven treatment by the gov-
ernment both during the colonial era and in the early years of
independence. By the beginning of the Suharto era in the late
1960s, therefore, there were already strong regional inequal-
ities and contrasts among the provinces, as already demon-
strated in the previous two chapters. Only then did attention
seriously begin to be paid to national economic planning and
development. Indeed, it has been one of the major premises
of the Suharto government that economic development and
growing prosperity promote national integration and blunt
friction among the different ethnic groups within the country. 56
Even though the Suharto government recognized these re-
gional disparities as being important, the first Five-Year De-
velopment Plan (1969–1974) focused upon the reestablishment
of political and economic stability. 57 It emphasized economic
growth, rather than equality, to secure the main needs of society
and to reestablish the country’s economic credibility. An im-
pressive 8.4 percent annual growth rate during Repelita I was
indeed attained, but the Plan’s stress was upon strictly sectoral
planning. 58 Consequently, the greatest growth occurred in
those provinces already well endowed with infrastructure or
already experiencing growth. In addition, economic protection
given to the modern sector, to medium-and large-scale enter-
prises, resulted not in phasing out the dual structure of the
economy, but instead in reinforcing the dichotomy between
urban and rural labor markets. It also created a new dualism
between the formal and informal sectors, particularly in urban
areas. 59 The cost of economic growth during the first Five-Year
Development Plan was, therefore, a further increase in the eco-
nomic disparities among both peoples and regions.
Part of the purpose of Repelita II (1974–1979), 60 therefore,
was to confront the unequal rates of development between
rich and poor provinces, and to “raise the living standards of
the whole people.” 61 This plan sought to widen opportunities
for employment and achieve a more equitable distribution of
income. 62 It emphasized regional development and set out to
achieve a balance between regional and sectoral growth by in-
cluding regional targets in the planning activities of each of
the central government’s sectoral ministries. It contained goals
in five basic areas: (1) to reap the highest possible benefits
from the potentials of the different regions, both from the na-
tional development point of view and from that of the indi-
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vidual region; (2) to harmonize the rate of growth among the
provinces and to improve conditions in the poorest provinces
by allocating at least a proportion of all development activity to
them; (3) to help provincial governments solve their large-scale
provincial problems; (4) to encourage regional development
through the establishment of provincial planning boards (Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah [Bappeda]); and (5) to inte-
grate the Indonesian economy into one economic unit. 63
To achieve these goals, the country was divided into a hier-
archy of development regions, each with its prospective growth
centers: four major regional metropolises, ten regional devel-
opment centers, and eighty-eight smaller subcenters (see
Figure 7.1). 64
Theoretically, attention has been given all along to the goal
of economic equity, from the earliest days of Indonesia’s in-
dependence. The fifth sila of the Panca Sila speaks of social
justice for all the people of Indonesia. It was not until the third
Five-Year Development Plan (1979–1984), however, that equity
was placed first in the trilogy of Indonesia’s interrelated devel-
opment goals: equity or spreading the benefits of development
(pemerataan), a reasonably high economic growth rate, and
healthy and dynamic national stability. 65 Major emphasis was
placed on attaining greater equality in eight areas of socioeco-
nomic development: meeting basic needs; providing more equal
opportunities in obtaining education and health care; obtaining
more equal distribution of income, with special attention to the
lowest income groups; the creation of more employment oppor-
tunities with high priority on employment-generating and labor-
intensive projects; more equality in business opportunities, es-
pecially for the economically weak groups; more equal opportu-
nities to participate in the development process, especially for
youth and women; more equitable distribution of development
activities throughout all the regions of Indonesia; and more
equal opportunity of obtaining justice before the law. 66
The government’s commitment to greater equity in eco-
nomic development has been constantly reiterated in official
pronouncements. In his 1981 Independence Day speech, Pres-
ident Suharto stressed the New Order’s determination to “en-
hance the material and spiritual wellbeing through efforts that
give priority to the equitable distribution of development gains
leading towards the creation of social justice.” 67 The Broad Out-
lines of State Policy (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara) adopted
by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1983 directed
that the overriding goal of the fourth Five-Year Development
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Figure 7.1. Development regions and growth centers in Indonesia.
Plan (1984–1989) should be to raise the standards of living, in-
tellectual abilities, and general welfare of all the people. They
also stated that Repelita IV should create an environment that
provides every incentive and opportunity for all to participate
and perform fully and harmoniously in the national development
effort; that more emphasis should be given to equity in the de-
velopment trilogy, while at the same time ensuring that the
three elements of equity, economic growth, and national sta-
bility are in constant harmony and mutually reinforcing. 68 At
the fortieth anniversary celebrations of Indonesia’s indepen-
dence in 1985, President Suharto again confirmed his com-
mitment to distributional equity and recommended boosting the
development of outlying regions, spreading around infrastruc-
tural development projects, and stepping up transmigration. As
one critic put it, the government’s growing preoccupation with
the problem of equity stems from an awareness that staying
within the limits of tolerable inequities is a condition for main-
taining the momentum of development as well as for staying in
power. 69
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Various strategies have been tried to fulfill government
promises of greater equity in the fruits of development and thus
help the poor achieve some benefits from the economic growth
of the country. In the 1970s huge government subsidies on food
and fuel were established, and regulations were implemented to
control the prices of nine essential commodities (bahan pokok,
including rice, sugar, salt, kerosene, and fertilizer).
Policies have been formulated to try to synchronize the pace
of development in the regions. The relatively less-developed re-
gions have been encouraged to achieve higher rates of growth
in conformity with their potentialities, while equity has been
promoted within each region itself by having both central and
regional governments give special attention to isolated, less
fertile, and other problem areas. Efforts have been made to de-
velop greater transportation and communications links between
these least-developed regions and other, more prosperous
areas. Increased central government grants to the regions
through the Inpres (Instruksi Presiden) program have been
used for the development of infrastructure and the provision of
drinking water, health facilities, elementary schools, irrigation,
credit schemes to aid rural hawkers and others in the rural pop-
ulation, and other social services. There has been an emphasis
on job-creating public works programs and labor-intensive en-
terprises in both rural and urban areas. The government is
committed to a further expansion in public spending, which is
expected to lead to an increase in the demand for consumer
goods and in spending on labor-intensive programs. This in turn
should “directly improve the position of those sectors of the
population whose increases in income have lagged behind the
average in recent years and whose standards of living have re-
mained very low.” 70
But there is also recognition among government policy-
makers that economic equity has to be balanced with economic
growth, especially in a country with a fast-growing population
and in an era of rising expectations. In overall terms, Indonesia
has experienced an impressive rate of growth. Between 1969
and 1980 the economy grew at an average rate of 7.4 percent.
(Population grew during the same period at a rate of 2.3
percent, leaving an actual annual increase in the gross domestic
product of 5.1 percent.) 71 These solid gains resulted mainly
from increased OPEC oil prices and increased liquified natural
gas sales, but manufacturing production also rose impressively
during the 1970s, at an average rate of 12.3 percent. 72 Major ef-
forts to boost rice production have met with enormous success:
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Indonesia went from being the world’s largest importer of rice
in 1975 to self-sufficiency by 1985. 73 New technologies in many
sectors of the economy have raised productivity, as have
economies of scale (realized when larger factories produce
more items at a lower unit cost). 74 Electricity production in-
creased at an average annual rate of 17 percent between 1973
and 1984 (from 2,494 million to 13,296 million kilowatt-hours).
75 However, economic growth slowed in the early 1980s to less
than 5 percent per annum, thanks to the world recession, per-
sistent high interest rates, growing worldwide protectionism,
drought in the countryside, and the falling price of petroleum
(which still made up about 70 percent of Indonesia’s export
earnings at the beginning of 1985). 76
Manufacturing industry has been strongly encouraged by a
government that wants to lessen its dependence upon oil and
gas exports; indeed, government policies have met with consid-
erable success. Manufactured goods have increased from a tiny
2 percent of all exports at the beginning of the 1970s to an im-
pressive 17 percent in 1984. 77
However, it has been in the more capital-intensive rather
than in the labor-intensive industries that most growth has
taken place, even though it is the small-scale and household
or cottage industries that account for about 80 percent of the
total manufacturing employment. 78 Yet it is this very duality
that poses a dilemma for policy makers. Should effort and re-
sources be directed to labor-intensive, small-scale, and cot-
tage industries to increase employment and reduce poverty,
or should they be concentrated on medium and large firms in
the modern sector where labor productivity is much higher, to
promote greater economic growth? Unemployment and under-
employment affected approximately 26 percent of the formal
labor force in 1984. 79
Since 1969 there have been interesting changes in the gov-
ernment’s objectives for industrial development. Repelita I em-
phasized industries ancillary to agriculture; Repelita II empha-
sized social objectives, particularly employment and the pro-
tection of pribumi entrepreneurs. Broad-based industrial de-
velopment based on domestic oil, mineral, timber, and other
natural resources, and labor-intensive manufactures for export
were the focus of Repelita III; in the current plan, Repelita
IV, manufacturing is to take the place of the oil sector as the
main focus of growth, to provide a stronger and more diversified
base for economic development. The plan aims at further ex-
panding import substitution, increasing net foreign exchange
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earnings, and providing a substantial number of jobs for the
estimated 9.3 million workers who are expected to enter the
labor force over the next five years. 80 The goal is to promote
machinery, machine-tool, and export industries, especially those
that process raw materials into intermediate products with
higher value added. This, it is argued, would also help to correct
the regional imbalance of manufacturing industries, as most
of the raw materials are found in the Outer Islands (and so
far most of the manufacturing industries are in Java). Several
resource-based growth centers are thus expected to emerge
in the Outer Islands, based on oil and gas, wood, fertilizer,
and aluminum-smelting industries in North Sumatra; oil and
gas, coal, tin, forest, plantation products, petrochemicals, steel,
and cement industries in South Sumatra; oil and gas, petro-
chemicals, and forest-based industries in East Kalimantan; and
iron, nickel, paper, cement, and shipping industries in South
Sulawesi. 81 Repelita IV also recognizes the need for better in-
tegration of small, medium, and large industries, so that devel-
opment of medium and large industries will directly accelerate
the development of small ones. In addition, it should assist
small-scale industry in the Outer Islands to overcome problems
such as low productivity, intermittent employment, inadequate
financing, limited marketing, poor quality control, and other
management problems. 82
The recent rapid growth in manufactured exports illustrates
the government’s policy of export substitution in the plywood
and crumb-rubber industries (even though the net economic
benefits of this policy of regulated industrialization are small).
83 This, as expected, has decreased exports of unprocessed
timber and rubber.
New technologies have flooded into many sectors of the In-
donesian economy, raising productivity: Green-Revolution tech-
nology, with its emphasis on improved hybrid seeds and use of
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation, has affected rice
cultivation especially. Improved transportation and communica-
tions services, the increased availability of electric power, im-
provements in management and the numbers of skilled people,
and increased economies of scale have been other important
components. 84
But the government has not been concerned just with eco-
nomic growth. Rural development has been a major objective
since the beginning of the third Five-Year Development Plan.
It emphasized community participation in planning and imple-
menting rural development programs, and better village ad-
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ministration and coordination of development activities. An am-
bitious ten-year program to increase the plantation sector’s
level of earnings has focused on small-holder plantation devel-
opment, in keeping with the government’s priority of seeking a
wider geographical dispersion of development and a more equi-
table distribution of income. 85 The government has shifted to a
far greater reliance on incentives, extension, and local partici-
pation in the area of rice production than in the past. 86 Some
squatter farmers and shifting cultivators have been given title
to land and helped to produce export crops through the Nu-
cleus Estate Program, begun in 1977. Cooperatives have been
strongly encouraged, not only to distribute fertilizer and rice,
but to deal with all basic needs, including other small-holder
crops, kerosene, handicrafts, fisheries, shipping, and transport.
87 Electricity facilities have been extended to rural areas to
upgrade rural business enterprises and small-scale industries,
agriculture, and education. 88
Urban development has focused on specific growth centers;
small and medium-sized cities have been encouraged rather
than the growth of large cities. Indeed, Repelita IV aims at ac-
celerating the development of industrial growth centers and in-
dustrial zones, and at establishing centers for small industries
throughout the country to facilitate the growth of small-scale
manufacturing. Meanwhile a “Neighborhood Improvement
Program” has been directed at improving the quality of life of
lower-income groups in urban areas through the construction
of low-cost housing and the provision of social services such
as safe water supplies and health and educational services.
89 Investment outside Java has been particularly encouraged
through a mixture of incentive and disincentive measures as an-
other means of evening out development.
Decentralization of the development budget has been one
of the government’s most important tools in its new policy em-
phasis on equity. The Inpres Kabupaten scheme, inaugurated in
1970, and the provision of earmarked grants to the provinces
first began this trend of channeling development expenditures
through local governments rather than through central gov-
ernment departments. By the early 1980s there were eight
Inpres programs in operation: grants to provinces, kabupaten
(districts), and villages; grants for the construction of primary
school buildings, for health infrastructure, particularly clinics;
for road rehabilitation; and for reafforestation/regreening. 90
Grants to the provinces in 1981–1982 ranged from Rp ten billion
each for provinces in Java to Rp 7.5 billion each for provinces
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outside Java. Kabupaten development grants for construction of
infrastructure were based on population size; plans had to be
approved first by the provincial government, then by Bappenas
(the National Development Planning Agency). But the use of the
subsidies to the villages (Rp one million per village, of which at
least Rp 200,000 were designated for women’s activities) had to
be approved only by kabupaten officials and not by any higher
authorities. The result has been that more projects have been
accomplished more quickly, and regional government officials
have gained in both experience and skill.
Inpres grant procedures thus take account both of high pop-
ulation densities through per-capita grants and of low density
and poor infrastructure through proportionately larger in-
creases in provincial grants to provinces outside Java. 91 Re-
gional officials now administer ten times as much revenue as
they did ten years ago. And, in an attempt to overcome the lack
of technical skills at regional levels, detailed specifications, es-
pecially for buildings, have been provided by the central gov-
ernment. 92 Greater local participation in government contracts,
in contrast to previous heavy reliance on large national con-
tractors, has resulted from a series of regulations issued in
1979 as presidential decrees (Keputusan Presiden or Keppres).
Repelita IV promises a continuation of the Inpres funds to be
made available directly to provincial, district, and village au-
thorities, thereby allowing these bodies to continue to exercise
local judgment on development planning. It also calls for better
coordination among the disparate projects in the region and
among government agencies and argues for the strengthening
of the regional development planning bodies (Bappeda).
Other evidence of the government’s commitment to pemer-
ataan includes the establishment of a Directorate for Regional
Development. This Directorate has undertaken programs in
about half of Indonesia’s provinces to reach the rural poor
through credit, employment, industrial, and other activities; to
develop greater capability in planning and executing programs
at the provincial and kabupaten level; and to increase the ca-
pability of central government agencies to support the develop-
ment of local government. 93 These programs concentrate on
more densely populated kecamatan (subdistricts) and can be di-
rected toward any of a number of projects such as production,
employment, infrastructure, or welfare. Direct grants have been
made to the poor, and technical assistance and training pro-
grams have been funded for provincial kabupaten and keca-
matan planning units. 94
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Recent experiments to enhance equity and encourage local
initiative through wide-ranging pilot projects have been un-
dertaken through the Provincial Area Development Program
(PDP). This program has focused on aiding underdeveloped dis-
tricts and on assisting low-income people directly through nu-
merous small projects rather than concentrating investments on
strategic growth poles and hoping that the benefits will trickle
down to the masses. The PDP is seen as an important way to in-
crease participation in development and bottom-up planning. 95
Government-financed credit programs have been made in-
creasingly available for small businessmen, craftsmen, and
traders through the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, and at the
provincial level through regional development banks. At the
kecamatan level, loans through the Badan Kredit Kecamatan
(BKK, the subdistrict credit board) have been particularly ef-
fective in channeling assistance to poor rural households. 96
The government’s transmigration (resettlement) program
has been expanded to a multi-objective program from its
original purpose of moving people from overcrowded areas of
Java and Bali to the Outer Islands to achieve a more even dis-
tribution of population in the country. It is also intended to
provide manpower for the labor-scarce areas outside Java, Bali,
and Lombok, so that they can develop as centers of growth,
particularly for agricultural production. It is hoped that this
will both attract the spontaneous migration of landless peoples,
thus improving their living conditions, 97 and increase regional
development. Transmigration is designed also to be “a vehicle
to promote national stability and integration.” 98 However, as
discussed earlier, it is also perceived as an attempt to extend
central government control over, and achieve Javanization of,
parts of the Outer Islands. 99
At least in theory, therefore, the government is committed
to a trilogy of development goals that are regarded as mutually
reinforcing and interdependent: equity (or the evening out of
inequalities, pemerataan), economic growth, and national sta-
bility. 100 However, although the economic planners insist that
such goals are harmonious, critics have argued that the evi-
dence suggests otherwise. Encouraging growth through greater
efficiency at Indonesia’s ports, for example, has led to more
streamlined operations and increased containerization; yet the
costs and fruit of this have been distributed very unevenly.
One underlying cause of the riots in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta’s
port, in 1984 was the poverty and increasing suffering of dock
workers negatively affected by these changes. Increased use
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of new hybrid, high-yielding varieties of rice has led to the
greater use of scythes in harvesting. But such harvesting needs
fewer laborers (men) and thus eliminates a traditional source of
women’s income (harvesting with the traditional single-bladed
knife, the ani-ani). 101 Meanwhile, stability has been purchased
by increased centralization of authority and repression rather
than by greater participation and by seeking consensus on how
to overcome the tensions created by growth and uneven devel-
opment. The greater central government presence within the
rural sector has led to the decline of village self-government
and traditional patterns of reciprocity and to the advancement
of the more privileged local classes within rural society, with
their greater access to government resources and their ability
to control them. Sociopolitical stratification has undermined
the goals, for example, of agricultural cooperatives and rural
banks, for these have become dominated by local elites, who
have prevented many small farmer and lower-income house-
holds from gaining access to the various benefits and services
that these institutions were designed to provide, such as agri-
cultural credit, fertilizer, extension information, and marketing
services. Without basic structural reform at the village level to
allow greater access to land and other productive resources, it
is dubious how much real development and equity can be at-
tained. 102
But overall, national economic growth and relative political
stability have led to a general improvement in living standards
throughout the country. According to a July 1980 public-opinion
poll conducted by the respected Indonesian newsweekly Tempo,
a considerable majority of the population felt substantially
better off than they did ten to fifteen years earlier. 103 Certainly,
the government assessment of the general level of popular
welfare is favorable. In his Independence Day speech in August
1985, President Suharto stressed that the “various basic neces-
sities for people, such as food, clothing, public housing, edu-
cation, and health facilities, are increasingly better and more
evenly distributed.” 104 And improvements in transportation and
communications and in the variety and availability of goods
even at the village level are striking to any returning visitor.
Yet critics have also been quick to point out that there is
a wide gap between the impressive plans and theories of eco-
nomic development espoused by the government and the im-
plementation of these policies; and that although pemerataan
is much talked about, uneven development has continued and
even been promoted by government policies, leading to growing
Government Response to the Need for National Integration
236
interregional disparities and an increasing gap between rich
and poor. Paauw claims that much of the income generated by
the upsurge in export earnings from extractive products (par-
ticularly petroleum and natural gas) has been narrowly dis-
tributed within the capital-intensive sector, with a large share
accruing to the government and to individuals associated with
large-scale government enterprise. Employment opportunities
have not kept up with the growth of the labor force, so that in-
creasing numbers are being forced into low-income agriculture
and underemployment or unemployment in the urban sector.
He suggests that the distribution of income, productive assets,
and wealth have thus become more unequal during the past
decade of Indonesia’s planned growth. 105 MacDougall charges
that economic progress has failed to improve living standards
among the bottom 30 percent of citizens and has not dealt with
the grave problems of unemployment; underemployment in low-
paying, low-productivity jobs; severe disparities of income; and
corruption. 106 White found that inequality had increased signif-
icantly in his village-level studies of employment and income in
some of the poorer communities of rural Java; 107 and Hughes
and Islam conclude that although there has probably been an
overall decline in rural inequality in Java, there has been an in-
crease in rural inequality in the Outer Islands because of the
general decline there in rural expenditure levels relative to the
national level. 108 They also found that urban inequality had
risen very sharply in Java and that there had been a large in-
crease in urban-rural income disparity in Java as well. 109 In
general, therefore, it appears that although the proportion of
the population in poverty has dropped significantly, from 57
percent of the population in 1970 to about 40 percent in 1980,
absolute numbers of poor people have remained fairly stable
over the past decade. 110
The plight of the poor thus remains very serious. A World
Bank Report in 1980 noted that “a significant portion of In-
donesia’s population remains among the poorest in the world‚”
and that the development process has not really had a favorable
impact on the welfare of rural poverty groups. 111 In 1976 the
per-capita consumption of more than fifty million Indonesians
was less then $90 per annum; life expectancy at birth was a
low forty-eight years, and 600,000 infants died each year below
the age of one. Illiteracy rates were high, and over 100 million
people had no access to safe drinking water. Nearly half the
population received less than 85 percent of the recommended
daily allowance of calories. 112 Since then, the rupiah has been
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devalued three times: in 1978 by 33 percent, in 1983 by 28
percent, and in 1986 by a further 31 percent. 113 The subse-
quent rise in prices has hurt particularly those at the bottom.
Increased consciousness of their poverty and of the lifestyles
of the wealthy has serious implications: a public-opinion poll
in July 1981 showed that more than 50 percent of those ques-
tioned considered the greatest danger to national unity to be
social disturbances between rich and poor. 114 The World Bank’s
1984 restricted report states that the still very high magnitude
of poverty constitutes the major challenge the country faces. 115
Equality is easier to legislate than to implement. For ex-
ample, when poverty in the rural areas results partly from the
concentration of land in the hands of a few individuals, when
up to 50 percent of the population in some villages do not own
land, and unemployment is high, it is still much easier to discuss
land reform than to bring it about. 116 Little has been done since
the 1960s; and even when attempts at land reform have been
made, these have not always been successful. Government land-
reform policies promoted rural unrest in both 1978 and 1979,
and the riot in Jenggawah in East Java apparently originated
from the unfair redistribution of land. It seems that many of
the programs that have been aimed at the poor in fact have
reached only limited numbers, and some government measures
that were designed to achieve greater equality in economic de-
velopment may actually have done the opposite. Even Suharto’s
strong support for increased rice production, on the grounds
that it is crucial for political stability as well as for successful
economic development, seems to have been biased in favor of
urban consumers and benefited farmers who produce surpluses
rather than helping poorer subsistence farmers. 117
Similarly, the government subsidies on food and fuel (which
amounted to $2.4 billion in the 1981–1982 budget) 118 in
practice benefited those who purchased these commodities
rather than those who lived at subsistence levels (and used
firewood for fuel). It has been charged that the subsidy on
kerosene especially in Java, though helping to preserve the eco-
logical balance in an environment that is seriously threatened
by the cutting of firewood on steep slopes, encouraged over-
consumption and waste. Domestic consumption of kerosene in
the late 1970s grew at 7 percent per annum, far faster than
the 2.3 percent rate of population growth, while domestic con-
sumption of all petroleum products grew at an annual rate of
12 percent. 119 Oil was thus diverted from export purposes (and
foreign-exchange earnings), while subsidies took an increasing
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proportion of the budget that could otherwise have been used
for further development projects. This was finally recognized in
1983, when subsidies were cut substantially: the food subsidy
was discontinued and the oil subsidy cut back, although the fer-
tilizer subsidy was retained. 120 The government’s goal now is
to have the prices of essential commodities reflect their market
value by the end of Repelita IV in 1989. 121
Questions have also been raised about whether the gov-
ernment village-aid programs (Inpres) for the construction of
roads, bridges, and schools encourage local initiative and devel-
opment efforts or instead kill local creativity and bolster depen-
dence on the government; and whether the much-sought-after
“participation” in development is instead actually perceived as
a burden, as orders to be carried out. In many village “self-help
projects” the poor frequently become passive observers rather
than active participants. 122 Even cooperatives have not worked
well. They have been promoted by the government rather than
growing from local community initiatives. Thus, they suffer from
lack of effective control by the members themselves and conse-
quently are not trusted. 123 Indeed, critics have asked whether
the government would even accept, let alone welcome, compe-
tition from community-based initiatives.
Despite the government’s oft-repeated commitment to
greater equality and to raising living standards through labor-
intensive projects and small and middle-sized industry, much
has been spent on large, highly capital-intensive enterprises
and on the import-intensive sectors of power generation, in-
dustry, and mining. 124
Use of money on projects such as the Nurtanio aircraft
plant is highly questionable. Between 1976 and 1985 over $500
million was spent on Nurtanio’s development plan, and tens of
millions more in state funds will be needed before the company
is able to stand on its own a decade from now. Yet Suharto’s
prestige is intimately bound up with its success, because he uni-
laterally initiated the program and has steadfastly supported it
in his belief that it would help Indonesia take off industrially in
the mid-1990s. 125
In response to the slump in the world economy in the early
1980s and the decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the gov-
ernment decided to continue its level of investment in most
major industrial and “developmental” projects. Projects were
thus kept going that created profits for the regime’s leaders
(and foreign backers), while the three major devaluations of the
rupiah against the U.S. dollar and the reduction or abolition of
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subsidies on basic commodities increased the cost of living and
thus disadvantaged the ordinary people. Retrenchments, cuts
in wages and allowances, and shorter working weeks have all
added to people’s difficulties. 126
As oil revenues decline further and as more revenues have
to be generated from taxes on goods, services, and property and
from taxes on international trade, lower-income people will be
even more seriously affected. Their share of the tax burden will
increase, because among lower-income groups the proportion
of consumer expenditures used to buy the commodities most af-
fected by excise taxes (kretek [clove] cigarettes, sugar, alcohol,
and beverages) is quite large.
Meanwhile, the benefits from export revenues have accrued
disproportionately to the small section of the urban population
with better education and access to government jobs. 127 Even
though Garnaut argues that the accompanying expansion of
modern employment and income has resulted in significant
numbers of Indonesians enjoying substantially higher material
standards, the expanded employment opportunities in the
modern sector have not been large enough to have a major
impact on labor in the traditional sector. Real wages have not
risen, while unemployment and underemployment have. And
while employees in the traditional sector have gained little or
nothing in higher wages, the traditional producers of cash crops
for export have received lower real incomes as a result of the
resources boom. 128
Although some of the huge increases in natural-resource
revenues in the past have been used for subsidies and public
projects such as rural facilities and schools, the great bulk
of public expenditure has been concentrated in activities that
have provided few direct benefits to people in the traditional
economy. Meanwhile, much work remains to be done on rural
village infrastructure: roads and small bridges, irrigation
canals, small dams, rural water-supply projects, warehouses,
markets, and so on. Booth and McCawley conclude that al-
though the 1970s was the best decade in Indonesia’s recorded
history for sustained economic growth, too many opportunities
for reform were missed as development efforts remained oil-de-
pendent, capital-intensive, and Jakarta-centered. 129
Increases in protectionism between 1983 and 1985, seen
in the growing list of goods that cannot be imported because
they are produced locally, have also had mixed results, stim-
ulating the production of domestic engineering and industrial
products, but also creating inefficiencies and misallocation of
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investment and hindering economic growth. A good example of
this two-sided effect of protectionism is the import ban on new
and secondhand ships: this has protected the domestic ship-
building industry but has significantly raised costs for transpor-
tation and thus prices for goods that are shipped. The ban is
also inconsistent with the objectives of the important Presi-
dential Instruction (Inpres No. 4) of April 1985, which were
to reduce handling and transport costs for exports as well as
to simplify the administrative procedures governing interisland
and foreign trade. 130
It has been argued that the government with its overreg-
ulation and bureaucracy seems more concerned with mea-
surable, tangible results than with the process of development
and changes in orientation and attitudes. Decentralization in
the system of planning, implementation, and supervision is
needed, so that the aspirations and potential of the commu-
nity can be fully accommodated in programs developed “from
below.”
Hendrata has commented that a major problem thwarting
development is the traditional paternalistic bureaucracy which
has
a much stronger orientation to above than below, an overly strict
observance of procedure even if it means sacrificing efficiency;
an aversion (or perhaps an inability) to act as a creative and dy-
namic manager taking calculated risks to achieve optimal results
in line with sound business principles; an emphasis on appearing
to be a “ruler” rather than a “servant” of the community; a pater-
nalistic attitude toward the people and subordinates based on the
conviction that “Father knows best”; plus a doubt as to the ability
of the people to find solutions for their own problems. 131
Meanwhile, the inequality between Java and the Outer Is-
lands continues. Despite a theoretical commitment to the
evening out of economic inequalities by encouraging economic
development in the Outer Islands, most investment, both do-
mestic and foreign, has been in Java. From 1967 through April
1984, the government licensed 787 foreign investment projects
worth some U.S. $9,368 million. Of these, 560 (71.2 percent)
were located in Java (with ninety-five projects worth $2,957
million in Sumatra, fifty-eight projects involving $447 million
in Kalimantan, and eleven projects worth $274 million in Irian
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Java). 132 In addition, development funds from aid donors have
been heavily concentrated in resource-rich or already relatively
industrialized areas. 133
Arndt argues that the regional imbalance between Java and
the Outer Islands has been aggravated through the still further
concentration of industry, urban development, and decision-
making power in Jakarta and through the relative neglect of the
least-developed regions, particularly in eastern Indonesia. 134
Even within Java there is considerable concentration of in-
dustry. Despite the official goal of encouraging new industries in
rural areas, over half of all the employees in large and medium-
sized industries in the early 1970s were concentrated in just
twenty of Java’s eighty-two kabupaten‚ and that pattern seems
to have been continued. Despite a government commitment to
the growth of small and medium-sized cities, Jakarta has almost
tripled its population over the past twenty-five years, from 2.97
million in 1961 to 4.58 million in 1971 to an estimated 8.16
million in 1986. 135
Meanwhile, within the Outer Island provinces, despite a gov-
ernment commitment to rural and equal development, huge
industrial enclaves have been created, such as the Asahan alu-
minum project in North Sumatra and the natural-gas-based,
large-scale industrial complex around Lhokseumawe in Aceh,
that have few trickle-down effects on the regional economy.
Perhaps at the root of the problem is the controversy over
the underlying assumptions of Indonesia’s development
program. The government’s position has been that a basic con-
dition for reaching the targets of development is undisturbed
national stability. This explains, at least according to some
critics, why the New Order government is actually pursuing
a “trickle-down” strategy of development, despite its official
commitment to pemerataan (the equitable distribution of de-
velopment efforts and their benefits); for it is committed to
maintaining the social order without fundamental change. 136
Critics charge that the government has overemphasized se-
curity, the fear of regional disintegration, and the threat of com-
munism in efforts to hold on to its own power, thus curbing
freedom of thought and action, creativity, and basic human
rights. 137 They maintain that the increasingly centralistic and
authoritarian government has become rigid and is stifling local
initiative. 138 Even the Director of the National Institute for Eco-
nomic and Social Research, Education, and Information noted
the existence of too much paternalistic government bureau-
cracy, overregulation, and excessive supervision. 139 Despite of-
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ficial recognition of the need to devolve authority for regional
development to the provinces themselves, power instead has
been increasingly centralized. Measures taken to promote eco-
nomic integration have frequently backfired: in 1975, for ex-
ample, provincial customs and export duties were prohibited in
order to promote greater economic integration of the country
and to stimulate interisland trade. But this move left the
provinces with no legal source of foreign exchange and thus
financially weak. As power has become more concentrated in
Jakarta, a brain drain of the more able and better-trained
provincial leaders to Jakarta has occurred. The effect has been,
on the one hand, provocation of regional and local resentment
and, on the other, the further development of dependent atti-
tudes among provincial administrators remaining in the daerah
(regions). These attitudes have made local officials hesitant
to take development initiatives and too accustomed to central
government handouts to do anything but wait for anticipated
central government help and directives.
Currently, nearly 80 percent of total public expenditure in
the provinces is disbursed through the national budget and con-
trolled by ministries and agencies headquartered in Jakarta,
leaving only about 20 percent of the funds to be administered
by the provincial governments. Of this 20 percent, about half
comes from Inpres funds; only half comes from locally raised
taxes and levies, and these tax sources are strictly controlled by
the central government. There is a strong need for more decen-
tralization and deconcentration to allow local governments and
regional branches of national bodies headquartered in Jakarta
to make more decisions. 140
The government has also been unable to deal firmly with the
increasingly pervasive problem of corruption. Although periodic
attempts are made to control corruption, only minor officials
have been apprehended, while flagrant abuse among senior
government officials goes unheeded and is carefully covered up.
Yet there is an awareness that the fall of a number of Third
World governments has had its roots in corruption that riddled
the state; there is also a recognition that the experience and
lessons of history had better not be ignored. 141 Editorials in
newspapers and newsmagazines in Indonesia periodically focus
on the corruption issue, recognizing the institutionalized cor-
ruption in the country and calling for enforcement of the Anti-
Corruption Law. Renewed government efforts to deal with the
acknowledged widespread corruption in all government depart-
ments, though, seem to have met with only limited success.
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Pauker, however, argues that corruption may not be as
harmful to the economic system as is generally assumed. Cer-
tainly the petty corruption that results from inadequately low
salaries for civil servants delays and obstructs the economic
process and is “a socially harmful form of indirect taxation.”
But he argues that the much bigger form of corruption that
comes from the “symbiotic relationship between political power
and economic entrepreneurship actually expedites economic
growth.” Politically influential Indonesian military men and
civilians, who often lack business skills, help authentic entre-
preneurs, who are often foreigners or ethnic Chinese, to im-
plement projects that would otherwise be obstructed by the
graft-seeking lower bureaucracy. They also help to obtain
credits from official sources for those most capable of using the
money productively. 142 As Pauker sums it up, the harm done by
corruption in high places is not so much economic as sociopo-
litical: it erodes the authority of the ruling elites, causes dis-
trust in government, and lowers resistance to radicalism. 143 It
has been suggested that such corruption is likely to lead either
to destabilizing radical political upheavals or to the increasingly
harsh repression of its critics by the government, the latter of
which appears to be taking place.
However, the damage done to the economy is nevertheless
considerable. Import and other monopolies in such major
sectors of the economy as steel, plastics, cement, insurance,
and food restrict competition and thus lead to inefficiency and
permit mismanagement. In addition the companies controlling
these monopolies, which have links with Suharto’s family and
friends, provide enormous profits for their owners. It has been
“conservatively estimated that the entire system of privilege
generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue each year
for the companies involved.” 144 Much of this profit supports ex-
travagant lifestyles and is invested outside the country.
Indonesia’s economic policies came under heavy criticism in
the early 1980s from World Bank experts in a confidential draft
document entitled “Selected Issues of Industrial Development
and Trade Strategy.” The report charged the government with
creating policies that misallocated economic resources and thus
thwarted Indonesia’s long-term economic and social devel-
opment goals. Using the principle of comparative advantage as
its underlying premise, the report advocated fewer government
controls rather than better controls over economic activity. 145
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Perhaps here is one of the clearest examples of cultural
misunderstanding and opposing social and political value
systems. World Bank experts, with their emphasis on capitalism,
growth, economic efficiency, and the free-market system, are
not culturally attuned to Indonesia’s priorities or fully cognizant
of the importance of social and political constraints impinging
on economic decision making in Indonesia. Granted, there is
the generally accepted need for economic reform through re-
ducing licensing inefficiency and unwieldy bureaucracy, and for
the simplification and reduction of government regulations, but
the Bank’s recommendations for a shift toward a more outward-
looking, export-oriented trade policy run counter, at least to
some extent, to the government’s officially accepted goal of pe-
merataan (equitable distribution), which at least in the past im-
plied domestic production and import substitution rather than
export-oriented manufacturing for earning foreign exchange.
Similarly, the Bank’s recommendation for a shift from “an ad-
ministratively determined allocation system to a price-deter-
mined one” is in direct opposition to Jakarta’s emphasis on
encouraging pri- bumi (indigenous Indonesian) entrepreneurs
through preferential treatment. The free-market World Bank
theories grated also against the Indonesian government’s in-
herent distrust of an uncontrolled private sector, and the Bank’s
desire to open up the Indonesian economy to attract greater
Western investment ran up against the Indonesians’ great sen-
sitivity to economic domination by foreigners. 146 As one critic
summed up the situation, for Jakarta’s technocrats the World
Bank’s recommendations may have been theoretically neat, but
they were politically and historically inept. 147
But despite all the criticisms of the government’s economic
policies, the assessment of Awanohara, Habir, and Handley in
a recent overview of Indonesia is that economic progress has
been shared remarkably evenly throughout the vast Indonesian
archipelago, given the urgent needs and superior political clout
of the cities, the difficulties of transport and communications,
the faltering bureaucracy, and the inclination of the military-
dominated central government to concentrate power in Jakarta.
Evidence can be seen in the consistent growth of rice output
over the past fifteen years; in the construction of roads, schools,
and piped water; and in other new economic activities
throughout the archipelago, much of which would not have
happened without these government policies. 148 Certainly, the
country’s agricultural sector has grown rapidly, industrial
output has increased dramatically, average per-capita income
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has soared (from about $100 per annum in 1965 to $650 in
1985), and a substantial middle class has developed since In-
donesia declared its independence in 1945; and the disparate
elements of commerce, industry, and agriculture have been
forged into a national economy with a considerable degree of
national economic unity. 149
CONCLUSION
Government policies, therefore, have been of great importance
in promoting and strengthening national integration. In the so-
ciocultural field, diverse peoples from a great variety of ethnic
and cultural backgrounds have been encouraged to emphasize
their common sociocultural unity and identify more closely with
one another as fellow Indonesians. Knowledge and use of the
national language have been strongly promoted, and, through
a variety of educational, social, and cultural organizations,
greater cohesion attained.
In the interaction dimension, great progress has been made
in improving and expanding the transportation and communi-
cations networks, thus reducing the former isolation of many
peoples and areas, especially in the Outer Islands. Mobility has
increased significantly. And through the domestic satellite com-
munications system especially, the different parts of the country
have been brought into much closer and more effective commu-
nication with one another.
In the economic dimension, government policies have been
important not only in encouraging and directing economic
growth but also in attempting to ensure that the benefits of de-
velopment are distributed more equitably than they would be in
a free-market economy. Not all of the government’s economic
policies have been successful, however, and progress toward
the goal of greater economic equity has been undermined also
by corruption and bureaucratic mismanagement.
Inevitably, Indonesia still has a long way to go in creating a
fully integrated nation-state, but the distance the country has
come already is both impressive and encouraging.
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Retrospect and Prospect
AS THE earlier chapters have illustrated, national integration
is a vast, multifaceted, and enormously complicated concept.
Not only does it consist of a number of major dimensions, each
with a multitude of component parts, but these dimensions
are integrally intertwined, each affecting and being affected by
the others. Moreover, events or trends in each dimension can
produce integrative results at one level and disintegrative ef-
fects at another. This book has attempted to draw together a
wide variety of material from many diverse sources in a com-
prehensive study of the geographical aspects of national inte-
gration. It has included an examination of the major dimensions
of integration, an analysis of their spatial patterns, and a con-
sideration of the impact of government policies on the country’s
patterns of cohesion. This chapter includes both an overview
and a discussion of some of the major problems confronting In-
donesia’s national integration in the late 1980s.
The concept of national integration itself is remarkably
complex. Obviously, this book is not a conclusive study: more
could be added to the discussion of the four major dimensions
that have been considered here—historical and political, socio-
cultural, interaction, and economic—as they relate to national
integration. And further work needs to be done in analyzing
more precisely the interrelationships of their many components.
Inevitably, questions also remain about the best way to quantify
the dimensions once defined. The present analysis has been
limited by the available data. The lack of data has both ne-
cessitated the omission of significant aspects of the concept of
national integration, such as the feelings, perceptions, and at-
titudes of people in different parts of the country toward the
nation-state, and at times forced the use of surrogates, such
as road density rather than the preferred numbers of inter-
provincial travelers. In addition, some of the available data are
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of dubious validity, meaning that both they and the statistical
analysis based on them have to be regarded cautiously and crit-
ically.
Another problem relates to the time element. Although inte-
gration is a dynamic concept, and the historical chapter has ex-
amined changes in the levels and processes of integration in the
past, the major part of this study has been concerned with the
conditions of national integration as they exist at a cross section
of history, during the limited time frame of the 1970s and early
1980s.
The results of the analysis are also a reflection of the scale
selected. As discussed in chapter 1, the province has been used
as the unit of analysis mainly for practical reasons, as most
data are available only at that level. However, the great con-
trasts in both area and population size among the provinces
necessitated standardization of the data, leading inevitably to
the introduction of certain distortions, because no index can
adequately encompass both population and area differences at
the same time. The use of the province as the areal unit of
analysis has also camouflaged wide intraprovincial differences,
which at times may be of more significance than interprovincial
differences in assessing the strength of national integration.
In particular, the role of the urban centers in their respective
provinces may have been distorted, because their data have
been averaged with those of the entire population of the prov-
ince in which they are located. This seems to have affected par-
ticularly the status of South Sulawesi in the overall analysis
of integration and may also have unduly accentuated Jakarta’s
preeminence at the expense of West Java. The patterns of na-
tional integration would be found to be much more intricate
if a smaller unit of analysis, such as the kabupaten (district)
had been used. 1 But even use of the kabupaten would have
presented difficulties, as it too is related more to areal than
to population size. 2 Indeed, no unit can be perfect in mea-
suring differences in both population and area, especially when
the geographic realities include such great contrasts in popu-
lation distribution as exist in Indonesia (where Java contains 62
percent of the population of the country but has less than 7
percent of its land area).
However, despite the limitations caused by problems of ex-
pressing the concept of national integration in Indonesia in
measurable terms and of obtaining relevant, accurate, and suf-
ficiently detailed data, the study depicts a very interesting,
complex pattern of integration. In place of the Java-Outer Is-
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lands core-periphery model that has been used so widely in the
literature to describe Indonesia, the study demonstrates con-
vincingly that a far more complicated pattern exists. In many
ways, at least as far as per-capita characteristics are concerned,
Java has been mislabeled as the core, for despite its high pop-
ulation density and well-developed infrastructure, it does not
exhibit many of the characteristics associated with a core, espe-
cially in the sociocultural and economic dimensions of national
integration. Java generates less than a third of the country’s
gross national product while consuming a disproportionate
share of the country’s revenue; meanwhile, almost three-
quarters of Indonesia’s poor live in (mainly rural) Java. In re-
ality, only Jakarta emerges as the national, dynamic, urban core,
surrounded by a diverse periphery, with no obvious decline in
the level of integration associated with increasing distance from
that core. The contrasts among the Outer Island provinces on
a per-capita basis, particularly between some in Sumatra and
Kalimantan on the one hand and some in eastern Indonesia on
the other, are far more striking than any Java-Outer Islands di-
chotomy. The poverty and underdeveloped character of West
and East Nusatenggara, even in comparison with Java, is espe-
cially marked and contrasts sharply with conditions particularly
in East Kalimantan and North and South Sumatra.
If this new interpretation of the core and periphery is ac-
cepted, it helps our understanding of the unequal development
patterns of the past and can affect regional planning and policy
decisions for the future. As demonstrated in chapter 5, Jakarta
has been the focus of a disproportionate amount of both do-
mestic and overseas investment, largely because of its status as
the capital city and core of the country, with its cumulative ad-
vantages of a more highly developed infrastructure, labor pool,
local market, and center of decision making. The importance
for business and industry of physical proximity to this center
of economic and political power cannot be overemphasized in
a country like Indonesia where telephone communications are
less dependable and less effective than in the West, and where
personal contacts are so important in cutting through the maze
of bureaucracy.
Yet this excessive investment in and around Jakarta has
provoked widespread resentment. As one of Indonesia’s own
critics, Alisjahbana, so expressively described it in the late
1960s, Jakarta, as the source of all finance and decision making,
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has become the leech, sucking blood from the body of the fish,
growing fatter while the fish (Indonesia), losing blood, gets
thinner. 3
Jakarta’s location on Java and its domination by Javanese
have had widespread ramifications for the pattern of economic
development in Indonesia as a whole. 4 Political pressure from
tens of thousands of poor Javanese and Sundanese migrants to
Jakarta (the great majority of whom come from West Java), and
from the educated unemployed in the city, is obviously far more
immediate than pleas for attention and investment from more
remote Outer Island provinces, especially the poor ones. In ad-
dition, there is a natural tendency for Javanese leaders to favor
their own suku (people) before attending to others in the Outer
Islands, whose different cultures and needs are both strange to
them and not clearly understood or respected. Thus, the amount
of government revenue spent in Java, and especially in Jakarta
and West Java, is out of proportion to its comparative land area
and even to its relative population size. 5 Furthermore, imports
flow into Java far in excess both of its exports and of imports
into other parts of Indonesia.
Yet the government, aware of the need for greater spatial
equality in development, has made pemerataan (the evening out
of development) a top priority in its interrelated trilogy of de-
velopment goals—spreading the benefits of development, eco-
nomic growth, and national stability—and has made efforts to
disperse investment and government projects to all areas of the
country. But policies designed to attain a better balance in eco-
nomic development among the different regions of the country
run into an almost insoluble dilemma. Obviously, for the sake
of regional development and spatial economic equity, it is nec-
essary to restrict uncontrolled economic growth in Java and
encourage manufacturing activities in the Outer Islands; yet ef-
ficiency and growth considerations, not to mention the severe
problems of poverty, unemployment, and underemployment on
Java, underscore the essential need for increased investment
there.
Thus, the problems Indonesia faces in terms of both national
integration and national development remain enormous. Popu-
lation pressure continues to rise inexorably. The 1980 census
revealed that population had grown in the previous intercensal
period (1971–1980) at an annual rate of 2.34 percent, despite
vigorous government support of family planning. 6 This figure
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translates into a population increase of twenty-eight million be-
tween 1971 and 1980 and an estimated further growth of sev-
enteen million between 1980 and 1985. 7
Meanwhile, population distribution has become increasingly
uneven, in real even though not in percentage terms, despite
government commitment to the transmigration program, which
relocates landless people primarily from Java and Bali to more
sparsely populated areas in the Outer Islands. Indeed, the trans-
migration program is able to resettle only a small proportion of
the annual population increase of Java, and at enormous cost.
8 The disparity in population densities between Java and the
Outer Islands has increased significantly over the past twenty
years. From an average density in 1961 of 476 per square kilo-
meter in Java and nineteen in the Outer Islands, average den-
sities increased to 690 and thirty-one, respectively, by 1980. 9
Obviously, these figures camouflage the even greater contrasts
existing among individual provinces (for example, between
Central Java, the province with the highest population density
[outside Jakarta and Yogyakarta], with 742 per square kilometer
on the one hand, and the province with the lowest density, Irian
Jaya, with three per square kilometer on the other). The gap
between Java and the Outer Islands thus grows ever wider, at
least as far as population numbers and density are concerned.
And the over half a million Outer Islanders who have moved
to Java over the past fifteen years have partly counteracted
the government’s transmigration efforts, both by adding to the
numbers already in the urban areas of Java and by draining
some of the most creative and dynamic talent from the Outer Is-
lands.
The pressure on land resources in Java is immense. Of Java’s
estimated 100.5 million people in 1985, over thirty-five million
were landless, and these numbers are increasing yearly. An-
other estimated forty million do not own enough land to live
on, as the average size of land holdings continues to decline. 10
One unfortunate result of Green Revolution technology, which
has boosted rice production and helped to make Indonesia self-
sufficient in rice, has been the growing gap between rich and
poor farmers. Only richer farmers can afford both the added
costs of hybrid seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and so on, and the
element of risk involved. In consequence, cultivated land has
become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few. By
1980, 60–70 percent of the cultivated land in Java was owned
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by just 10 percent of the population, 11 and the percentage of
small farmers having less than half a hectare rose from 46 to 63
percent between 1973 and 1980. 12
Rural-to-urban migration is another major problem, because
not only do the new urban migrants swell the numbers of the
unemployed and underemployed, but they also put great strain
on the existing social fabric as well as on already inadequate
physical facilities (water supply, fuel, sanitation, housing, and
so on). Although the rates of urban growth have been relatively
low (Indonesia is considered only 22.4 percent urban now, com-
pared with 17.2 percent in 1971, and the growth is due partly
to a change in both the definition of urban and the location of
urban boundaries), the sheer numbers of new urban dwellers
are staggering: 12.3 million in less than ten years. Nowhere
is the problem of rapid urbanization more clearly seen than in
Jakarta, which has increased its population by over three and
a half million people in just the past fifteen years. 13 Its popu-
lation in 1986 totaled an estimated 8.2 million (more than the
entire population of Kalimantan’s four provinces) and probably
is considerably higher than these official estimates, as thou-
sands live in West Java, outside Jakarta’s official boundaries,
and commute to work or take up short-term residence in the city
and so are not counted as permanent residents. It is estimated
that more than 70 percent of Jakarta’s population live below the
poverty line (earning less than $22.50 per month), inhabiting
slum dwellings with almost no potable water, sanitation facil-
ities, or medical services. 14
To avert growing dissatisfaction, particularly among the
young unemployed, the government has located investment
disproportionately in the cities, rather than focusing it in the
rural areas in an attempt to keep people there, assure rea-
sonably full employment, increase rural incomes, and thus
reduce rural-to-urban migration. The gap between urban and
rural areas has thus widened over the past twenty years.
Indeed, it has been suggested that Java might do well to em-
ulate the South Korean and Taiwanese experience of village de-
velopment; in these two countries villages are both 100 percent
literate and 100 percent electrified. Locating small-scale indus-
tries in the villages of South Korea and Taiwan has also ensured
not only an extra source of income for farm families but vir-
tually no rural unemployment as well. In contrast, at the be-
ginning of the 1980s Java’s 35,000 villages were only about 65
percent literate and less than 10 percent electrified. As a survey
in 1979 indicated, better irrigation, better roads, more schools,
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more credit for small-scale industries and workshops, and more
technical training were objectives Javanese villagers sought. 15
It has also been argued that although rural development is not
a sufficient condition for rapid economic growth, it is a major
necessary condition in the early stages of that growth. 16 The
widening income gap between agricultural and nonagricultural
workers also needs to be addressed. 17
Other major economic problems remain. Despite the fact
that the World Bank upgraded Indonesia’s classification to that
of a lower middle-income country in 1982 (with an estimated av-
erage gross national product per-capita figure of $560 in 1985),
18 over fifty-seven million people remain extremely poor.
Part of the national economic problem arises from the de-
pendence of Indonesia upon the petroleum sector for almost 70
percent of its total budget, a reality that has left the country
vulnerable to price fluctuations. Plans based upon continued
projected increases in oil prices had to be scaled back when
OPEC in the early 1980s reduced Indonesia’s production al-
location in response to falling oil prices, the world recession,
and an increase in non-OPEC-produced oil. By 1986 economic
problems caused by the major slump in world oil prices had
begun to shake the country. These were accentuated and com-
pounded by the reduced demand for some of Indonesia’s other
exports, such as tin, rubber, and palm oil; by decreased foreign
investment in the country; and by growing protectionist senti-
ments in the West against Indonesia’s increased export of man-
ufactured goods. Further, continued spending on imports and a
significant problem with capital flight have caused difficulties in
the balance of payments and added to a steeply rising foreign
debt burden. 19 The grave drop in government income has ne-
cessitated a cutback in government spending and a total re-
vision of the country’s development plans. The question now
seems to be whether Indonesia will be able to meet the rising
expectations of its population (which have been brought about
to some extent by the increase in both the interaction and
economic aspects of national integration) or whether people’s
growing discontent and frustration with economic austerity will
spill over into political and social unrest. Government concern
with this problem, however, began long before the 1986 crisis:
as early as April 1981 commercial advertising was banned from
national television, in large part because it led to rising expec-
tations that the government could not hope to fulfill. 20 But the
situation is much more critical now.
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Another major economic-related problem is the growing and
increasingly conspicuous gap between rich and poor, both be-
tween the rural poor and urban rich and between the urban
elites and the extremely poor city dwellers. Partly because of
television coverage and improved communications, ordinary In-
donesians are much more aware of the wealth of multimilli-
onaire generals, government leaders, and relatives of the pres-
ident, and of the luxurious life-style of the rich and powerful
in contrast to their own struggles to survive. They hear of how
land formerly owned by poor transmigrants has become part
of extensive, privately owned plantations; of the wealth of the
Chinese and other foreign traders with high government con-
nections; and of the increased profits of middlemen even though
commodity prices do not change. They struggle with the higher
prices they have to pay because of import monopolies, protec-
tionist regulations, and government controls of the economy.
They hear about the illicit fortunes amassed by the families of
deposed presidents such as Duvalier in Haiti and Marcos in the
Philippines and have no trouble recognizing the analogy to their
own country.
In the political field the country faces similar dilemmas of
trying to balance national with regional needs, and the need for
political control and stability with that for political participation.
The political consensus in Indonesia has always been fragile
because of the existence of ethnic, religious, cultural, and his-
toric diversities and conflicts. Despite the considerable progress
that has been made in developing a feeling of “Indonesian
identity” among the widely differing peoples of the archipelago,
deep-seated regionalisms and local ethnic pride continue to
thwart full political as well as sociocultural integration. The po-
litical problem centers on how much to allow these regional dif-
ferences to be reflected in regional autonomy and how much
power to retain in the central government. The newly inde-
pendent government of Sukarno quickly discarded a federal
form of government for a unitary system. And despite the ar-
guments of former Vice-President Hatta that a devolution of
political, administrative, and fiscal authority would be more re-
sponsive to local needs and conditions, the New Order gov-
ernment of Suharto has sought to centralize power and exert
ever-increasing control over the entire archipelago. This policy
inevitably has met with resistance.
Serious regional discontent and unrest still fester in a few
areas of the country. In Aceh (northern Sumatra) the National
Liberation Front of Aceh (NLF) is still active in its struggle for
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independence from Indonesia (which its separatist leaders pro-
claimed at the end of 1976), and claims of large-scale military
repression have been made. 21 Simmering discontent survives in
areas of Maluku, and in many other areas there is unhappiness
with the power and pervasiveness of the central government.
In East Timor there remains deep disenchantment with and
resistance to Indonesia’s annexation of the territory in 1976.
Reports from its Jakarta-appointed provincial assembly have
charged that corruption, brutality, and other abuses of power
(including ignoring local customs and behaving as conquerors)
by some in both the army and administration are causing
growing fear and anti-government feeling as well as economic
hardship there. 22 Despite Jakarta’s financial assistance, it is
claimed that living conditions have worsened. 23 In addition,
there is considerable resistance to and resentment of the gov-
ernment’s much vaunted goal of asimilasi.
Irian Jaya remains the locus of further regional dissatis-
faction and periodic unrest. Although the government has grad-
ually and effectively consolidated its control over the province,
and although the Organisasi Papua Mer deka (OPM, Free Papua
Movement) is officially banned, its followers continue to be
active, especially in the eastern border area, in their seces-
sionist attempts to wrest Irian Jaya from the Indonesian gov-
ernment and achieve independence. As in the other areas of
unrest within the country, much of the cause of the trouble is
attributable to the presence of “outsiders,” predominantly Ja-
vanese, who run the affairs of the province and who, with their
culturally superior attitudes and insensitivity to local customs,
as well as their Islamic faith, offend the indigenous inhabitants.
The transmigration of Javanese to all three areas is perceived by
some not as a “civilizing mission to promote their welfare and
lagging economic development,” but as one of the “most blatant
land robberies in history.” 24
Indeed, Javanese influence is a problem throughout the
Outer Islands and is one dimension of the whole core-periphery
problem, because the government is excessively controlled by
Javanese. Not only has the government experienced increased
Javanization, but so too has the military. For example, by 1980
all twelve territorial military commands in the Outer Islands
were in the hands of officers from Java (eleven Javanese and
one Sundanese [from West Java]); thus not a single Outer Is-
lands territorial command was held by a “native son‚” whereas
the commands in Central, West, and East Java were all held
by native sons. The overwhelming power of the Javanese in the
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high commands can be seen also in the officer corps; 89 percent
of military officers were either Javanese (80 percent) or Sun-
danese (9 percent). 25
The conflict between the need for political control and po-
litical participation is also sharp. Suharto believes in strong po-
litical control partly to ensure national stability, itself a basic
condition for development and integration. 26 Indeed, over the
past twenty years Indonesia has enjoyed a relatively high level
of political stability, unlike many developing countries. But esca-
lating criticism has emerged, particularly in the last few years,
that the Suharto government has become increasingly author-
itarian and repressive as its support base has narrowed. 27
Notwithstanding Suharto’s appeal to the Panca Sila and the
1945 Constitution, there have been serious signs of discontent
among some of the country’s former senior government leaders
and politicians, discontent that has been firmly put down. The
result is a growing isolation of the New Order’s hierarchy from
the people, with only a few reaping the benefits of power. 28
Little has been done to develop the political and judicial in-
stitutions that the country so badly needs. In addition, there is
serious concern that Suharto is personally adapting the New
Order concepts to preserve his own executive control over the
electoral process; that he has legitimized such extra-constitu-
tional institutions as Kopkamtib (the Operational Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order); 29 and above all that he
is attempting to become the personification of the Panca Sila
and the Constitution of 1945, so that any criticism of him is
interpreted as being an attack on the basic institutions of the
state. Awanohara reports a vague but widely held notion that
Suharto is becoming more and more like a Javanese king and
Indonesia like a traditional Javanese empire, feudalistic, stulti-
fying, and unsuited to meeting the challenges of modern times.
30
Discontent with poverty, social injustice, and abuses of
power by the authorities in the rural areas is widespread.
Perhaps at the root of the pervasive dissatisfaction is a general
disillusionment about the New Order society and the gov-
ernment’s ability to deal with the country’s many ills. Two main
issues stand out: the lack of real political participation despite
the veneer of democratic institutions, and a misguided eco-
nomic development program that has fueled corruption on a
grand scale and exacerbated the gap between rich and poor. 31
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Political participation is encouraged only during the elec-
tions that take place under highly controlled conditions every
five years. Elections are regarded by the Indonesian gov-
ernment as an important demonstration of democracy (despite
the existence of a military-dominated administration), a legiti-
mation of the regime, and an endorsement of the government’s
development policies. However, elections are also to impress
foreign democratic governments, particularly those of the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia, and to ensure their contin-
ued support. However, only 39 percent of the 920 delegates
to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Per-
musyawaratan Rakyat) are elected by popular vote and then
only after careful screening of the candidates by government se-
curity forces. 32
Fear that the strength of the political parties would un-
dermine the power of the Suharto regime (as well as the offi-
cially given reason that uncontrolled political parties and elec-
tions would accentuate tensions and divisions among the pop-
ulace as they did in 1955 during Sukarno’s time) led the New
Order government to place severe constraints on the political
process. Political parties have been restricted in their cam-
paigning, and Golkar (Union of Functional Groups), an army-
initiated and government-sponsored organization, has been ac-
tively promoted as an alternative to the traditional parties.
After the 1971 elections, when nine major political parties
competed, the government sought to streamline the process
and create two weak parties that could easily be controlled and
manipulated. 33 It therefore forcibly consolidated the various
Muslim parties into one umbrella organization, the Partai Per-
satuan Pembangunan (PPP, Development Unity Party), and the
remaining five non-Muslim parties into the Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party). These restruc-
tured parties have suffered from destructive internal faction-
alism, weak leadership, 34 and a series of government rules and
regulations restricting political activity to the kabupaten (dis-
trict) level and progressively decreasing the preelection cam-
paign period (to sixty days in 1977, forty-five in 1982, and
twenty-five in 1987).
Meanwhile, although the government denies that Golkar
is a party, it functions very much like one. Yet as an official,
government-sponsored institution, it has a number of advan-
tages over the political parties: for example, it has access to
government facilities in finance, transportation, and communi-
cations; it has greater freedom to campaign at all levels in In-
National Integration in Indonesia
257
donesian society; and it has been able to exert considerable
political pressure by coopting, coercing, and manipulating local
village officials. 35
In addition, Golkar institutionalizes the army’s role in po-
litical and civilian life. As Pye put it:
Golkar represents a remarkably effective organ for enforcing and
legitimizing the domination of the military in Indonesian politics.
Hostility toward army rule is directed against Golkar, yet since
Golkar represents all elements in Indonesian society through its
functional groups, it is hard to be hostile toward it. 36
The armed forces in each election have become actively in-
volved on behalf of Golkar, despite the fact that they are rep-
resented directly in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, House
of People’s Representatives) by 100 delegates (out of a total of
460) selected by the president.
Unrest has focused both on the composition of the People’s
Consultative Assembly (MPR) and on the continuing domination
of the military in the government. The Working Group of the Pe-
tition of Fifty (an opposition group of former senior ministers
and political leaders) has openly questioned whether the pres-
ident should continue to appoint one-third of the Assembly,
claiming that this arrangement was adopted in 1967 as a tem-
porary measure only, with the idea that subsequently the whole
body would be elected. 37
Distinctly controversial also is the continuing and increasing
role of the military in government administration; for the mil-
itary, who make up only 0.36 percent of the population, form
a distinct ruling class, controlling all essential governmental
bodies and state-owned enterprises. 38 By 1982, active or retired
military men occupied half the positions in the Indonesian
higher central bureaucracy; at the highest levels military pen-
etration is nearly complete (the president and his principal
immediate aides) or has increased (coordinating ministers) over
the course of the New Order regime. 39 Military personnel dom-
inate the affairs of every Cabinet department. Their involvement
in almost every facet of public life is considered by the gov-
ernment to be part of their dwi fungsi (two functions): the mil-
itary’s role not just to protect the nation in wartime but also to
help with nation building. Inevitably, however, there are those
who would like to see the restoration of a fully civilian govern-
ment and the return of the military to their barracks.
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The role of Indonesia’s economic development program in
promoting national integration has also come under attack on
a number of counts. The government’s main expectation, that
economic development would lead almost automatically to
greater cohesion and political stability as more people were sat-
isfied and had their needs met, is highly debatable; for eco-
nomic development always leads to rising expectations, which
are all but impossible for a government to meet. In addition,
economic development, by unleashing new forces in society,
almost inevitably creates as many new problems as it solves.
It has been argued that economic development leads to such
changes as industrialization, urbanization, and increases in lit-
eracy and mass-media exposure, which in turn expand political
consciousness, multiply political demands, and broaden the
desire for greater political participation on the one hand, but
also tend to undermine traditional sources of political authority
and traditional political institutions on the other. 40 The prob-
lem, therefore, arises of how to adjust the political system so
as both to preserve political stability and to allow for greater
political participation and development. Oey argues that under
the New Order, political consciousness and demands for greater
participation have increased tremendously; yet these have not
yet been absorbed constructively by new and strong institu-
tions. 41 The MPR and DPR, which could channel at least some
of this development, lack legitimacy because of their undemo-
cratic basis. Golkar also is not in a position to act as a strong
institution because it is government controlled and lacks the
genuine support of the masses at the grass-roots level. Oey con-
cludes that the inevitable result will be an increase in political
instability and disorder in the years ahead. 42 The recent waves
of student demonstrations and bombings; the arbitrary arrest,
intimidation, interrogation, beating, and imprisonment of op-
position leaders and of anyone who dares to criticize the gov-
ernment; the mysterious killings by the death squads; and the
muzzling of the national press are but some of the evidence of
this increasing authoritarianism and repression. 43
Critics of Indonesia’s economic development program point
also to the increasing disparities in the income and development
levels in different parts of the country as demonstrated in this
study, disparities that result from uneven economic growth and
government policies that have frequently exacerbated rather
than reduced them. In addition, they are concerned about the
collusion between government and big business and about how
the development program has affected corruption in the
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country. For the problem of corruption has grown enormously
in magnitude in recent years, partly because of the increased
opportunities offered by a vast bureaucracy administering a
pervasive regulatory system of government controls over all as-
pects of economic life and partly from the plethora of money en-
tering the country from foreign governments, companies, and
international organizations, and from oil and other revenues.
As discussed in chapter 7, corruption now affects almost every
part of Indonesian life and society and may even have become
accepted as the norm by the younger generation upon whom
power will devolve. Attempts to deal with corruption appear to
have been more symbolic than substantive.
Although almost all observers of the Indonesian scene agree
on the major problems, they vary considerably in their evalu-
ations and judgments about them. On the more condemnatory
side are those who regard the system as so immensely corrupt
and incompetent, with its embedded nepotism and its con-
spicuous luxury in a setting of extreme poverty, that the situ-
ation is irretrievable and almost inevitably explosive. 44 On the
other hand, other Indonesia watchers, while recognizing the
corruption and inefficiencies endemic in the system, conclude
that the present Indonesian government has accomplished an
enormous amount both in promoting economic development
and in strengthening national integration. 45 Certainly there
could be much more corruption. More foreign exchange
earnings could be misused in extravagant modernization pro-
jects or glamorous buildings (as they were in Sukarno’s day). 46
Funds currently used for development could be diverted for the
acquisition of sophisticated new weaponry, as has happened in
a number of other Third World countries.
These very different evaluations of Indonesia’s achieve-
ments in nation building are comparable to the juxtaposition of
the rather optimistic picture painted by the statistical section in
the earlier part of this book and the somewhat more pessimistic
conclusions reached in this present chapter. The situation pre-
sented in this chapter emphasizes the key problems facing In-
donesia. These include the effects of population growth, distrib-
ution, and pressure on the country’s resources; rural-urban con-
trasts; problems arising from Indonesia’s economic overdepen-
dence on the petroleum sector; rising expectations and growing
unemployment; the growing gap between rich and poor; and
political problems arising primarily from Java’s dominant in-
fluence, Suharto’s style of government (with its lack of mean-
ingful participation), and the role of the military in government
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and commerce. Unquestionably, these issues represent a for-
midable challenge to the New Order government in its public
commitment to equity, economic growth, and national stability.
They also present a threat to the country’s continued integrity,
probably a more serious one than that presented by the condi-
tions measured in the statistical analysis.
The statistical analysis of national integration based on
provincial per-capita characteristics, however, provides a dif-
ferent perspective on the overall picture of national integration.
It gives an objective insight into the geographical stage on
which the political, economic, and historical events take place.
As discussed in chapter 1, the geographical background (the
spatial patterns of various integrative forces) does not de-
termine the future of national integration in any country. But it
does demonstrate the relative vulnerability of the country as a
whole, and of certain areas in particular, to disintegrative forces
and events.
Many indices in the sociocultural, interaction, and economic
dimensions show that integration among the provinces is
growing. More people speak the national language, take part
in the national educational system, receive better health care,
belong to nationwide organizations that acknowledge (if
forcibly) the state ideology of Panca Sila as their sole basis,
have access to national radio and television programs, and are
linked together through improved transportation and commu-
nications networks and through increased interprovincial trade
than at any time in the past. Increasingly, Indonesians from all
over the archipelago are being bound together into mutual webs
of common interests, financial and communication linkages, and
a shared sense of nationhood and national unity. Overall stan-
dards of living have risen for the majority of Indonesians (at
least until recently), 47 and even the poorest areas have expe-
rienced some improvements as a result of the resources boom
and economic development of the 1970s. 48 Despite its great di-
versity, the country has also been progressively welded into one
functioning political entity. 49
With the exceptions of the two areas most recently added
to the country, Irian Jaya and East Timor, widespread regional
unrest seems to be a phenomenon largely of the past. 50 The
major threat to Indonesia’s continued national integration
comes not so much from regional as from transregional eco-
nomic and political sources, particularly the conspicuous and
growing gap between the rich and the poor, population
pressure, the growing Javanization in government, and in-
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creasing repression in the political arena. But the statistical
analysis demonstrates a growing (albeit uneven) level of inte-
gration in Indonesia. 51
In spite of the differences in these two evaluations, however,
there is no real incongruence between the picture discussed in
this chapter’s overview of problems confronting the country and
that drawn by the statistical analysis. Each of these approaches
deals with different facets of integration. Both describe aspects
of the reality of Indonesia. Both the integrative and the disin-
tegrative aspects of Indonesia’s national integration are true at
the same time.
This is so for two major reasons. First, the generally inte-
grative picture drawn by the statistical section is concerned
with provinces and their averaged per-capita characteristics,
whereas the nonstatistical part deals more with national, in-
traprovincial, rural-urban, and other scales and facets of in-
tegration. Second, as discussed in the first chapter, national
integration is a multifaceted, highly complex, and at times par-
adoxical concept, in which factors of integration operate at dif-
ferent levels and indeed increased integration at one level may
result in decreased integration at another. To have aspects of
integration moving in opposite directions at the same time is to
be expected with such a complex and complicated phenomenon.
Thus, the statistical sections are dealing to some extent with dif-
ferent aspects and levels of integration than the nonstatistical
sections. From a structural point of view, Indonesia is indeed be-
coming more integrated as greater unity is forged among the di-
verse ethnic groups and greater interaction takes place among
people from its different areas. However, serious issues of in-
adequate national integration as well as other economic, po-
litical, and social problems also remain. But it is quite probable
that the country could have experienced far greater tensions
and unrest had it gone through the severe problems discussed
in this chapter without the growing integration portrayed in
the statistical analysis, for the setting in which the problems of
Indonesia are occurring is more integrated and protective of na-
tional unity than would have been the case even a decade ago.
This study has illustrated that continuing provincial dis-
parities do exist and in some respects have been accentuated
by uneven development. However, it can be argued that the
current situation is considerably more stable because of the
government’s commitment to increasing national integration
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and ameliorating the greatest economic contrasts through its
policy of pemerataan, the evening out of spatial inequalities in
development.
Indonesia thus remains a diverse and fascinating country,
one in which great progress has been made toward the fuller
integration of its many islands and peoples, yet one where
enormous problems, particularly demographic, economic, and
political, remain. As the Indonesian government is aware, in-
tegration is a dynamic concept, a condition that has to be
constantly nurtured, one where peoples of different social and
cultural backgrounds and economic levels have to be bonded
continually into a better functioning and more mutually inter-
dependent whole. In this process much has been accomplished,
but much yet remains to be done, as Indonesia pursues its goal
of “Unity in Diversity.”
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Notes
1: INTRODUCTION
1. These questions have all been asked before. Political geo-
graphers, as well as political scientists, have long been in-
terested in the existence and functioning of the state. For
example, Friedrich Ratzel recognized implicitly the need for
internal national integration when he described the state as
an organic being and a complex system of interacting parts
(see Harm de Blij, Systematic Political Geography, p. 140).
Richard Hartshorne, in “The Functional Approach in Polit-
ical Geography,” distinguished between centripetal forces
working for national integration and political cohesion, and
centrifugal or divisive forces pulling the state apart. Jean
Gottmann focused on the major centripetal or cohesive
forces in his discussion of the “spirit” and iconography of
each nation (“Geography and International Relations”).
2. G. William Skinner, ed., Local, Ethnic, and National Loy-
alties in Village Indo nesia: A Symposium. However, Im-
manuel Wallerstein, (“Ethnicity and National Integration in
West Africa,” pp. 665–670) found that ethnic loyalties facil-
itate integration into urban communities.
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3. Brian J. L. Berry, “Hierarchical Diffusion: The Basis of De-
velopmental Filtering and Spread in a System of Growth
Centers”; Salah El Shakhs, “Development, Primacy, and
Systems of Cities.”
4. Ernst B. Haas, “The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of
Latin America,” p. 315.
5. John Friedmann, “A General Theory of Polarized Devel-
opment,” p. 94.
6. W. A. Douglas Jackson and Edward J. F. Bergman, “On the
Organization of Political Space,” p. 155.
7. Karl Deutsch, for example, describes integration as “the
attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’
and of institutions and practices strong enough and wide-
spread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable ex-
pectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.” Karl
W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North At-
lantic Area, p. 2. The Dimensionality of Nations program
at Northwestern University and the Yale Political Data Pro-
gram have been concerned with quantifying indices related
to national integration and the political solvency of govern-
ments. In a cross-national comparison, these programs have
examined the national resources, administrative capabili-
ties, and popular support for particular governments and
their formal and informal commitments, but with little con-
sideration of the spatial dimension. See Rudolph J. Rummel,
“The Dimensionality of Nations Project”; and Karl W.
Deutsch et al., “The Yale Political Data Program.” See also
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of
Leaders and Forces; Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano
(eds.), The Integration of Political Communities; Joseph S.
Nye, “Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Mea-
surement”; Leon N. Lindberg, “Political Integration as a
Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Mea-
surement”; Myron Weiner, “Political Integration and Political
Development”; David E. Apter, The Politics of Modern-
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ization; Fred M. Hayward, “Continuities and Discontinuities
Between Studies of National and International Integration:
Some Implications for Future Research Efforts”; Karl W.
Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building; and
Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration.
8. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication,
pp. 63–64.
9. Clifford Geertz, for example, in Agricultural Involution: The
Process of Ecologi cal Change in Indonesia, divided In-
donesia into two ecological zones: Inner Indonesia, corre-
sponding to Java and characterized by wet-rice agriculture,
fertile volcanic soil, high agricultural productivity, and high
population density; and Outer Islands, centered upon
swidden agriculture, alkaline soils, low agricultural produc-
tivity, and low population density. Brian J. L. Berry, Edgar
C. Conkling, and D. Michael Ray, in The Geography of Eco-
nomic Systems, pp. 400–402 and 408, contrast the inner
Indonesian heartland of Java, Madura, and Bali with the
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4. In this chapter the term Javanese refers to all three major
ethnic groups living in Java (the Sundanese in West Java,
the Javanese in Central and East Java, and the Madurese in
East Java), but particularly to the ethnic Javanese and Sun-
danese.
5. Between 1968 and 1982 Jakarta received 21 percent of
all domestic capital investment and West Java a further 22
percent (and 19 and 20 percent, respectively, of the value of
all approved foreign investment projects). Percentages cal-
culated from Tables IV.16b and IV.16d in Biro Pusat Statistik,
Indikator Ekonomi 1982.
6. Even though there is evidence to suggest that the growth
rate was higher during the first part of the decade than in
the latter half, demographers and planners were taken by
surprise at the extra millions.
7. Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983, Buku Saku,
Table II.1.1.
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8. Between 1905 and 1977, 991,100 people had been moved
under the official government transmigration program; but
during this period the population of Java increased by thirty-
five million. During Repelita II, 1974–1979, approximately
75,380 people per year were resettled; during Repelita III,
1979–1984, the numbers more than tripled to 292,000 per
year. Yet Java’s population continued to grow at a rate of
almost two million a year. Costs have escalated: in 1977 the
cost of moving a fully subsidized family of five, including
transport, land, housing, materials, tools, seed, and initial
food supplies, was $1,200; by 1983–1984, the comparable
expense was estimated at $11,663. See Colin MacAndrews,
“Transmigration in Indonesia: Prospects and Problems,” p.
465; and Arndt, “Transmigration: Achievements, Problems,
Prospects,” pp. 51,66.
9. Biro Pusat Statistik, Penduduk Indonesia 1980 Menurut
Propinsi dan Kabupa ten/Kotamadya, Series L, pp. 1–22.
10. Sid Astbury, “Agonizing over Mechanization Down on the In-
donesian Farm,” p. 85.
11. Beth Rose, An Overview of the Indonesian Rice Economy, p.
5.
12. “June 1985 Log,” p. 6.
13. In 1961 the population of Jakarta was 2.97 million, in 1971
4.58 million, in 1980 6.50 million, and in 1986 an estimated
8.16 million. Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 1983,
Buku Saku, Table II.1.2 and Table II.1.1.
14. Barbara Crossette, “Street Vendors of Jakarta Are Sold on
Self-Help.”
15. “A Political Undertone to the Anti-Chinese Riots in Java,” p.
780.
16. As the example of Sri Lanka illustrates. Alan M. Strout,
“Pertumbuhan Pertanian, Tenaga Kerja dan Pembagian Pen-
dapatan: Dilema bagi Repelita III.”
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17. This widening gap, as well as that between rich and poor,
illustrates the contention at the beginning of the book that
factors of national integration operate at different levels.
18. Population Reference Bureau, 1985 World Population Data
Sheet.
19. Ross Muir, “Survey of Recent Developments,” p. 12.
20. Sacerdoti, “The Wheel of Fortune Stops.”
21. See, for example, Mohammed Thaib Hasan’s letter, “The
Plight of Aceh.”
22. Michael Richardson, “Jakarta’s Can of Worms.”
23. Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, pp. 336–337.
24. Tengku di Tiro, “Indonesia or Java?,” p. 4.
25. Benedict R. Anderson and Audrey Kahin, “Current Data on
the Indonesian Military Elite,” Indonesia 29, p. 157.
26. Undoubtedly, a main motivation for his strong political
control is to ensure his own retention of power. In October
1986 Suharto announced his readiness to serve a fifth con-
secutive five-year term.
27. Harold Crouch, “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in In-
donesia,” p. 586.
28. Guy Sacerdoti, “Consensus Conundrums,” p. 34.
29. Some evidence of this can be seen in the appointment of
Benny Murdani, considered to be the most hawkish of the
regime’s military in the suppression of opposition, dissent,
and restlessness, to head the armed forces. The political ad-
ministration has thus been handed over to the Indonesian
security and intelligence establishment (Kopkamtib),
whereas previously Kopkamtib was under the control of
career defense-force officers rather than career security and
intelligence officers. See Max Lane, “Climate of Fear: The
Rise of General Benny Murdani,” p. 3.
30. Susumu Awanohara, “Suharto’s Kingdom,” p. 32.
31. “Indonesia—A Sense of General Disillusionment,” p. 647.
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32. For example, by October 1986, about sixty of the 800
prospective candidates from Golkar, 250 of 800 from the
PPP, and 259 of 629 from the PDI had been judged unfit
to run in the April 1987 parliamentary elections. Shim Jae
Hoon, “Minority Political Parties Face Struggle for Votes,” p.
48.
33. Although the official reason given was to reduce the com-
plexity of the electoral system.
34. This weakness is deliberately encouraged by the gov-
ernment as it thereby keeps the parties more amenable.
35. R. William Liddle, “Indonesia 1977: The New Order’s
Second Parliamentary Election,” p. 178.
36. Lucian W. Pye, Southeast Asia’s Political Systems, p. 61.
37. Guy Sacerdoti, “A One-Man Consensus?,” p. 30.
38. For example, even though only ten of the twenty-four inner
cabinet are military personnel, the military is in all the
key watchdog positions in the administration; in fact, one-
third of the Indonesian army is in urban and administrative
duties. Over half of the provincial governors likewise are
military men. Ho Kwon Ping, “The Men on White Horses
Now Ride a Tiger,” p. 42.
39. John A. MacDougall, “Patterns of Military Control in the In-
donesian Higher Central Bureaucracy,” p. 89.
40. Hong Lee Oey, Indonesia Facing the 1980’s: A Political
Analysis, p. 369.
41. Ibid., p. 370.
42. Ibid., p. 371.
43. See Lane, “Climate of Fear‚” p. 3; Kieran Cooke, “Suharto
Tightens his Political Hold”; and Max Lane, “Suharto Inten-
sifies Clamp-down on Dissent,” p. 3. A recent article in the
Far Eastern Economic Review reported on a deep malaise
that has apparently set in, spurred on by the economic
downturns, but resulting more profoundly from a combi-
nation of events including the continuous crackdowns on
Muslim opponents; the closing down of the Sinar Harapan
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newspaper; the failure to bring to justice the murderer of
Dice Budimuljono, the mistress of a prominent person con-
nected to the presidential palace; and the increased
awareness of the great wealth and corruption of members
of the presidential family, government leaders, and their as-
sociates. See Shim Jae Hoon, “Breaking Old Ground,” pp.
46–47.
44. Indeed, a Tempo poll in July 1981 found that over 50
percent of those questioned considered “social disturbances
between rich and poor” to be the greatest danger to national
unity. Sacerdoti, “Taking the Pulse.” See also various issues
of Indonesia Reports and Inside Indonesia.
45. See, for example, Guy J. Pauker, “Indonesia 1979: The
Record of Three Decades,” pp. 124–127.
46. Although, according to one critic, the amount Sukarno
spent is miniscule compared with the misappropriations of
funds in recent years.
47. According to World Bank statistics, life expectancy rose
from 43 to 52 years for men and from 45 to 55 years for
women between 1965 and 1983; infant mortality rates
dropped from 138 to 101 per thousand live births, while
child death rates (ages one to four years) declined from
twenty to thirteen per thousand children over the same
period. World Bank, World Development Report 1985‚ Table
23. Per-capita consumption of rice has also increased im-
pressively, from 88 kilograms in 1954 to 107 kilograms in
1970 to 146 kilograms in 1983. Leon A. Mears, “Rice and
Food Self-Sufficiency in Indonesia,” p. 126. The recent
downturn in the economy because of the drop in oil prices
will almost inevitably be reflected in lower standards of
living in the immediate future.
48. Yuli Ismartino reports slow but steady development over the
past eight years in East Nusatenggara. He claims that the
economy has registered growth rates above the national av-
erage, thanks to increases in coffee and sandalwood oil pro-
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duction and the intensive greening campaign begun in 1979
(in which sturdy, fast-growing lamtaro trees were planted
throughout the province, which provide fodder for more
than 500,000 head of cattle). See Yuli Ismartono, “Letter
from Kupang.”
49. In a world that has seen the increasing growth of region-
alisms and local ethnic nationalisms in both developing and
developed countries (such as the Sikhs, the Eritreans, the
Kurds, the Basques, and the Quebecois), such integration is
all the more remarkable.
50. Aceh also has experienced some unrest and rebellion in its
consistent attempts to throw off all outside control, whether
Dutch or Indonesian. However, the costs have been far
higher in East Timor and Irian Jaya. An estimated 100,000
people (15 percent of the population) died in East Timor
between 1974 and 1980 as a result of war, being forced
into villages, disease, and famine. In Irian Jaya, thousands
have been killed and thousands more have fled across the
border to Papua New Guinea, according to local reports.
See “West Papua: Asia or Melanesia? An Interview with Rex
Rumakiek”; and Robin Osborne, “The Flag that Won’t Go
Away.”
51. It is interesting to see that, partly as a result of the policies
of the New Order government of Suharto, which have
sought to balance development in the sociocultural, inter-
action, and economic dimensions in its attempts to build
a “just and prosperous society,” several provinces have
changed their relative status in the country and become
more integrated, from a per-capita perspective. In the in-
teraction dimension particularly, Aceh has been drawn more
closely into the nation-state over the past decade. Despite
its low integration in the economic dimension, it stands out
for its highest rate of recent economic growth and foreign
investment. West Kalimantan also has experienced closer
integrative ties, particularly in the sociocultural and inter-
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action dimensions. These two changes are important partly
because of the peripheral locations of these two provinces
and their proximity to Malaysia. Southeast Sulawesi has
also become somewhat more integrated, as evidenced in
its improved ranking on one of each of the interaction and
economic factor scores. (See Christine Drake, “The Spatial
Pattern of National Integration in Indonesia,” p. 485.) By
contrast, between 1971 and 1980 at least, West and espe-
cially East Nusatenggara have slipped even further in their
status as least integrated and developed of all the provinces
in the country, while the gap between them and the most
highly developed and integrated provinces on many indices
has widened. Bengkulu also declined in its relative level of
integration. The provinces of Java, meanwhile, which stood
out as a much more uniform bloc with common character-
istics in the early 1970s, have become less distinctively dif-
ferent on a per-capita basis.
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Glossary
abangan a Javanese of a heterodox religious
orientation; normally a Muslim who is
greatly influenced by pre-Islamic Hindu,
Buddhist, and indigenous animistic beliefs.
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia:
Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
adat localized traditional law and custom; one of
the major strands of contemporary
Indonesian law.
agama religion.
Akabri Akademi ABRI: Indonesian Armed Forces
Academy in Magelang (Central Java).
ani-ani single-bladed knife traditionally used for
cutting rice stalks.
armada fleet; armada khusus: special fleet; armada
lokal: local fleet; armada Nusantara:
archipelago fleet; armada perintis: pioneer
fleet; armada rakyat: people’s fleet, made
up traditionally of wooden sailing vessels,
some of which are now equipped with
outboard motors.
asimilasi assimilation.
Badan Pembina
Kesatuan
Bangsa
Institute for the Advancement of National
Unity.
bahan pokok basic commodity.
bahasa language; bahasa Indonesia: the
Indonesian national language, derived from
Malay; bahasa Melayu pasar: market
Malay.
bangsa nation, a people.
banteng wild buffalo.
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Bappeda Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah:
Regional Development Planning Board.
Operates at the provincial level.
Bappenas Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional: the National Development
Planning Agency, established in 1965,
which has overall responsibility for
economic development plans.
Bhinneka
Tunggal Ika
Unity in Diversity. The motto of the
Republic of Indonesia (Sanskrit).
Biro Pusat
Statistik
Central Bureau of Statistics.
BKK Badan Kredit Kecamatan: subdistrict credit
board.
BPKI Badan Penyelidikan Kemerdekaan
Indonesia: the Committee for the
Investigation of Independence for
Indonesia, formed in May 1945, where
Sukarno proposed the Panca Sila.
Budi Utomo Glorious Endeavor Society. An early
nationalist organization, founded in 1908.
bupati district head. Chief officer of a kabupaten.
cukong Chinese businessman. A term used to refer
particularly to those Chinese businessmen
in collaboration with leading figures in the
state bureaucracy or military.
Cultuurstelsel Cultivation System, instituted by the Dutch,
lasting from 1830 to 1860, in which the
natives were compelled to use part of their
land to grow crops in demand on the
European market.
daerah territory, region, environs, vicinity, area.
daerah-daerah
lemah
economically weak or isolated areas.
dakwah Muslim missionary activity.
Demokrasi
terpimpin
Guided Democracy. The type of government
exercised under Sukarno from 1957 to
1965.
desa village.
Dewan
Pertimbangan
Agung
Advisory Council of State.
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DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: House of
People’s Representatives. One of the two
representative bodies provided for in the
Constitution of 1945. Cf. MPR.
dukun shaman, traditional healer, magician,
fortune-teller, or sorcerer.
Ekonomi
terpimpin
Guided Economy.
Fretilin Frente Revolucionaria do Timor-Leste
Independente: Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor. A guerrilla
movement seeking the independence of
East Timor.
Garis-garis
Besar Haluan
Negara
Broad Outlines of State Policy.
garuda eagle, mystical bird, carrier of the god
Vishnu; incorporated into the official seal of
the Republic of Indonesia.
Gapi Gabungan Politik Indonesia: the Union of
Indonesian Political Associations.
Gestapu Gerakan September Tigapuluh: September
30 Movement. Refers to the abortive
pro-Communist coup of 1965 and, by
inference, to the bloodshed that followed.
Golkar Golongan Karya: Union of Functional
Groups. Groupings within society, such as
peasants, workers, and women, that are
represented by delegates to the various
deliberative bodies. Golkar functions as an
army-instituted and government-supported
political party, winning over 60 percent of
the vote in each of the elections held
during the Suharto era.
gotong royong mutual cooperation, mutual aid; the
customary practices of labor and produce
exchange as they exist particularly in the
Javanese peasant village (based on the
hard-headed calculation of expected
reciprocity).
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Guided
Democracy
political system of the period 1957–1965 in
which the focal point of political power
shifted to the president and the DPR was
transformed into a nominated body of
representatives of “functional” groups.
Guided
Economy
economic policy in the period 1959–1965
that emphasized state direction of the
economy, state ownership of capital, and
economic self-sufficiency.
haji one who has made the pilgrimage to
Mecca; a title prefixing the name of the
haji, commanding great respect among
santri.
hajj the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, expected
of every devout Muslim having the means
to do so as one of the Five Pillars of Islam.
hukum nasional national law.
hutan forest, woods, jungle.
IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia.
An informal association of Western and
Japanese governmental lending agencies
together with international development
agencies such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and the
United Nations Development Program,
established in 1967 to aid Indonesia’s
recovery and development. The IGGI
included, in order of their total outstanding
loan commitments at the end of 1980:
Japan, the United States, the World Bank,
West Germany, the Netherlands, France,
the Asian Development Bank, Canada,
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
Italy, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand,
and Austria. For contributing countries for
fiscal year 1984–1985 see note 14 in
chapter 5.
Indess Indonesian Distance Education Satellite
System.
Indische
Vereeniging
the Indies Association, formed by
Indonesian students in the Netherlands,
originally promoting the common interests
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of Indonesian students in the mother
country, but later becoming involved in
Indonesian politics and nationalism.
indoktrinasi indoctrination.
Indonesische
Vereeniging
the Indonesian Association, founded in
1922, which pioneered the Indonesian
independence movement in Europe. In
1925 it adopted the Indonesian form of its
title‚ Perhimpunan Indonesia.
Inpres Instruksi Presiden: presidential instruction.
Program financed through special
presidential instructions or authorization
for infrastructural works at the local level.
kabupaten regency in the colonial administration,
district since independence; the
administrative division below the propinsi
(province), corresponding approximately to
a county in the United States.
Kalimat
Syahadat
the credo of Islam, consisting of the
statement, “I testify that there is no God
but Allah, and Muhammed is his prophet.”
The only ineluctable requirement of Islam.
kampung village or part of a village; the
administrative ward of a city; a
neighborhood in a city, often inhabited by
migrant villagers, especially one inhabited
by the lower classes.
kapal putih literally “white ships”; ships used by the
Dutch colonial government for
administrative purposes on noneconomic
routes.
kebatinan mysticism.
kecamatan subdistrict; the administrative division
below the kabupaten (regency or district).
kepercayaan belief; kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan yang
Maha Esa: belief in the One Supreme
Being, the first principle of the Panca Sila.
Keppres Keputusan Presiden: presidential decree.
kepribadian individuality, personality, identity.
Kepribadian Indonesia: Indonesian identity.
kerudung veil.
kerukunan social harmony.
kharisma term used to refer to the Muslim Sunday
lectures.
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komunisme communism.
Konfrontasi Indonesian hostile confrontation against
the formation of Malaysia, involving
military action mostly along the eastern
Malaysian borders from 1963 through
1965.
Kopkamtib Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan
dan Ketertiban: Operational Command for
the Restoration of Security and Order; the
very powerful military agency for domestic
security and intelligence created as a
national security organization in the wake
of the abortive communist coup of 1965.
kota city.
kotamadya municipality or city district; on the same
administrative level as the kabupaten.
Kowilhan Komando Wilayah Pertahanan: Regional
Defense Command.
K.P.M. Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (the
Royal Package Transport Company); the
Dutch interisland shipping company,
formed in 1891, withdrawn from Indonesia
in 1957.
kraton palace, court (of a Javanese ruler).
KUD Koperasi Unit Desa: village cooperative.
ladang unirrigated field. Generally associated with
swidden cultivation in Indonesia and to be
found almost entirely in the Outer Islands.
See swidden, sawah.
LSD Lembaga Sosial Desa: village social
association(s).
Majapahit the empire founded in 1293 on the eastern
part of Java’s north coast, expanded under
Gajah Mada to include much of present-day
Indonesia, dissolved in the early sixteenth
century when the courtiers fled to the
interior of Java and to Bali.
Manipol
USDEK
Manifesto Politik; the Political Manifesto of
the Republic, as propounded by Sukarno on
Independence Day, 1959. It consisted of
five ideas: Undang-undang dasar 1945, the
1945 Constitution; Sosialisme Indonesia,
socialism à la Indonesia; Demokrasi
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terpimpin, Guided Democracy; Ekon omi
terpimpin, Guided Economy; Kepribadian
Indonesia, Indonesian identity.
merantau the circular migration pattern of the
Minangkabau men (possibly to gain
freedom from a matriarchal society), often
to Jakarta but always implying a return to
their homeland.
merdeka free, independent; kemerdekaan: freedom,
independence.
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: People’s
Consultative Assembly. One of the two
representative bodies provided for in the
Constitution of 1945. Cf. DPR.
mufakat consensus; an agreement achieved by the
process of musyawarah.
musyawarah discussion; search for a consensus through
compromise and synthesis and the
reconciling of opposing views.
Nasakom the national front formed in 1961, based on
nasionalisme, agama, and komunisme:
nationalism, religion, and communism.
negara state.
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, the thirteen-member oil cartel,
the majority of which are Muslim countries.
The great rise in petroleum prices after
1973 focused enormous wealth in the
OPEC Muslim world. Indonesia, as a
member of the cartel, has benefited from
the increased economic and political power
also experienced in the other Muslim
countries of OPEC.
orang
Indonesia asli
native Indonesian(s).
Orde Baru New Order; term used by the Suharto
regime for post-Sukarno policies based on
realistic thinking and opposed to the
personality cult and alleged lack of
constitutionality of the Sukarno regime.
Orde Lama Old Order; term used by the Suharto
regime to refer to the policies of the
Sukarno era.
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Palapa Indonesia’s domestic satellite
communications system, first launched in
July 1976. Palapa also has symbolic
meaning, because Gajah Mada, Prime
Minister of the famous Majapahit kingdom,
swore not to eat palapa (a cake made of
coconut and palm sugar) until Indonesia
was united.
pamong praja civil service; regional administrators
appointed by the central government.
Panca Sila the five principles of the Indonesian State;
the basic official ideology enunciated by
Sukarno and incorporated in the preamble
to the 1945 Constitution. The five
principles are belief in One Supreme Being,
just and civilized humanity, nationalism,
democracy, and social justice.
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia: Indonesian
Democratic Party.
peci the small black velvet cap, originally a sign
of Islam, but now worn as the national
headdress by most Indonesian men.
Pedoman
Penghayatan
dan
Pengamalan
Panca Sila
guide to the comprehension and practice of
Panca Sila.
Pelnas Persatuan Pengusaha Pelayaran Niaga
Swasta: Union of owners of private trading
vessels.
Pelni Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia: National
Shipping Company.
pembangunan development, construction.
pemerataan equality.
pemerintah government.
pengadilan
negeri
court of the first instance (secular).
pengadilan
tinggi
court of the second instance (appeals).
Pepelra Persatuan Pengusaha Pelayaran Rakyat:
Union of People’s Shipping Employers. An
organization founded in 1971 to serve as a
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unifying force and communication channel
for perahu shipping owners (with the
government).
perahu sailing vessel, important especially in
eastern Indonesia.
peranakan Indonesia-born Chinese, often of mixed
ancestry, who speak a non-Chinese
language by preference, and who have
adopted some Indonesian customs and
attitudes. The term derived from
Peranakan Tionghoa (Chinese children of
the Indies). See totok.
Perhimpunan
Indonesia
Indonesian Association, a nationalist youth
organization of Indonesian students in the
Netherlands that promoted independence
for the archipelago and advised Indonesian
nationalists in Indonesia on tactics.
Permesta Perjuangan Semesta Alam: Total Struggle
(of the Republic of Indonesia’s
Revolutionary Government); the most
serious regional rebellion against the
Sukarno administration, by people in West
Sumatra and North Sulawesi, 1958–1961.
Perserikatan
Komunis
Indonesia
the Indonesian Communist Union.
Pertamina Perusahaan Negara Pertambangan Minyak
dan Gas Bumi Na sional: the National
Petroleum and Natural Gas Company
(state-owned).
Perumtel the state-owned telephone utility.
Peta Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air: Voluntary
Defenders of the Homeland. A volunteer
army established by the Japanese in 1943.
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia: the Indonesian
Communist Party.
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia: the Indonesian
Nationalist Party.
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan:
Development Unity Party.
pribumi indigenous Indonesian.
priyayi the entire complex of strongly Hinduized
aesthetic canons and theology forms; the
priyayi variant of the Javanese religion. The
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term priyayi originally referred to the
gentry way of life (i.e., the courtiers and
officials of the king), but now it implies the
whole set of attitudes and moral
commitments adhered to by nearly every
white-collar Javanese, whatever his social
origin.
propinsi province(s). There are twenty-four true
provinces (pro pinsi), two special
autonomous regions (Daerah Istimewa) of
Aceh and Yogyakarta, and the special
capital district of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus
Istimewa). In this book the term province is
used for all three types.
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik
Indonesia: Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed in
1958.
Radio Republik
Indonesia
the national radio of the Republic of
Indonesia.
rakyat ordinary people.
Repelita Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun:
Five-Year Development Plan. Repelita I: the
first Five-Year Development Plan,
1969–1974; Repelita II: the second,
1974–1979; Repelita III: the third,
1979–1984; Repelita IV: the fourth,
1984–1989.
RGDP regional gross domestic product.
rukun tetangga neighborhood association, the smallest
administrative unit in the Indonesian
system of government.
rupiah (Rp) basic monetary unit of Indonesia. From
1971 to 1978 Indonesia maintained an
exchange rate of Rp 415 to the U.S. dollar.
In November 1978 the rupiah was devalued
to an exchange rate of Rp 625 to the U.S.
dollar. The rate floated slightly to Rp 670 in
1982–1983. It was devalued again in March
1983 to Rp 970 to the U.S. dollar and has
floated since. In March 1985 the exchange
rate was Rp 1,100 to the U.S. dollar.
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santri a devotee of a strongly Muslim and rather
Arab style of life. The santri is faithful to
the Five Pillars of Islam: repeating the
basic creed (the Kalimat Syahadat), giving
alms, praying five times a day, fasting
during the month of Ramadan, and making
the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) if health and
finances permit. Used collectively, this term
applies also to the group of those having
these characteristics.
Sarekat Islam the Islamic Union, which grew out of the
Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trading
Union), founded in 1911 to strengthen
Indonesian batik manufacturers in Solo
(Surakarta) against Chinese competition.
The appeal of Sare kat Islam to the
religious bond between fellow Indonesians
was one of the first overt expressions of
early nationalist feeling. Its aims were
fourfold: promoting a commercial spirit
among Muslims, mutual assistance to
members, encouraging spiritual
development and general welfare, and
opposition to misunderstanding about
Islam.
sawah irrigated rice field; the method of
cultivating rice on irrigated land.
sosialisme socialism.
statistik statistics.
Subsidi Daerah
Otonomi
autonomous region subsidy.
suku a tribal, or subtribal or ethnic group.
sukubangsa ethnic group or tribe.
Susenas Survey Sosioekonomi Nasional: national
socioeconomic survey.
swidden shifting or slash-and-burn cultivation, in
which fields are cleared, farmed for one or
more years, and then allowed to return to
bush for fallowing, usually to be
recultivated at a later time.
Glossary
323
Syariat Islamic law based on scholarly
interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith
(codified Islamic tradition consisting of the
sayings and actions of Muhammed as
related by those who knew him personally).
tempo time; also the name of a weekly magazine
similar to Time magazine in the United
States.
toleransi tolerance.
tonari gumi neighborhood associations organized by
the Japanese during their occupation of
Indonesia, 1942–1945.
totok ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, either
China-born or China-oriented, who speak a
Chinese language by preference. See
peranakan.
transmigrasi transmigration. Government rural
resettlement program that seeks to
relocate large numbers of Javanese (and
some from Bali and Nusatenggara) from
overpopulated areas to areas of sparse
population in the Outer Islands.
Undang-undang
dasar 1945
Constitution of 1945.
Universitas
Terbuka
Open University, established in 1984.
Volksraad People’s Council. A body created in 1918,
composed of both elected and appointed
members to advise the governor-general
and apprise him of public opinion. Although
it had no real political power, it did serve as
a forum for the more moderate of
politically active Indonesians in the 1920s
and 1930s.
wayang shadow puppet; Javanese shadow puppet
show; any theatrical production based
traditionally on the Hindu epics and other
traditional literature. Wayang kulit: shadow
puppet play with leather puppets. Wayang
orang (wong): Javanese stage show featuring
human dancers; puppets are replaced by live
actors whose acting and dancing are
formalized in imitation of the puppets.
zakat religious tax.
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